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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the historical development, from the interwar years to 2015, of 
large-scale refugee resettlement to Canada -- or what in recent years has come to be known as 
the “Group Processing Program”. Beyond various discussions of the humanitarian and foreign 
policy dynamics of such programs, there has been little scholarly attention to the ways in which 
large-scale resettlement of refugee groupings operate. The dissertation aims to fill this scholarly 
gap by asking: how are such resettlement decisions made? What criteria are used in deciding 
which groupings of refugees are selected for resettlement in Canada? To answer these questions, 
the dissertation relies on a mixture of archival research, document analysis, and interviews with 
key UNHCR and Canadian government officials. In addition, it examines Canadian practices in a 
comparative context, with particular attention to the equivalent program in the United States, the 
Priority-2 Group Referral, as well as the UNHCR’s group methodology approach.   
Group resettlement decisions are typically framed in humanitarian language and 
Canadian officials have long been uneasy with discussing the exclusion, or even the assessment, 
of refugee groupings. Secrecy is thus integral to the decision-making process. The dissertation 
examines this secrecy as well as unease in relation to biopolitical practices whereby officials sort 
what they view as homogeneous and vulnerable grouping of refugees with clear boundaries from 
heterogeneous, messy, porous, and risky ones. At work in group resettlement programs are risk 
management techniques that examine the risk, health, settlement potential, and admissibility of 
groupings of refugees. Group processing decisions rely on the biopolitical management of 
refugees, whether in camps or elsewhere, making them visible, ordering refugees, and permitting 
the carving out of groups of refugees.  
The dissertation begins to address the absence of discussion in the literature over how 
resettlement decisions are made.  In doing so, it provides an opportunity to critically reflect on 
how biopolitics, risk management techniques, and border practices are employed in the crafting 
and sorting of groupings of refugees for resettlement.  
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Introduction  
Contemporary refugee resettlement schemes are, by their very nature, highly selective 
and this is especially pronounced when it comes to settling refugees in groups. Of the many 
groupings of refugees identified by the UNHCR as being in need of resettlement, only a few are 
selected by the small number of countries that have these programs, such as Canada, the United 
States, and Australia. What is the nature of the selection process? Why -- and how -- are some 
groupings of refugees chosen over others?   To answer these questions, in this dissertation I draw 
on a mixture of archival research, policy analysis and interviews with key individuals in the 
Canadian government and the UNHCR.   
Whereas most refugee selection and resettlement processes are individualizing,
1
 group 
resettlement really is about the “group” -- or, more precisely, the process of grouping. With 
group resettlement, officials attempt to determine or gage the quality and degree of groupness. 
They worry about fluid and messy groupings. Officials do not take the boundaries of refugee 
“groups” presented to them -- whether by NGOs or the refugees themselves -- for granted. 
Rather, they examine the firmness of boundaries and commonalities of individual members of 
groupings, sorting what are perceived as vulnerable and self-contained groupings from 
seemingly messy and tainted ones. In the case of the latter, this might include groupings made up 
of people believed to be rebels, terrorists, subversives, or individuals considered imposters.  
Refugees are subjected to multiple types of border practices under group resettlement, 
from risk management practices that operate remotely to biopolitical practices in camps based on 
ideals of homogeneity, order, and visibility. The dissertation aims to contribute to the dynamic 
                                                     
1
 A quick perusal of the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook demonstrates this point. UNHCR, Resettlement 
Handbook, (Geneva: UNHCR, November, 2011). http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.html  
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scholarship in critical border studies by examining how borders operate in overseas resettlement 
programs. It draws attention to how the border intersects with the bureaucratic construction of 
collective narratives by the UNHCR and through the reification of refugee “groups.” 
My focus on group resettlement schemes provides an opportunity to consider the 
complex practices surrounding the grouping of refugees by governments. On the one hand, 
government officials are extremely reluctant to publicly discuss such practices. Officials are 
uneasy with the practice of selecting groupings of refugees for resettlement; there is always the 
concern that they will be accused of discriminating against one grouping in favour of another.  I 
draw attention to those moments in which state officials are uneasy with such grouping and 
selection of refugees. I consider the various contexts in which this unease manifests itself, 
revealing the particular form that it takes, whether it is the government’s fear that it will be 
accused of discrimination or the perception that the grouping of refugees presents additional 
security concerns. Besides government officials, NGO and refugee advocates have reservations 
when it comes to the grouped selection of refugees. NGOs have long questioned the Canadian 
government’s varying responses to the resettlement of Hungarian refugees in 1956,  Ugandan 
Asian refugees in 1972, Chilean refugees in 1973, and Indochinese refugees in the late 1970s.
 
 
Since the 1970s the Canadian government has been increasingly sensitive to these sorts of 
criticisms. The unease that surrounds group resettlement leads to considerable secrecy and the 
dissertation illustrates how the Canadian government conceals what it perceives as the more 
contentious elements of the selection process. I demonstrate how secrecy operates in official 
discourses and biopolitical selection practices under Canada’s group processing and the US’s 
Priority 2 (P-2) group referral program. On the other hand, government officials wish to 
publicize the selection of groupings of refugees already approved for group processing. 
3 
 
 
Moreover, the grouping of refugees affords governments more leeway to consider the health, 
integration potential, and security risk of refugees under consideration for resettlement. I 
demonstrate how the carving out of groupings of refugees allows the Canadian government to 
circumvent legislation such as IRPA as well as UNHCR priorities which require that 
resettlement decisions be based on protection concerns and needs.  
The seemingly mundane bureaucratic rationales employed within official discourses can 
give the appearance that group resettlement programs are merely designed to create efficiencies 
in the selection of groupings of refugees that are genuinely in need of protection. This 
dissertation suggests otherwise. Group resettlement decisions enlist a broad range of actors and 
institutions from the UNHCR, International Organization of Migration (IOM), Canadian Border 
Services Agency (CBSA), and Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT), to the US 
State Department and Department of Homeland Security. I highlight the network of actors, 
techniques, forums, and expertise that are enlisted in the mapping, profiling, assessment, and 
selection of groupings of refugees.  Rather than bracket resettlement as a rare positive story in an 
otherwise bleak geopolitical situation for refugees, I demonstrate that group resettlement 
schemes provide an opportunity to consider unique types of biopolitical and risk management 
practices that sort what are perceived to be risky and heterogeneous groupings of refugees, from 
those deemed internally homogenous and vulnerable. In this way, I begin to peel away the 
secrecy and mystery surrounding group resettlement.  
Literature Review  
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While formal group resettlement programs are relatively new, group-based resettlement 
has a long history.
2
   During the interwar years and immediately following the Second World 
War, resettlement decisions were based on racial preferences, economic needs, and labour 
shortages. Western governments did not make a consistent distinction between refugees and 
immigrants. As the Cold War took hold in the late 1940s, political ideology also began to drive 
resettlement selection.
3
 Throughout this period the assumption was that the resettlement of 
refugees was the preferred durable solution.
4
 For Aleinikoff, resettlement was the “exilic” 
approach to dealing with forced displacement and both he and Chimni chart its decline as 
beginning in the mid-1970s and taking hold in the 1980s.
5
 For Chimni, the move away from 
resettlement towards an emphasis on first voluntary and then later forced repatriation reflected 
the interests of dominant states. From their perspective, the absence of labour shortages meant 
that largescale resettlement was no longer warranted.
6
 In explaining the new emphasis on 
repatriation in the 1990s, Aleinikoff notes:  
 
From a liberal, human rights approach, the fundamental wrong done to refugees was a 
denial of their right to live freely in their home countries. Furthermore, forced exile 
violated the internationally recognized right of citizens to return to their countries of 
origin. From this perspective, resettlement can never be the primary remedy because it 
does not restore this right.
7
 
 
                                                     
2
 See Gerald E. Dirks for an extensive discussion of various groupings of refugees historically selected by the 
Canadian government, including Hungarians, Ugandan Asians, and Indochinese.  Gerald E. Dirks, Canada's refugee 
policy: indifference or opportunism? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977).  
3
 See Reg Whitaker, Double Standards: The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Lester and Orpen 
Denys Ltd, 1987).  
4
 T Alexander Aleinikoff, “State-Centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Containment,” Michigan Journal of 
International Law 120, (1992-93).  
5
 Ibid, 125; B.S. Chimni, “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable 
Solutions to Refugee Problems,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 23, no. 3 (October 2004); “The Geopolitics of Refugee 
Studies: A View from the South,” Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no. 4 (1998).   
6
 Chimni, “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation,” 58.  
7
 Aleinikoff, “State-Centered Refugee Law,” 127.  
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In contexts where the nation state -- or what Malkki calls the “national order of things”8 -- is 
dominant, repatriation has been viewed as the ideal “durable solution” because, following Nyers, 
it restores refugees to statist identities and communities.
9
   
Coinciding with the push towards repatriation in the 1990s was what Aleinikoff refers to 
as “policies of containment”—the imposition of visas, reductions in resettlement, pushbacks, and 
returns. One result of such tactics by Western governments is the growth of what are now 
referred to as “protracted refugee situations” in the Global South. Hyndman explains: 
Asylum has been respatialized, by which I mean that the geopolitical valence of refugees 
has changed since the Cold War, resulting in efforts to assist refugees closer to their 
homes in ‘regions of origin’. This occurred first in the early 1990s through a policy of 
‘preventive protection’ and then in the 2000s through the externalization of asylum.10  
 
The intensification and delocalization of border control practices by Western governments, 
including airline carrier sanctions, the imposition of visas on refugee-producing or hosting 
countries, offshore processing or transit centers, and other measures to deter refugees, play a role 
in exacerbating situations of protracted displacement. The effects of shutting down “legitimate” 
routes for refugees is now on display in media images of “boatloads” of people crossing the 
Mediterranean sea from Libya to Italy, with many of them drowning. 
In this context, one of the goals of contemporary resettlement is to help resolve situations 
of protracted displacement. From the perceptive of the UNHCR, it is “a tangible expression of 
international solidarity and a responsibility sharing mechanism, allowing States to help share 
responsibility for refugee protection, and reduce problems impacting the country of asylum.”11 
                                                     
8
 Liisa H. Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity 
among Scholars and Refugees,” Cultural Anthropology 7, no. 1 (1992). 
9
 Peter Nyers, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
10
 Jennifer Hyndman, “A Refugee Camp Conundrum: Geopolitics, Liberal Democracy, and Protracted Refugee 
Situations,” Refuge 28, no. 2 (2011): 12. 
11
 UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, 3. 
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More strategically, contemporary group resettlement schemes attempt to mitigate the effects of 
state practices of containment, externalization, and pre-emptive border practices noted above. 
Few scholars have paid much attention to overseas refugee selection (or resettlement) in 
the broader Refugee Studies literature. This is true both within Canada
12
 and beyond.
13
 Fewer 
still consider group resettlement.
14
 One of the rare scholars to comment on Canadian group 
processing in a sustained manner is Shauna Labman. Labman suggests “selection seems to focus 
on small, resolvable situations of protraction that garner international attention and agreement,”15 
such as the Bhutanese who she points out are considered desirable in terms of employment skills 
and educational levels. She goes on to say that, 
With the resettlement of groups, considerations of efficiency, lessened expense, and the 
resolution of certain camp populations gets privileged over protection when the focus is 
on the strategic use of resettlement. Ease of management ultimately overrides protection 
concerns.
16
  
 
                                                     
12
 Exceptions include: Jennifer Hyndman, “A Refugee Camp Conundrum”; “Second-Class immigrants or First Class 
Protection? Resettling Refugees to Canada” in Resettled and Included? Employment Integration of Refugees, ed. 
Bevelander, Hagstrom, and Ronnqvist (Malmo: Malmo University, 2009); Shauna Labman, “At Law’s Border: 
Unsettling Refugee Resettlement” (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, December 2012); “Queue the 
Rhetoric: Refugees, Resettlement and Reform,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal 62 (2011); 
“Resettlement’s Renaissance.”  
13
 Exceptions include: Don Barnett, “A New Era of Refugee Resettlement,” Center for Immigration Studies 
(December 2006): 2, URL: http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2006/back1006.pdf; Heidi Boas, “The New 
Face of America’s Refugees: African Refugee Resettlement to the United States,” Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 21 (Spring 2007); John Fredriksson, “Reinvigorating resettlement: changing realities demand changed 
approaches, “Forced Migration Review 13 (2002); David A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions 
Program: Reforms for a New Era of Refugee Resettlement (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Migration 
Policy Institute and the Bertelsman, 2004), http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/36958.htm; Margaret 
Piper AM, Paul Power, Dr. Graham Thom, “Refugee resettlement: 2012 and beyond,” Policy Development and 
Evaluation Service, Research Paper 253,  (Geneva: UNHCR, February 2013); Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Blurring 
Boundaries: Refugee Resettlement in Kampala—between the Formal, the Informal, and the Illegal,” Political and 
Legal Anthropology Review (Polar) 34, no. 1 (2011); “A Legal History: the Emergence of the African Resettlement 
Candidate in International Refugee Management,” International Journal of Refugee Law 22, no. 1 (2010); Joanne 
Van Selm, “The Strategic Use of Resettlement: Changing the Face of Protection?,” Refuge 22 no. 1 (2004); Gary 
Troeller, “UNHCR Resettlement: Evolution and Future Direction,” International Refugee Law 14, no. 1 (2002). 
14
 For Canada’s group processing see: Labman, “At Law’s Border,”; “Resettlement’s Renaissance.” For the US P-2 
group referral program (similar to group processing) see: Boas, “The New Face of America’s Refugees”; Martin, 
The United States Refugee Admissions Program.  
15
 Labman, “At Law’s Border,” 226.  
16
 Ibid, 232.   
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Labman does not provide much elaboration. Instead her argument is that both the former ‘Source 
Country Class’ designation and group processing are intentional maneuvers away from the law 
designed to permit more discretion for the state.
17
 Labman suggests that “group resettlement 
enables Canada to address protracted situations in a strategic manner by removing a large and 
cohesive group from the protraction.”18 She draws attention to the administrative and managerial 
influences on programs such as group processing.
19
 Notwithstanding the contributions of 
Labman, which I find compelling, I approach group resettlement schemes from a different angle, 
with greater attention to how discretion operates under these programs as well as how official 
narratives are employed to frame these practices of selection.   
Beyond Canadian practices, several authors have commented on the United States 
Priority 2 (P-2) group referral program,
20
 which is similar to Canada’s group processing and will 
be discussed throughout this dissertation. These authors point to the US’s desire to select what it 
believes are self-contained and homogenous groupings of refugees, which is of particular interest 
to my analysis of Canada’s group processing program. Commenting on the future of the US’s P-
2 group referral process, Martin argues:  
Resettlement initiatives will be marked by the need to draw clear lines around the group 
to be admitted, so as to minimize fraud and discourage future migration of others who 
might hope to be included in the resettlement. The quest will be for finite groups, and 
resettlement will work best if much solid work on identification and line-drawing can be 
completed before resettlement plans become known in the refugee camp or settlement.
21
 
 
The desire for groupings of refugees with what are perceived as firm boundaries is reflected in 
Heidi Boas’s analysis of the gradual shift towards African resettlement and the types of 
                                                     
17
 Ibid., 228-229 
18
 Ibid, 218.  
19
 Ibid, 232.  
20
 The United States operates a priority system that determines eligibility for resettlement. The referral of groupings 
of refugees by the UNHCR for resettlement occurs under the P-2 category understood as “groups of special 
humanitarian concern.” See Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program, Chapter III.  
21
 Ibid, Chapter one, executive summary, http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/35999.htm  
8 
 
 
groupings of refugees selected under the United States P-2 designation. Boas draws on the 
examples of the resettlement of the Sudanese “lost boys” and Somali “Bantu” to demonstrate that 
this shift cannot be reduced to humanitarian concerns. The end of the Cold War meant that 
resettlement was no longer dominated by the selection of anti-Communist refugees in the US. 
Added to this, the signing of the Comprehensive Plan Action in 1989, something discussed in 
chapter two, reduced the number of Indochinese refugees while the US became increasingly 
involved in African conflicts in places such as Somalia.
22
 In terms of the Somali “Bantu” these 
factors provided an opening in which decision-makers responded to pressures from Christian 
organizations as well as traditional players in the resettlement process such as World Vision and 
the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society. With the Sudanese “lost boys”, Boas argues that they: 
also appealed to refugee advocates and decision-makers because they fit the profile that 
was at the center of U.S. interests at the time. The Lost Boys were a prime example of a 
protracted refugee situation, as they spent their entire adolescence living in a refugee 
camp with no durable solutions available.
23
 
 
Importantly, Boas highlights the fact that they “were also an easily identifiable, discrete group 
that could be processed and resettled relatively quickly.”24 She goes on to explain that the: 
Somali Bantu were an ideal group for P-2 resettlement status because they were 
physically identifiable and because their persecution claims were, in some sense, already 
familiar to the US government. The Somali Bantu share distinct physical features which 
make them easily identifiable, including a kinkier hair texture than dominant-clan Somali 
and a distinctly-shaped nose.
25
 
 
Boas suggests that “during the mid-1990s, the State Department began to focus on finding new 
large, self-contained groups of individuals with persecution claims for P-2 referral, which was 
                                                     
22
 Boas, “The New Face of America’s,” 431-468. 
23
 Ibid, 451-452.  
24
 Ibid; see also Sara L. McKinnon, “Unsettling Resettlement: Problematizing ‘Lost Boys of Sudan’ Resettlement 
and Identity,” Western Journal of Communication 72, no. 4 (2008): 404 
25
 Boas, “The New Face of America’s,” 454.  
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considered easier and more efficient.”26 In the wake of the winding down of large-scale 
resettlement for the Indochinese and former Soviet Union, according to Boas, the US turned to 
P-2 processing for practical purposes.
27
  
In contrast to the work of Martin and Boas, this dissertation analyzes the assumptions 
underpinning the construction of collective narratives associated with purportedly self-contained 
and homogenous groupings of refugees. As such, it is more in line with the work that Catherine 
Besteman has done on the identity of the Somali “Bantu” selected for the United States P-2 
group referral stream. Besteman examines the ethnogenesis of this collective identity 
highlighting the role of bureaucratic mandates, political strategizing, and histories of 
discrimination. She points to “essentialized notions of racial difference” at work in the 
identification and verification practices of the Somali “Bantu” for P-2 processing.28 Besteman’s 
work is helpful in analyzing the UNHCR’s role in creating collective narratives in group profiles 
examined by resettlement states such as Canada.  
The dissertation builds on Besteman’s work by situating the contested construction of 
collective narratives of displacement and vulnerability within the resettlement decision-making 
process. I shed light on the calculations of states in determining the risk, internal sameness, 
firmness of boundaries, and the ease of processing refugee “groups” under consideration for 
resettlement. I trace the emergence for the preference of what are taken to be self-contained and 
finite refugee “groups.”  
Many authors have investigated what motivates resettlement decisions. Most notably in 
the Canadian context, Reg Whitaker has highlighted the Canadian state’s ideological and 
                                                     
26
 Ibid, 446.  
27
 Ibid.   
28
 Catherine Besteman “Translating Race across Time and Space: The Creation of Somali Bantu Ethnicity,” 
Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 19, no. 3 (May 2012), 291,295.  
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political criteria for the selection and exclusion of immigrants and refugees during the Cold War. 
Whitaker points to the secrecy surrounding attempts to limit the number of refugees from the 
Soviet bloc. The rationale behind these measures was the fear of highly trained agents being 
deliberately planted in refugee flows for the purposes of espionage and sabotage.
29
 This is 
similar to the current discourse surrounding the Syrian refugee movement and the concern by 
some politicians and security experts that terrorists might pose as refugees to gain entry into 
Western countries. Cold war politics also influenced determinations of refugee status in the 
United States. Ashutosh and Mountz argue that geopolitical relations were reflected in 
interpretations of the Convention: 
Asylum claimants fleeing communist regimes such as Cuba and Nicaragua had much 
higher rates of acceptance than those fleeing non-communist regimes supported by the 
US government, such as El Salvador and Guatemala.
30
  
 
The grouping of refugees based on Cold War ideology, therefore, cut across the distinction 
between inland and offshore refugee practices, something that this dissertation considers. Boas 
suggests that “beginning in the 1950s, U.S. resettlement shifted along foreign policy and 
ideological lines to focus on resettlement from Communist countries.”31 Boas further identifies 
what motivated US resettlement decisions suggesting that: 
Four main factors have traditionally impacted the U.S. government’s decision to accept 
or deny a particular refugee group for resettlement, and how many refugees to accept 
overall: foreign policy objectives, domestic immigration goals, pressure from interest 
groups, and humanitarian concerns. Each of these factors has historically influenced the 
United States’ decisions regarding refugee admissions to varying degrees, based on the 
particular historical and political context of the time.
32
  
 
                                                     
29
 Whitaker, Double Standards.  
30
 Ishan Ashutosh and Alison Mountz, “The Geopolitics of Migrant Mobility: Tracing State Relations Through 
Refugee Claims, Boats, and Discourses,” Geopolitics 17, no. 2 (2012): 337. 
31
 Boas, “The New Face of America’s,” 435 
32
 Ibid, 438.  
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Similarly, Mathew Gibney argues that US resettlement policy is tied to foreign policy 
considerations and is influenced by lobbying groups.
33
 Foreign policy concerns continue to 
influence US resettlement decisions. Harkins explains that “according to the U.S. Department of 
State, the current U.S. resettlement operations in Thailand are being conducted both as a 
humanitarian response to the displacement situation in Thailand as well as a strategic 
intervention to support the long-term foreign policy goal of a transition to democracy within 
Burma.”34 For Kamal Raj Sigdel, geopolitics has influenced the US government’s differential 
response to Bhutanese and Tibetans refugees in Nepal. Sigdel argues that while the Tibetans 
have been in a protracted situation in Nepal much longer than the Bhutanese, the US did not 
prioritize their resettlement. Sigdel suggests the Tibetan’s political aspirations for independence 
serve the interests of both India and the US to act as a bargaining chip to counterbalance 
undesirable Chinese actions in the region. With the Bhutanese, struggles for repatriation are 
viewed as a risk that could spark regional tensions.
35
 For this reason, the US pushed for large-
scale Bhutanese resettlement. Both the Bhutanese and Karen Burmese were selected for the US 
P-2 group referral and Canada’s group processing.  While these sorts of motivations behind 
resettlement decisions are not the focus in what follows, I do consider those moments when there 
are tensions between foreign policy goals, political priorities, bureaucratic objectives, and 
security concerns under group resettlement schemes. I discuss the issue of motivations behind 
resettlement decisions in more detail in the theoretical section below.  
                                                     
33
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There is plenty of literature on resettlement that is critical of how Western governments 
frame the relationship between offshore refugee selection and inland asylum practices. Labman 
argues that resettlement is used by states to obfuscate their unwillingness to meet their legal 
obligations under the Refugee Convention through a replacement of refugee protection by 
migrant selection.
36
 Casasola points to how Bill C-31, an important precursor to Canada’s new 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001), was sold to the public by presenting 
resettlement initiatives “as a counter to some of the more punitive actions the government 
planned in order to limit access to the refugee determination system in Canada.”37 Hyndman and 
Giles argue that refugees in long term camps and protracted situations are feminized based on 
their location and lack of rights, while refugees on the move are positioned as threatening to the 
security and welfare of Western states. The distinction relates to a sedentary bias that persists in 
spite of the celebration of increased mobility in the present period.
38
  
In this dissertation, I build on these important insights by revealing how biopolitical 
practices produce similar distinctions between “groups” of overseas refugees framed as “real” 
and “deserving.” As such, this dissertation demonstrates that we need to exercise caution in 
interpreting the rhetoric of governments on the relationship between “asylum seekers” and 
overseas refugees in camps. Julien Reid demonstrates this in his critical analysis of the 
biopolitics of the ‘War on Terror’, which draws attention to how official rhetoric can be far 
removed from the actual practices of governing.
39
  The narrative that pits onshore refugees 
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against resettled refugees works to not only justify draconian and exclusionary practices on the 
former, but it also obscures security practices that act on refugees in overseas camps. In the eyes 
of Western governments, resettled refugees are more than just passive recipients of humanitarian 
aid that wait patiently for resettlement. Not all refugee “groups” are seen as deserving of 
Canada’s generosity, yet this fact must be concealed since this would challenge official rhetoric 
that draws a distinction between inland and offshore refugees.  
The critiques of resettlement programs have led to a variety of recommendations for their 
reform. For example, Fredriksson argues that in order to avoid the international refugee 
protection regime becoming completely dependent on the discretionary character of resettlement, 
states need to view resettlement and “asylum” as part and parcel of the same international 
refugee protection regime administrated and overseen by the UNHCR.
40
 Similarly, Troeller 
argues, “resettlement must remain a complement to, and not a substitute for, the right to seek 
asylum.”41 Some of the scholarly recommendations suggest specific areas where resettlement 
practices need improvement. Fredriksson argues for a coherent global system for resettlement 
that has transparent eligibility criteria and is applied consistently.
42
 Troeller emphasizes the need 
for “quality control”, “integrity”, “credibility”, and further harmonization of resettlement criteria 
between states and the UNHCR.
43
 Casasola argues that the Canadian resettlement program needs 
to develop priorities that are in keeping with the protection needs model developed by the 
UNHCR.
44
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In this dissertation, I take a more critical approach. The proposals above aim to lessen 
discretionary power under resettlement and yet this is precisely why states prefer this method in 
dealing with refugees. It is unlikely that they would voluntarily give up this discretion. Attempts 
to further base resettlement decisions on UNHCR priorities ignore how this organization works 
in the interests of states, something I discuss throughout this dissertation. Furthermore, I 
question, and critique, the taken for granted assumption that internally homogenous and self-
contained refugee “groups” exist and can be separated from what are viewed as messy, fluid, and 
tainted “groups.” I draw on critical refugee work in highlighting how sovereign logics based on 
visibility, ordering, grouping, and homogeneity are expressed in group resettlement schemes.  
The brevity of the review above is itself a reflection of the paucity of research on 
contemporary group resettlement schemes. I believe there are several reasons for this. To begin 
with, as noted above, there is considerable secrecy surrounding group resettlement decisions, 
making it difficult to conduct research on this topic. In my interviews and discussions with both 
government officials and NGOs familiar with group resettlement, at times, I encountered the 
perception that programs such as Canada’s group processing are merely a bureaucratic method 
for resettling refugees. In the US and Australia there is virtually no public promotion of group 
resettlement.
45
 Rather, the group method is absorbed into the general resettlement programs of 
these respective countries.
46
 While there is some publicity around the announcement by the 
Government of Canada that a particular grouping of refugees will be selected, there is very little 
attention to the process through which that decision was made. Beyond this, there is an 
understandable focus of the refugee studies literature on the expansion and delocalization of 
border practices, externalization efforts, detention practices, and other facets of inland 
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determinations of “asylum.” In the area resettlement, a substantial portion of the literature 
focuses on the settlement and integration aspects
47
 of this process as opposed to selection 
practices. For example, some authors examine the role of faith-based organizations in helping 
refugees settle into communities.
48
  
This dissertation aims to reduce the gap in the scholarly literature on group resettlement 
(and refugee resettlement selection practices in general) by exploring a complex process that is 
mostly hidden from public and indeed, scholarly view.  
Theoretical Interventions 
Governmentality and Group Resettlement   
Many studies of resettlement examine why particular decisions are made. This leads to a 
focus, as noted above, on the role of foreign policy, domestic lobbying groups, geopolitics, 
political priorities, and other motivations behind resettlement decisions. While these factors 
continue to matter in resettlement decision-making, an exclusive focus on why questions makes it 
difficult to get at the knowledge, expertise, and techniques at work in group resettlement 
programs. Registration, verification, and profiling techniques play an important role in the 
decision-making process under these programs. Studies that consider why resettlement states 
responded positively, for example, to the Bhutanese or Burmese tell us little about the 
bureaucratic methods and rationale of processing these groupings of refugees. Moreover, ‘why’ 
questions presuppose the existence of national, racial, cultural, and ethnic “groups” from which 
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resettlement states can choose. Omitted in the analysis therefore is how states’ craft groupings of 
refugees for resettlement. That being said, this dissertation still considers conventional 
motivations behind group resettlement decisions since an exclusive focus on how questions may 
not capture the broader geopolitical context of decisions. It examines how these motivations both 
intersect with, and sometimes challenge the bureaucratic and security logics under group 
resettlement schemes.  
The emphasis on how questions in the governmentality approach, according to Dean, is 
more than a description of how authority operates; rather it means examining “all that which is 
necessary to a particular regime of practices of governments, the conditions of governing in the 
broadest sense of that word.”49 In this dissertation I examine the various forms of knowledge 
(e.g. biographical, demographic, security, intelligence, etc.) deployed in the practices of selection 
under group resettlement schemes. I consider how this knowledge allows authorities to map 
refugee movements and place refugees into “groups,” “subgroups,” and populations. For Dean, 
an analytics of government “wants to understand how different locales are constituted as 
authoritative and powerful, how different agents are assembled with specific powers, and how 
different domains are constituted as governable and administrable.”50 Census, mapping, 
profiling, and identification practices are connected to the exercising of expertise under group 
resettlement; they play a role in making certain actors and locales such as the UNHCR Working 
Group on Resettlement in Geneva, Switzerland, powerful and authoritative.  
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Drawing on the governmentality approach, I emphasize aspects of governing that usually 
escape state-centric and institutional analysis.
51
 Rose and Miller suggest:  
By means of inscription, reality is made stable, mobile, comparable, combinable. It is 
rendered in a form in which it can be debated and diagnosed. Information in this sense is 
not the outcome of a neutral recording function. It is itself a way of acting upon the real, a 
way of devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in 
question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention.
52
 
 
Hyndman’s analysis of UNHCR operations in Kenya captures the importance of mobile 
inscription devices in governing refugee camps:  
Refugee operations embody a language of arithmetical calculation and therapy that 
transposes particular events and activities in the field into standardized reports, statistics, 
and community development projects suitable for consumption at the UNHCR branch 
office in Nairobi and headquarters in Geneva. Information from a particular location and 
context is standardized and made comparable to reports from other places.
53
  
 
In a similar vein, I point to how census data, identification practices, and profiles attempt to 
capture and standardize specific types of information that are of interest to authorities in places 
such as Ottawa, Washington, and Geneva.  
The governmentality approach has strong affinities with the genealogical method, which 
seeks to denaturalize objects and subjects, identities and practices that we tend to take for 
granted.
54
 One way to achieve this, according to Walters, is through conceptual invention. Rather 
than reiterating official concepts and narratives, he suggests the creation of new concepts that 
still remain close to official ones yet change ‘the angle’ at which fields of activity are 
perceived.
55
 To this end, I draw on statements made by government officials during interviews 
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that are reflective of the logics of certain practices under group resettlement. These statements or 
expressions capture elements of the practices of selection under group resettlement that are not 
readily apparent in official literature and public announcements. 
Unease and Secrecy   
In this study of group resettlement, I consider the unease of officials surrounding the 
management of heterogeneity in camps and the grouping of refugees. I reflect on how those 
elements of group processing viewed as contentious are shrouded in secrecy. Secrecy relates to 
biopolitical practices at work in programs formally based on vulnerability and humanitarianism 
in the contemporary period. Several authors have highlighted how government officials 
mobilize, play, and manage unease.  Most notably, Bigo points to a transversal and transnational 
field of unease management. Within this field, security and intelligence professionals play with, 
or use, the structural unease prevalent in societies that govern themselves according to risk and 
neo-liberal rationalities of rule. The effect of this is to affirm their position of authority to make 
truth claims in relation to a range of threats thereby deflecting attention away from their 
shortcomings.
56
 Hyndman and Mountz’s examination of externalization practices and what they 
call neo-refoulement in the EU and Australia draws on Bigo’s work. They argue that: 
The mobilization of fear to securitize asylum serves a politically powerful resource for 
states that need legitimate grounds for extraordinary measures, such as exclusion from 
their territories by potentially legitimate legal subjects, namely asylum seekers.
57
  
 
Huysmans and Buonfino examine how political framings of insecurity posit linkages between 
terrorism and migration in British parliamentary debates following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
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These debates by political elites in the UK point to both a politics of exception and a politics of 
unease. In terms of the latter, Huysmans and Buonfino explain: “the politics of unease is a more 
continuous and technocratic debate that sustains or challenges the introduction of policing 
technologies for governing a wide range of societal questions.”58 
 I approach the question of fear, insecurity, and unease from a slightly different angle. 
Rather than focus on the mobilization of fears and unease towards specific political and 
governmental objectives, I consider those moments when government officials express 
insecurities and anxieties surrounding the expectation of relatively homogenous and self-
contained groupings. I draw attention to how secrecy operates through the tensions and relations 
of various binaries at work in group resettlement, including: visibility/invisibility, 
homogeneity/heterogeneity, boundaries/disorder, and “groups”/individuals. I also draw on the 
work of authors such Renisa Mawani and Barry Hindess in order to highlight similarities 
between earlier colonial anxieties within colonies, or white settler societies, and the concerns of 
officials under group resettlement schemes to ensure firm boundaries and homogeneity.
59
  
Group Resettlement and Border Practices    
This dissertation draws on the literature related to critical border studies. It investigates 
risk management techniques and biometrics
60
 associated with delocalized border practices.
61
 At 
the same time, an examination of group resettlement schemes provides an opportunity to 
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examine how borders intersect with the bureaucratic and statist construction of collective 
identities. I highlight how the border materializes in biopolitical practices based on groupings. 
Most of the literature on critical border studies focusses on how border practices act on 
individual migrants, travelers, or refugees.
62
 Much of Salter’s work, for instance, concentrates on 
the performative dimension of border examinations or interrogations at airports and other points 
of entry into states.
63
 The focus is on the routinization of exceptional politics and the sovereign 
decision, subjecting migrants and travelers to a confessionary complex.
64
 Salter argues that “the 
state of exception where law and force are indivisible remains the heart of the examination—
even if there are policies, procedures, and risk algorithms that structure the representation of 
those decisions, the interpretation of the claimant’s narrative is entirely discretionary.”65 With 
group resettlement, the sovereign decision is based on a grouping, not an individual. In many 
instances, groupings of refugees are unaware that UNHCR and government authorities are 
considering them for group resettlement. Biopolitical and risk management practices occur 
remotely and are shrouded in secrecy. Moreover, given that groupings of refugees may be crafted 
from wider refugee populations in camps, individual refugees may be unaware that they are 
members of a grouping under consideration. It is not until a refugee camp is selected for group 
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resettlement that the border materializes within this space, crafting a homogenous grouping 
framed as vulnerable, encapsulating it, and policing its boundaries. 
At work in group resettlement schemes are risk management techniques that are 
reflective of Valverde’s and Mopas’s notion of “targeted governance.”66 These techniques 
operate at a distance from camps, testing the “inadmissibility patterns,” settlement and economic 
outcomes, incidences of diseases, biodata, and intelligence information of prospective groupings 
of refugees. They sort what are presumed to be heterogeneous, messy, and risky groupings from 
the homogenous, self-contained, and vulnerable ones. In a context where the need for 
resettlement vastly outstrips the available spaces, the rationale of programs such as Canada’s 
group processing is to strategically target limited resettlement offers. Even in those instances 
where relatively largescale resettlement occurs, as was the case with 5,000 Bhutanese refugees 
resettled in Canada between 2009 and 2012 and over 25, 000 thousand Syrian refugees from late 
2015 through 2016, the reliance on risk management techniques and biometrics along with 
concerns over efficiency in resettlement processing reflects a targeted approach to governing. I 
highlight how governments exclude certain groupings of refugees on the basis that they 
ostensibly do not lend themselves well to expedited processing. They seek groupings they 
anticipate will not require lengthy security assessments. Valverde and Mopas note that the 
prevalence of “targeted governance” does not necessarily mean less governing, since “there are 
always more targets.”67 They point to a continuation of the utopian dream of total governance 
based on risk management techniques.
68
 The ‘targeted’ carving up and encapsulation of what are 
                                                     
66
 Mariana Valverde and Michael Mopas, “Insecurity and the Dream of Targeted Governance” in Global 
Governmentality: Governing International Spaces, ed. William Walters and Wendy Larner (London: Routledge, 
2004). 
67
 Ibid, 248.  
68
 Valverde and Mopas note that in the field of medicine, for instance, “the modesty that speaks about lifelong 
management of one’s own discrete, incurable but manageable health risks coexists with the (often-disavowed) 
22 
 
 
taken to be internally homogenous and finite groupings of refugees relies on practices of 
visibility that map global vulnerability and risk.  
With group resettlement, unelected security, intelligence, and immigration experts 
exercise discretion over which groupings of refugees are included and excluded in group 
resettlement programs. These officials use rules and regulations under legislation such as IRPA 
as tactics aimed at realizing their governmental and biopolitical objectives. In some instances, 
they employ exclusionary elements of this legislation to deny resettlement to groupings of 
refugees considered problematic, whereas in others they suspend or overlook the same 
legislation to allow for the resettlement of groupings viewed as “desirable.” The approval of 
groupings of refugees for group processing requires the Immigration Minister to exempt 
individual members of these groupings from refugee status determinations normally required 
under IRPA.  
 Drawing on Fleur Johns, Mark Salter suggests that the exception at the border is based on 
sovereign decisionism “expressed through a bureaucratic governmentality of discretion.”69 Under 
group resettlement, unelected officials exercise enhanced discretion as the sovereign decision at 
the border is fragmented amongst several institutions and actors, making it difficult to pinpoint. I 
draw attention to how unease and secrecy operate in the exercising of discretion under group 
resettlement. Officials are uneasy in making visible those practices that challenge the formally 
non-discriminatory character of group processing. They emphasize that the outright exclusion of 
refugee “groups” based on ethnicity and nationality does not occur; that individual resettlement 
always remains an option.  
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Grouping, Naming, and Labelling  
Given the focus of this study on the grouping process, I find it useful to engage with 
Rogers Brubaker’s concept of groupism. This is “the tendency to take discrete, sharply 
differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of 
social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.”70 
Brubaker argues that:  
ethnicity, race and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities 
or organisms or collective individuals—as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, 
bounded and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do—but rather in relational, processual, 
dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms.
71
 
 
Brubaker regards moments of extreme cohesiveness and solidarity amongst individuals as 
fleeting and contingent events that can easily dissipate. For this reason, he encourages us to 
consider the degree of what he calls groupness associated with categories, whether these are 
based on nation, race, or ethnicity. In doing so, we highlight the contingency behind the grouping 
process: we problematize the “group(s).” 
 Governments, NGOs involved in group resettlement -- and, indeed, those refugees who 
are being considered for resettlement -- engage in a parallel process of examining and 
problematizing “groups.” Such activity should not be characterized as groupism in any 
straightforward sense, but rather be seen as a variation of it. The officials are assuming “groups” 
but also that some “groups” are more group-like than others. Put another way, they are 
problematizing the idea of “groups” in an instrumental fashion, assessing how porous, risky, 
heterogeneous, homogenous, vulnerable, and risky they are. In contrast to this, Brubaker is 
critiquing the re-performance of groupism by social scientists, especially the assumption that 
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ethnic “groups” are the driving force behind “ethnic conflicts.” Instead, Brubaker prefers to 
examine how conflicts become ethnically or racially framed.  
This dissertation considers the relations between groupism and biopolitics. Government 
officials determine external biopolitical threats by assessing and sorting what are deemed as 
messy and risky groupings of refugees from internally homogenous and vulnerable ones. 
Practices based on vision, mapping, ordering, and drawing boundaries around prospective 
groupings of refugees reflect concerns over internal biopolitical threats to chosen groupings of 
refugees within camps. Authorities consider the potential presence of terrorists and imposters 
within chosen groupings, testing the groupings internal homogeneity, firmness of external 
boundaries, and the ease or difficulty of establishing membership. Moreover, they police the 
boundaries of chosen groupings in refugee camps.      
Given my critical engagement with Brubaker’s notion of groupism, I am highly 
conscientious of the danger of reproducing the various refugee “groups” discussed throughout 
this study. For this reason, in what follows, the use of the term “group” is not taken for granted, 
but rather is based on considerable reflection over how to articulate the group resettlement 
process in a manner that does not presuppose the groupness of refugees. Consider for example 
the formal definitions of the terms grouping and group. According to the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, a group is defined as “a number of individuals assembled together or having some 
unifying relationship”, whereas grouping is “the act or process of combining people or things 
into groups.”72  The former assumes individuals with preexisting commonalities (i.e. “groups”), 
whereas the latter emphasizes the active process through which “groups” are formed in the first 
place. The very label “group resettlement program” presupposes the groupness of those that 
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authorities aim to resettle. In contrast, this dissertation examines the ways in which resettlement 
selection practices operate to produce and reproduce “groups.” I will refrain from using the term 
“group” because I do not want to reinforce the sense that “groups” are there for resettlement 
states and their officials to discover. I want to get at how governments do not just choose 
between preexisting “groups,” but that the processes that they use to choose also serve to 
construct them at the same time.
73
 
In addition to forcing me to steer clear of the unreflective use of the term group in favour 
of the term grouping, the nature of my topic also requires me to navigate any empirical 
discussion of the “groups” and their naming.  This relates to Roger Zetter’s discussion of Greek-
Cypriot refugees and the effects of bureaucratic labels. Zetter highlights how labels shape 
identities, stereotype, and demand conformity from the groupings of refugees that they target in 
exchange for resources or humanitarian assistance.
74
 Within institutional settings, he suggests 
that “labels assume a much more powerful significance. They serve as a linguistic shorthand for 
policies, programmes and bureaucratic requirements - practices which are instrumental in 
categorizing and differentiating between facets of an identity.”75  Melissa Phillips’s critique of 
the label “African-Australian” demonstrates this. She views it as a convenient tool that 
homogenizes and denies diversity. For this reason, she prefers using the term ‘new entrants’ in 
describing the experiences of individuals from Southern Sudan.
76
 Phillips argues that labelling 
practices in the context of resettlement warrant more attention. She suggests that an effort should 
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be made to learn “about pre-arrival experiences and histories of new communities to understand 
their unique diversity.”77 Phillips is also skeptical of the label refugee, arguing that once applied 
it “seems to adhere hard and fast, long after refugees have been displaced and resettled.”78 
Despite this valid concern, my own preference is to use the term ‘refugee’ over ‘asylum seeker’ 
since the latter term is often used by those aiming to deny, or put into doubt, a particular status.  
Catch-all labels that are reductionist omit the heterogeneity, diversity, and fluidity of 
groupings of refugees. Michael Hutt, for instance, notes that the Bhutanese, selected for 
Canada’s group processing, is ethnically diverse. Those that have sought refuge in Nepal are 
sometimes referred to as Lhotshampa or Nepali Bhutanese located in the south of the country. 
Hutt explains that “the Bhutanese commonly make a distinction between the Buddhist ‘Drukpas’ 
of the north and the Nepali-speaking southerners, who are known as Hindu.”79 I will not delve 
too deeply into the origins of violence, intimidation, and ultimately the flight of many Bhutanese 
to Nepal, except to say that labelling played an important role in this, in particular the 1988 
Census in the south by the Bhutanese government.
80
 The narrow definition of citizenship in the 
Census was designed to exclude many Nepali-speaking southerners that were categorized as non-
nationals. As a result, the government stripped many of the Lhotshampa of their citizenship.
81
 
The contentious nature of naming is reflected in a “group profile” (a document that will be 
discussed at great length below) on the Bhutanese refugees prepared for US authorities. 
Commenting on the 1993 verification exercise conducted by representatives of the governments 
of both Bhutan and Nepal, it explains that “the term ‘refugee’ was intentionally avoided in the 
bilateral process. However, Nepal is using the term ‘Bhutanese refugees’ in its various 
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independent reports while Bhutan is using the term ‘people living in the camps in Nepal.’82 The 
group profile highlights the diversity and heterogeneity of the Bhutanese refugees, explaining 
that there are “over 50 ethnic or caste groups.”83 On top of this, Shiva K Dhungana suggests that 
“the Bhutanese refugees in and outside the camps are sharply divided over the issues of TCR 
[Third Country Resettlement], which has been further aggravated by the lack of transparent 
communication by the actors involved in resettling the refugees.”84 The contentious nature of the 
label Bhutanese is reflected in a 2014 report by the Asian and Pacific Islander American 
Scholarship Fund (APIASF). It explains that some refugees in the US see themselves as Nepali 
before Bhutanese. The report quotes Bishnu Subba, president of the Bhutanese Community of 
Akron, Ohio, who explains:  
The elderly population prefers to identify themselves with their ethnic group such as 
Nepali because of the historical and cultural ties that they have with the people of Nepal. 
On the other hand, [the] majority of the so-called 1.5 generation would like to identify 
themselves as Nepali because of the fact that they lived in Nepal all their life before 
arriving to the U.S. Then there is another group, [a] mostly educated and politically 
conscious lot, who prefer to identify themselves simply as Bhutanese, and as Bhutanese 
American once they become the U.S. citizens through naturalization.
85
  
 
The effects of labelling practices are reflected in some of the testimonies of young Bhutanese 
refugees. One person explains: “life in the camps is bad and it’s getting worse. Fifteen years ago 
we were enjoying a happy life in Bhutan. The Bhutanese government evicted us, labelling us 
Nepalese. This was because we spoke Nepali and we wore traditional Nepali dress. In 1990 the 
Government began to persecute us. They burnt and destroyed our house and chased us into the 
                                                     
82
 UNHCR, Group Profile and Proposal Document, Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal for Group Resettlement Referral 
to the United States, submitted June 12,
th 
10, see footnote 44.  
83
 Ibid, 3.  
84
 See Shiva K Dhungana, “Third Country Resettlement and the Bhutanese Refugee Crisis: A Critical Reflection,” 
Refugee Watch 35 (June 2010), 17-19.  
85
 Asian and Pacific Islander American Scholarship Fund (APIASF), Invisible Newcomers, Refugees from 
Burma/Myanmar and Bhutan in the United States. 2014, 33-34.  
28 
 
 
night. I was 2 years old at the time.”86 Another individual argues “I am a Bhutanese girl and I am 
proud of being Bhutanese.”87  
In the case of Burmese refugees, also selected for Canada’s group processing, a UNHCR 
official explained that these refugees get upset if authorities use the label Myanmar. Many 
refugees in Thailand associate it with the Military Junta that persecuted them.
88
 The APIASF 
report discusses the issue of using the Myanmar and Burma labels; it is worth quoting at length:  
The usage of the term “Burma” is consistent with reports released by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security as they track refugees to the United States. We 
recognize the sensitivity that exists regarding the use of the term. We use Burmese 
Americans and Burmese refugees to encompass all refugees with origins in 
Burma/Myanmar with the understanding that there are numerous ethnic groups who 
prefer to be identified by their respective ethnic identity. We are also sensitive to the use 
of the country’s current official name of The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Many 
in the international community use Myanmar because they believe that nations should be 
referred to by the name that they prefer. We are aware of the recent changes in U.S. 
relations with the country and that in its May 15, 2013 statement regarding Myanmar 
President Thein Sein’s visit to the United States, the Obama Administration referred to 
the country as Myanmar, as a courtesy gesture of respect for a government that is 
pursuing a transformative reform agenda.
89
 
 
The statements highlight the tensions between refugees that prefer the label Burmese, or their 
particular ethnic grouping, and many state officials that feel compelled to use the country name 
of Myanmar, especially in the context of international diplomacy. The same report explains: 
In the case of those from Burma, it is evident that opinions vary. Some people refer to 
their ethnic group and those who are from ethnic minority groups tend to not refer to 
themselves as Burmese. According to John Tinpe, “[the] community identifies itself as 
Burmese or from Burma. [As] there are many [ethnic groups] within Burma, each 
[identifies] as their own: Shan, Kachin, Karen, Kaya, Arakan, etc.”90 
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While official statements in Canada use the labels Karen and Burmese,
91
 the UNHCR group 
profile presented to Canadian authorities uses Myanmar.
92
  
In light of these complexities, an important question arises: how do we approach the issue 
of naming (or labelling) without reproducing that which we wish to examine and question?  I 
suggest that there is no perfect answer to this. As Joy Moncrieffe notes in the introduction to the 
edited volume: The Power of Labelling: 
Invariably, we all label ourselves and others to signal different aspects of our identities. 
We may accept some of the labels society assigned to us in childhood (black, white; 
Christian, Muslim; Hutu, Tutsi; poor, non-poor) and reject some or add to them. Labels 
impose boundaries and define categories. They are means to construct our social world; 
to define norms in relation to others who bear similar or different labels. Arguably, 
without labels, social interaction would be costly and cumbersome.
93
  
 
Labelling, therefore, is an inevitable part of social life. This does not mean that we should take 
labels for granted. The authors of the book emphasize the relations of power, unintended 
outcomes, diverse and political motivations surrounding the labelling process.
94
 In a similar vein, 
this study critically interrogates the process of bureaucratic and statist labelling related to the 
grouping of refugees, revealing how it simplifies complexity, omits heterogeneity and fluidity, 
and can be exclusionary. Still, some level of re-performing labelling, naming, and grouping is 
unavoidable when discussing group resettlement practices. In these instances, I do my best to 
approach this issue from the perspective of the refugees themselves, using the names they prefer. 
For instance, I will use the terms Karen and Burmese, but not Myanmar for the reasons noted 
above. Throughout the dissertation I discuss groupings framed along national lines, whether the 
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Hungarians, Ugandan Asians, Baltics, or the Somalis, Congolese, and Afghans. All of these 
labels are problematic as they subsume heterogeneity and diversity, while reinforcing statist 
identities. One solution is to use “scare quotes” every time names and labels are used, but this 
would be cumbersome. Instead, I encourage readers to be cognizant of the fluid, processual, and 
contingent nature of national, ethnic, racial, and bureaucratic categories, labels, and names. 
When encountering these throughout this study envision quotes around them. This will serve as a 
reminder to the reader to avoid taking for granted the labels attached to groupings of refugees 
and to interrogate the active role that authorities play in crafting them.  
Group Resettlement and the Management of Refugee Camps  
An important element of group resettlement decision-making is the management of 
refugee camps selected for these schemes. For this reason, I draw on the work of Turner and 
Hyndman, as well as Malkki.
95
 However, my analysis differs slightly from these works in that its 
focus is on the construction of collective narratives surrounding group resettlement and the 
refugee camp as a site of preparation for resettlement.  While group resettlement practices sort 
the risky from the at-risk, they do not suppress political subjectivities. Rather, collective 
experiences of violence, flight, and in some instances political resistance, are written into 
UNHCR group profiles in ways that serve statist and bureaucratic interests. The construction of 
narratives in these profiles relies on abstraction, simplification, and teleological assumptions. 
Group resettlement practices present a unique set of challenges for critical approaches to 
refugees.Thomson argues that the resettlement selection process, based on individuals, constructs 
the subject positions of doubting experts (i.e. the UNHCR) and deceptive refugees. This in turn 
leads to an emphasis on individual narratives of persecution that are presumed to be verifiable 
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compared to conditions of generalized violence experienced by groupings of refugees. She 
argues that the emphasis on individual experiences of persecution depoliticizes the collective 
experience of violence in refugee situations.
96
 This is similar to Malkki’s argument that 
humanitarian practices that rely on visual evidence of trauma play a role in silencing refugees 
and contributing to their dehistoricization and de-politicization.
97
 This silencing and de-
politicization can be seen when authorities attempt to verify or identify individual members of 
chosen groupings of refugees for resettlement. It is present in the risk management techniques 
that focus on specific types of information related to fraud, security, health, and integration 
potential. However, biopolitical practices based on groupings of refugees articulate common, or 
collective, narratives of persecution. In these instances, the issue becomes one of how these 
narratives are constructed; towards what ends; what is omitted in them? Already mentioned is the 
work of Besteman on the Somali “Bantu” identity. Bram Jansen examines the effects of 
resettlement on refugee camps highlighting how refugee cheating should be viewed as “a form of 
identity politics or impression management in an environment where identity is the main 
determinant of obtaining access to the structure of the refugee regime.”98 Jansen notes that in the 
wake of the Somali “Bantu” group resettlement in Kakuma Kenya, “groups in the camps began 
to organize themselves in order to become eligible for this desirable durable solution. Identity 
became an issue of access to opportunities.”99 I build on this type of research by considering the 
grouping of refugees within the context of resettlement decision-making.  
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Sovereign Power, Biopolitics, and the Governmentalization of Resettlement Decisions 
While this study of group resettlement employs a governmentality approach, it takes 
seriously the exercising of sovereign power. Drawing on Agamben, Nyers explains that 
“sovereignty, based on the relation of the exception, is a violent relation in the sense that it is a 
practice that works to keep things apart, create boundaries, and maintain separateness.”100 For 
this reason, it decides which groupings of refugees are worthy of inclusion in group resettlement 
schemes and which ones are excluded. It imposes boundaries on the spaces of refugee camps, 
attempting to encapsulate and separate what are deemed as vulnerable and therefore “deserving” 
groupings of refugees from the remaining refugees. Sovereign power reproduces the border 
through the examinations of group profiles remotely. The desire for what are presumed to be 
internally homogenous and bounded groupings of refugees reflects sovereign logics. As 
Goldberg argues in his analysis of how the “racial state” operates: “homogeneity is to be viewed 
as heterogeneity in denial, or more deeply yet as the recognition of heterogeneity at once 
repressed.”101 Group resettlement practices reinforce statist political imaginaries, simplify and 
abstract, and order disorder.
102
   
In Society Must be Defended, Foucault considers how the sovereign right to kill functions 
in a biopolitical system aimed at promoting the life of the species. Biopolitics inscribes racism 
into the mechanisms of the state that fragments or subdivides the species into subspecies 
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understood as different races viewed as superior or inferior/threatening.
103
 This form of racism, 
explains Foucault: 
makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other 
that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type 
relationship….the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the 
degenerate, or abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier 
and purer.
104
  
 
When the state functions in the biopolitical mode this form of biological racism justifies 
techniques aimed at eliminating threats, both internal and external to the population, including 
murder, political death, expulsion or rejection.
105
 It is in this manner that a form of power 
designed to promote the life of the species can sometimes kill.  
Many authors have developed Foucault’s notion of biopolitics and biopower. Simon 
Turner, for instance, points to a “caring biopower” at work in refugee camps in Tanzania 
concerned with the life and health of the refugee population. This “caring biopower” aims to de-
politicize refugee camps, separating perceived trouble-makers from innocent victims.
106
 Some 
authors have considered how changing conceptions of biological existence have altered security 
and risk practices. Dillon explains that this existence is now premised on circulation, 
connectivity, complexity and radical contingency.
107
 The notion of catastrophic risk
108
 is based 
on this conception of human existence embedded in what Braun calls a “global economy of 
exchange and circulation.
109
 Cooper argues that “life understood in terms of radical contingency 
is linked to… catastrophic risk, which operates outside the calculative capabilities of traditional 
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risk thinking.”110 She suggests that the speculative act of preemption within the biological world 
has led a fundamental rethinking of US defense policy as it attempts to incorporate the whole of 
life into its strategic vision.
111
 In this dissertation I consider how biopolitics operates through an 
instrumental version of Brubaker’s notion of groupism. I highlight how authorities attempt to 
reproduce an idealized perception of “groups” based on firm boundaries, internal sameness, and 
similar narratives of persecution and displacement. Government officials respond to fluidity, 
contingency, and heterogeneity in refugee camps by producing order, fixity, firm boundaries, and 
homogeneity. Biopolitics act on these spaces, carving out groupings of refugees, encapsulating 
them, and protecting them from threats, whether in the form of imposters, armed bandits, or war 
criminals. I consider how biopolitics operates through risk management techniques based on 
“targeted governance,” abstracting specific types of information of interest to authorities from 
the complex conditions that prevail within refugee camps.  
Methodology  
In studying group resettlement schemes, I rely on document analysis and interviews with key 
individuals within Canada and internationally. The dissertation draws on numerous Canadian 
documents such as the CIC Overseas Processing Manuel, Annual Reports to Parliament on 
Immigration, Reports on Plans and Priorities, and Cabinet documents and notes obtained at the 
Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa.  It also analyzes official UNHCR documents such as the 
Resettlement Handbook, Annual Projected Global Resettlement Needs, Progress Report’s on 
Resettlement, Working Group on Resettlement (WGR) documents, and Group Profile and 
Proposal Documents (GPPDs). I also examine the U.S. Department of State’s Annual Proposed 
Refugee Admissions and Refugee Council USA documents.  
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 While archival research provides useful insights into the historical selection of groupings 
of refugees in Canada, the identification of potential refugee group resettlement candidates, and 
official group resettlement procedures, it reveals less about how decisions are made.  For this 
reason, interviews were conducted with officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
(CIC), the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT), Canadian Border Services Agency 
(CBSA), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Canadian Council for 
Refugees (CCR). A total of 12 interviews were conducted. I also attended several Canadian 
Council for Refugees consultations which yielded important insights into the NGO perspective 
on Canada’s group processing and resettlement in general. Following the formal interviews I had 
regular correspondence with the interviewees, as well as others, regarding unfolding group 
resettlement decisions and changes to group processing.  
It should be noted that while I was able to interview two officials at CIC I did come up 
against considerable resistance from others within the department despite this being the lead 
agency for group processing. In fact, obtaining information on how group resettlement decisions 
are made in general was difficult. One example is that the UNHCR headquarters refused to 
disclose which groupings of refugees had been considered for group resettlement and yet not 
chosen. Officials were either unwilling to share this list or claimed that the organization simply 
does not keep those sorts of records. For these reasons, I had some difficulty in completing the 
table in Appendix A. Despite this, some UNHCR and Canadian government officials provided 
important information that filled some of these gaps. It took some effort to obtain two official 
UNHCR Group Profile and Proposal Documents (GPPDs) (group profiles) on the Bhutanese and 
Burmese, something normally not shared with the public. Some officials were reluctant to share 
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information on state to state meetings. For all of these reasons, obtaining information on 
Canada’s group processing program required an aggressive journalistic and indirect approach.  
While the empirical focus of this dissertation is on Canada’s group processing program, it 
also includes the UNHCR’s group methodology and the US’s P-2 group referral program. This is 
for both empirical and theoretical reasons. There are very few examples of Canada’s group 
processing program (see Table in Appendix A). The interviewing of UNHCR officials involved 
with the US’s P-2 group referrals provided access to many more examples of group resettlement 
while shedding light on Canada’s group processing program given the multilateral character of 
both the Bhutanese and Karen Burmese resettlement initiatives that both Canada and the US 
played a role in.   
Chapter Overview  
 The first chapter provides an historical analysis of the Canadian governments’ response 
to various refugee movements beginning in the 1930s up until the 1970s. It is based on analysis 
of government cabinet documents and discussions during this period obtained from the Library 
and Archives of Canada in Ottawa. The chapter draws attention to various historical factors 
considered by the Canadian government in comparing and contrasting groupings of overseas 
refugees, from racial preferences, economic considerations and integration potential, to cold war 
political motivations. It examines Canada’s response to the post-WWII “displaced persons” 
camps in Europe, the movement of the Hungarians in 1956-7, Tibetans in 1970, Ugandan Asians 
in 1972, Chileans in 1973, and the Indochinese in the late 1970s. The chapter introduces 
important themes discussed throughout the dissertation such as how secrecy and bureaucratic 
rationales influence resettlement decision-making. Historically, the Canadian government has 
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concealed those aspects of resettlement decision-making that it viewed as contentious. Behind 
closed doors, it attempted to balance Cold War political preferences, security concerns, 
integration considerations, and racial preferences in making resettlement decisions. It expressed 
preferences for certain groupings of refugees by relaxing and in some instances suspending 
normal immigration, health, and security requirements.    
 The second chapter begins by tracing the development of Canada’s Indo-Chinese 
Designated Class; a regulatory framework that shares some similarities with contemporary group 
resettlement. I point to how eligibility rules under this framework were loosened or tightened 
depending on the context. The chapter considers how the demise of this framework, and 
largescale Indo-Chinese resettlement in general, played a role in shaping the first examples of 
group resettlement in the 1990s. It draws attention to the Bosnian refugee crisis as a key moment 
that laid the foundation for the UNHCR’s group profiles. The desire for easily identifiable, self-
contained, and homogenous groupings of refugees represented a new factor of consideration in 
the state’s assessments of the ideal grouping of refugees. While the preoccupation with 
visualizing and drawing boundaries around chosen groupings of refugees is formally linked to 
concerns over fraud and security, I argue that it reflects the state’s assumption of, and preference 
for, groupness. Moreover, the drive for internal homogeneity and bounded groupings reaffirms 
sovereignties’ hold on territories and populations, visualizing them, and bordering them.  
  The third chapter is based on several interviews with both UNHCR and Canadian 
Immigration officials. It draws on two official UNHCR Group Profile and Proposal Documents 
(GPPDs) (group profiles) on the Bhutanese and Burmese. The chapter examines how the desire 
for visibility, clear boundaries, and homogeneity under group resettlement influences the spaces 
of refugee camps. It begins by considering UNHCR registration practices highlighting the role 
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they play in helping resettlement states visualize refugee camps and craft groupings of refugees 
under consideration for resettlement. I consider the gaps between the UNHCR’s formal 
procedures for identifying groupings of refugees for resettlement and the actual practices of 
selection. While NGO’s play a role in mapping global vulnerability, a select number of UNHCR 
and government officials is involved in the decision-making process under group resettlement. 
The chapter considers how framings of vulnerability, risk, and commonality are employed in 
UNHCR group profiles. These profiles subdivide groupings of refugees according to these 
categories. In the final part of the chapter I connect the UNHCR’s mapping, registration, and 
profiling to the exercise of expertise away from refugee camps in places such as the UNHCR 
headquarters in Geneva and the protracted refugee situations working group in Ottawa. I show 
how refugee camps targeted for group resettlement are subjected to biopolitical practices based 
on ordering, mapping, and visibility.  
The fourth chapter examines several group resettlement decisions, especially risk 
management techniques linked to “targeted governance” and remote border control.  These 
techniques rely on information related to integration, risk, admissibility, efficiency, and biodata. 
The chapter considers how the testing for groupness under group resettlement is framed by 
gender and essentialist notions of culture. It draws attention to how the multilateral nature of 
largescale group resettlement decisions affords Western governments more latitude to consider 
the health, security risk, and integration potential of groupings of refugees. Concerns over 
integration and security often express hidden cultural and religious preferences. While overt 
forms of racism have been eliminated from resettlement decisions, obsessions over fraud, 
security, and efficiency mask the influence of cultural assumptions and preferences in group 
resettlement schemes.  The final part of the chapter considers how group resettlement programs 
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are part of “targeted governance” aimed at alleviating the perceived security implications of 
“protracted refugee situations.”  
The fifth chapter examines recent changes to Canada’s resettlement program that 
purportedly aim to improve the social and economic outcomes of resettled refugees through the 
limiting of what are referred to as high needs refugees and the restructuring of the entire 
resettlement program from a diffuse global approach towards a more focused approach centered 
on the selection of a few refugee populations over several years. The Canadian government has 
attempted to sell the reforms to refugee advocates by claiming that this approach to resettlement 
would improve settlement outcomes, clear backlogs in the private sponsorship stream, and create 
efficiencies in the overseas processing of refugees based on previous group processing 
experiences.  
At work in the so-called multiyear commitments are biopolitical practices and the 
bureaucratic logic of group processing. Reflecting Valverde’s and Mopas’s concept of “targeted 
governance,” the reforms are based on the use of risk management techniques aimed at 
determining where to focus limited resettlement spaces on refugee populations deemed relatively 
healthy, homogenous, easy to integrate, and easy to process. The chapter also highlights tensions 
between a refugee regime formally based on the individual and the desire of governments to 
carve-out specific groupings from broader refugee movements. In the final part of the chapter I 
consider the Canadian government’s recent largescale resettlement of Syrian refugees. The 
seemingly open and democratic nature of how this resettlement decision unfolded can be 
contrasted with the usual secretive nature of group processing decisions. Despite this, I argue that 
biopolitics operated through both the governments and general public’s unease with the Syrians, 
as a grouping, perceived as risky and messy.   
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The final chapter reflects on the implications of the grouping process at work in group 
resettlement schemes. It considers this process in relation to border practices, risk management 
techniques, unease, secrecy, and sovereign power. I contemplate the possibilities for cultivating 
progressive alternatives to the current makeup of group resettlement schemes.  The chapter 
considers potential future research initiatives that build on and extend the research findings of the 
dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
Chapter One: An Historical Examination of Canada’s Response to Refugee Movements 
from the 1930s to the 1970s 
 
Introduction  
Historically, the Canadian government has selected overseas refugees based on the 
assumption of various national, ethnic, and racial groupings, from “displaced persons” and 
“hard-cores” in the aftermath of World War II, to anti-communist “heroes” such as “the 
Hungarians” during the Cold War. This chapter focusses on the period of the 1930s up to the late 
1970s and the beginning of the Indochinese refugee movement. A variety factors influenced the 
government’s response to overseas refugees during this period, including: integration potential; 
security concerns; Cold War political preferences; racialized preferences; and economic needs. A 
review of Cabinet documents and notes suggests that various governments in Canada expressed 
their preferences for specific categories of refugees by either relaxing or in some cases 
suspending what was considered the normal immigration, health, and security requirements at 
the time. These preferences, and sometimes exclusions, applied to both onshore and offshore 
practices.  
I begin the chapter by considering the government’s response to refugees in the 1930s 
highlighting the racialized and exclusionary nature of immigration policies towards Jewish and 
what the government referred to as “Asiatic Races.”  Notwithstanding Canada’s closed-door 
refugee policy during this period, exceptions were made for Sudeten refugees seen as potential 
farm labours by the immigration departments of the Canadian railroads. The chapter then turns 
its attention to the selection of refugees from Europe following WWII, referred to in official 
correspondence as displaced persons. During this time, the Canadian government categorized 
refugees based on a mixture of racial preferences, economic priorities and Cold War political 
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preferences. The chapter considers its response to East German farm labours, Baltics, female 
domestic workers, and the so-called “hard-core” cases left behind in displaced persons camps in 
Europe. It then reflects on Canada’s positive response to the plight of Hungarian refugees in 
1956. Viewed as anti-communist “heroes” and what were referred to as “excellent types” in 
terms of integration potential, the government relaxed immigration requirements in order to 
expedite the arrival of Hungarians. This positive reaction is contrasted with a lukewarm response 
to Polish Jews fleeing persecution during the same time period. The chapter then considers the 
selection of Tibetan refugees in the early 1970s. Cabinet documents and other official 
correspondence suggest that government officials considered a formal conception of group 
resettlement. While the government decided against this, in practice, immigration officials 
assessed and selected the Tibetans as a grouping. The chapter then examines Canada’s response 
to Chileans fleeing the Pinochet Coup in 1973. During the 1970s the government was put on the 
defense over its responses to the Chileans and other refugee movements such as the Ugandan 
Asians, Hungarians, and Indo-Chinese. Faced with charges of discrimination by NGOs at the 
time, it pursued a public relations campaign that downplayed Cold War strategic preferences and 
security concerns, while emphasizing bureaucratic technicalities in its varying responses to these 
groupings of refugees.  
The 1930s: Racism and the Sudeten Exception   
During the 1930s Canada’s immigration policies and laws were explicitly racist. This has 
been widely discussed. For example, the Canadian Council for Refugees notes that the 1923 
Chinese Immigration Act “prohibited all Chinese immigrants except diplomats, students, 
43 
 
 
children of Canadians and an investor class.”112 In September 1930, Order in Council P.C. 2115 
banned immigration of what it called “Asiatic races”, with few exceptions.113 As Abella 
illustrates, the government also blocked the entry of Christian Armenians, considered an “Asian 
race”, fleeing Turkish persecution both during and after WWI.114  A similar racist logic governed 
Canada’s response to Jewish refugees both prior to and during WWII. As Abella argues, “of the 
more than 800,000 Jews seeking refuge from the Third Reich in the years from 1933 to 1939, 
Canada found room for approximately 4000. In a world which was decidedly inhospitable to 
refugees, Canada was no exception.”115  
In contrast to this, the Canadian government opened its doors to German-speaking 
Sudeten refugees prior to WWII. It delegated authority to the immigration departments of both 
the Canadian Pacific and National Railways in order to resettle these refugees.
116
 Immigration 
officials from the railways were authorized to visit refugee camps in Europe in order to select 
farm families and glassworkers considered suitable for work in Canada.
117
  Newspaper articles at 
the time described the Sudeten as “new day pioneers”, who were self-sufficient and adept at 
tilling the land.
118
 Dirks provides several reasons as to why the Sudeten were permitted to enter 
Canada while most refugees at the time were not. First, the Sudeten had political and financial 
support from the British government and would therefore not cost the Canadian government any 
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money to settle them. Second, most of the German-speaking Sudeten were Roman Catholic, “a 
major distinction from the thousands of Jews who sought entry to Canada.”119  Dirks discusses 
how the authority to select the Sudeten was delegated to the railroads in order to distance the 
government from potential domestic criticism in a climate of unemployment and external 
criticism from Germany.
120
 As will be seen throughout this chapter and the rest of the 
dissertation, the Canadian government has long exercised selective publicity (and secrecy) 
regarding the selection of overseas refugees.  
The Post-WWII Period: “Displaced Person’s” Camps    
Following WWII, countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia selected 
thousands of refugees from camps in Europe. Despite Canada’s attempts during the war to limit 
as much as possible the number of refugees reaching its shores, it simply could not ignore the 
gravity of the situation in Europe following the war. While its acceptance of thousands of 
refugees was framed in humanitarian terms, the primary concern was to select suitable labour for 
its expanding economy. Sandvik explains that the post WWII resettlement schemes were 
strategically linked to the changing conditions of the world economy and its associated labor 
shortage:  
The original resettlement programs were focused on external capabilities. They were 
explicitly designed to ensure the selection of candidates who were suitable (physically 
and mentally fit) for domestic labor markets (which required labor 
intensive/unsafe/strenuous work), and of appropriate nationalities, ethnicities and 
religions, and with acceptable family compositions.
121
  
 
This is reflected in the types of refugees that Canada selected from Europe.  
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In March 1947 Canada’s Minister of Mines and Resources submitted a report to Cabinet 
that encouraged the movement of what was referred to as “group labour” from the displaced 
persons camps in Europe. The report recommended the setting up of an interdepartmental 
committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of Labour and Mines and Resources 
(Immigration Branch).
122
  The makeup of the committee reflected the interest of the government 
to use the selection of refugees in Europe as a de facto immigration program for resource 
expansion in Canada.  It considered the selection and admission of various occupational 
“groups,” which included 1,400 woods workers, 2,000 craftsmen for the clothing industry, and 
2,000 women for domestic work in private homes, hospitals, and similar institutions.
123
 In June 
1947 the Canadian government passed an order-in-council authorizing the entry of an initial 
5,000 non-sponsored displaced persons and sent mobile immigration teams composed of 
immigration, medical, security, and labour officials to Germany and Austria.
124
 Included in the 
teams were representatives of employers to “assist in the selection of group labour in order to 
assure suitability for employment.”125 As Knowles suggests “[the mobile immigration teams] 
resembled itinerant ‘head hunters’, only their mission was to select able-bodied refugees.”126 
The expression “group labour” can be viewed as an institutional category created for the 
purposes of sorting overseas refugees into various groupings based on assumed sets of labour 
skills.
127
 At times, this category intersected with assumptions about gender.  
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This is reflected in the overseas selection of women for domestic work. Upon arrival in 
Canada, the YWCA and Catholic Women’s League provided settlement services to the females, 
including: “basic instruction in citizenship, hygiene and household operation.”128 The 
International Refugee Organization had been created to manage the displaced persons camps on 
behalf of countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United States. Holborn’s largely uncritical 
analysis of the organization nonetheless reveals the gendered assumptions that underpinned the 
large grouped resettlement programs at the time.
129
 She describes how there was an expectation 
that male breadwinners would be willing to leave their families behind to work in countries such 
as Canada.
130
 Selection practices presupposed the existence of a patriarchal system based on the 
male breadwinner. The selection of female refugees for domestic work in Canada reinforced this 
system by presupposing what constituted women’s work outside the patriarchal family.  
During the early post-war period the Canadian government wanted to expand the 
population.
131
 This expansion, however, would be based on immigrants and refugees considered 
the “right fit” for Canada and the government at the time was comfortable in acknowledging this.  
An April 1947 internal memo on immigration policy suggested that:  
With regard to the selection of immigrants, a great deal has been said about 
discrimination. I want to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in 
selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a 
‘fundamental human right’ of any alien to enter Canada.132  
 
By “desirable” this meant predominantly white Europeans.  The government had earlier 
addressed criticism regarding its discriminatory practices and in a similar fashion attempted to 
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justify its racist policies. This was done in a manner that demonstrates the assumption of racial 
and class-based groupings: 
The claim is sometimes made that Canada’s immigration laws reflect class and race 
discrimination: they do, and necessarily so. Some form of discrimination cannot be 
avoided if immigration is to be effectively controlled. In order to prevent the creation in 
Canada of expanding non assimilable racial groups, the prohibiting of entry to 
immigrants of non assimilable races is necessary.
133
  
 
Drawing on Brubaker, it is important to highlight the government’s use of racialized and classist 
categories in its assessment and sorting of overseas refugees and immigrants as opposed to 
reifying the existence of “classes” and “races” as substantial groups or entities. 134  Brubaker 
explains: 
Understanding the reality of race…does not require us to posit the existence of races. 
Racial idioms, ideologies, narratives, categories, and systems of classification, and 
racialized ways of seeing, thinking, talking, and framing claims, are real and 
consequential, especially when they are embedded in powerful organizations. But the 
reality of race—and even its overwhelming coercive power in some settings—does not 
depend on the existence of “races.”135 
 
The government’s selection or non-selection of displaced persons was racially framed. As noted 
by Abella, Canada’s doors remained closed to Jewish refugees after the war, “various schemes 
were devised to bring in displaced persons…but every single one stipulated that no Jews be 
accepted.”136 Rather, Canada preferred the selection of white Baltic refugees (Estonians, 
Latvians, and Lithuanians) along with other Nordic peoples.
137
  
The employment of racial categories cut across the distinction between those that arrived 
in Canada “illegally” and those selected in camps in Europe. It can be seen in the government’s 
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response to the arrival of what were referred to as unauthorized displaced persons from Sweden 
on small boats in 1948-49.
138
  Authorities were concerned that these refugees had not gone 
through prior immigration examination in Sweden nor received a visa before arriving in Canada. 
In order to deal with the issue, then Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent suggested that warnings be 
made to immigrants and the owners of the boats overseas against unauthorized arrivals in 
Canada. The warnings, explained the Prime Minister, “should not be couched in too binding 
terms…..the announcement might leave a possible opening to permit genuine hardship cases to 
be allowed entry without reversing any stated policy of the government.”139 The Prime Minister 
wanted the flexibility to suspend normal immigration requirements for refugees framed as 
desirable types. For example, at a Cabinet meeting in 1948 the Minister of Mines and Resources 
submitted a recommendation to Cabinet to: 
Authorize the admission of an additional group of 145 refugees, principally Baltic, who 
had arrived at Canadian ports from Sweden. These persons had not undergone health 
examination or security screening prior to arrival. However, they represented a desirable 
type of immigrant and the only alternative to their admission was to return them to 
Sweden at government expense.
140
   
 
The Minister based this recommendation on reports received from Officials of the Immigration 
Branch, who argued that: 
The passengers on this vessel, almost without exception, are of a particularly desirable 
type of Baltic immigrant. They include about 40 family units, the balance having come 
forward as individuals. They comprise machinists, fishermen, textile workers, 
electricians, carpenters, dressmakers, etc. The amount of money in their possession totals 
approximately $1, 500 000 and some claim they have funds now being transferred to 
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them in Canada. The Department of Labour is interviewing these aliens and expects that 
placing them in employment will not be too difficult if admission is authorized.
141
   
 
 
This response was in stark contrast to the government’s infamous reaction in June 1938 to 900 
Jews fleeing Nazi persecution. As Abella explains, they were turned away and forced back to 
Europe where many of them ended up killed in Nazi death camps.
142
 The decision to make an 
exception for refugees from the Baltics can be contrasted to other refugees that arrived by boats 
to Canada’s shores during this period, such as the crew and passengers of the S.S. Sarabande, 
which consisted of Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and one Irish person.
143
 In 
this case, the Labour Department argued that the placement of these refugees would entail 
considerable difficultly and that “such placement would likely be slow, necessitating somewhat 
lengthy maintenance in hostels.”144 The same memo that praised refugees from the Baltics for 
being a desirable type argued that “the applicants on this ship [the S.S. Sarabande] are not of the 
same type as those on the ‘Parnu’ [i.e. the Baltics]. It is intended that all the passengers on the 
vessel who cannot comply with existing Immigration regulations be rejected and returned to 
Sweden.”145 Given the prevailing immigration regulations at the time, this meant deporting all of 
the refugees with the exception of the one Irish person. 
Historically, both the Canadian government and general public have viewed the 
unauthorized arrival by boat of refugees and immigrants as threatening. This continues to be the 
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case with the more recent arrivals of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees.
146
 The Canadian government’s 
decision in 1949 to relax immigration requirements and accept refugees from the Baltics arriving 
in this manner represents an important exception. This preference occurred both within Canada 
and in camps in Europe.  
The Early Cold War Period   
As the post-WWII period progressed, Cold War politics increasing influenced Canada’s 
response to refugees and immigrates.
147
 In the late 1940s there were a series of discussions 
between the Cabinet and the RCMP Security Panel over how to resolve the perceived need for 
security screening of immigrants, the reality of increased applications and backlogs, and the need 
to continue to grow Canada’s economy.148 In a cabinet meeting in February 1947 the Minister of 
Mines and Resources circulated a report by the RCMP Security Panel that aimed to “provide a 
solution to the problem which would permit immigration on an increased scale and at the same 
time involve the least element of risk from a security standpoint.”149 The Panel found the current 
system incapable of realizing this objective and therefore considered other solutions. One of 
these was to abandon screening outright. The Panel took issue with this idea pointing to the 
likely presence of least some subversives within immigrant movements coming from the so-
called “Soviet sphere of influence.”150 Another proposal attempted to address this concern by 
suggesting that security screening be concentrated on Eastern European countries. It was 
concluded, however, that the adoption of this approach: 
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would retard immigration from the areas in question, and would involve notifying 
relatives of the consequent delays and reasons therefor. This would, in turn, be 
tantamount to a statement of government policy that immigration from certain specified 
countries would be on a restricted basis.
151
 
 
Whitaker highlights the tensions between politicians and security bureaucrats during the Cold 
War. He argues that from the point of view of the Canadian security establishment, represented 
by the RCMP Security Panel, all immigration represented a threat to national security.
152
 
Politicians such as former Immigration Minister Jack Pickersgill struggled with the Panel to 
admit refugees viewed as anti-Communists in a bid to score pro-Western points in the Cold War 
ideological battle.
153
 Yet, in its early stages, the Security Panel acknowledged the strategic 
interests of the Cabinet to increase immigration. It was also aware, and concerned, that the 
government would face criticism if it concentrated security screening on Eastern Europe.  The 
Security Panel ended up recommending the continuation of:  
the present system of screening, but only to the extent that it would not interfere with the 
entry into Canada of immigrants otherwise acceptable—the question as to who would be 
selected for screening being left to the discretion of the R.C.M.P.
154
  
 
From the Panel’s perspective, this would resolve the issue of maintaining some form of security 
while still increasing immigration levels. The Cabinet decided in favor of the Panel’s 
recommendations and gave the RCMP discretion to apply security screening to individual cases 
that they felt warranted it.   
A year later, the Department of External Affairs, the Immigration Branch, and the RCMP 
considered the admission to Canada of “democratic anti-Communist refugees.”155 Discussions 
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were based on a memo prepared by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, which placed 
refugees into three categories based on their point of origin. This included: 
(a) Those who are in countries which have fallen under Communist domination, e.g., 
Czechoslovakia, and whose lives are in danger; (b) those who are in countries where the 
danger of Communist domination may become imminent, e.g., Greece and Finland; (c) 
those who are in other countries.
156
 
 
The memo (by definition) recommended that applicants in countries under “Communist 
domination” should obtain a visa in the country that they have fled to, the assumption being that 
anti-Communists would not want to been seen entering a Canadian mission in their country nor 
would they be able to leave the country legally.
157
 Applicants in the category “other countries” 
would be dealt with by existing immigration regulations, including security screening, while visa 
applications from those countries where communist control appeared imminent would be 
considered “by a small interdepartmental group consisting of representatives of External Affairs, 
Immigration and the R.C.M.P.”158  
The following year, in 1949, the Cabinet once again considered the application of 
security screening by the Security Panel. This time the RCMP was having problems securing 
information on applicants from Eastern European Countries, Israel, and China. The Security 
Panel made several suggestions to Cabinet, including one that called for “rejecting all 
applications” from these areas.159 This approach was passed over since it did not resolve the 
issue of balancing security concerns with the interest to attract some immigrants and refugees, 
whether for Cold War ideological reasons, the need for certain labour skills, or racial 
preferences. This last factor was reflected in the Panel’s recommendation to Cabinet to allow 
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applicants from eastern European countries and Israel to be considered on their merits at various 
visa-issuing centers in Western Europe, while applicants from China would be rejected, with the 
exception of: 
women with children under 18 years of age not accompanied by an adult male; 
unaccompanied male and female children 18 years of age and under; men over 65 and 
women 60 years of age; priests, clergymen, recognized members of religious bodies.
160
  
  
 
The recommended procedures highlight how security concerns intersected with racial and gender 
categories. The perceived threat of communist “subversives” influenced the state’s 
categorization of overseas refugees and immigrants.  
On the surface, security screening during this early Cold War period appeared to be 
individually based. Cabinet gave the RCMP increased discretionary powers to adjudicate 
between individual cases. Yet, discussions between it and the Security Panel suggest differences 
in security screening in light of different categories of refugees. The application of procedures 
was different for “anti-democratic refugees” inside and outside the “Soviet sphere of influence,” 
and for so-called “Asiatic races.” In short, where a refugee originated from determined the 
security screening practices they faced by the RCMP.  
As the Cold War progressed, economic needs continued to shape the selection of 
overseas refugees. For example, in 1956 the Immigration Minister approached the Cabinet about 
a shortage of farm labour in Ontario. The Minister suggested that there was a steady stream of 
refugees from East Germany coming into West Germany and that from those that applied for 
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immigration into Canada many potential farm labours could be obtained.
161
 In order to speed up 
their processing, the Minister suggested: 
Dispensing with the normal procedures for security screening in West Germany or 
perhaps Austria for about six weeks. No publicity would be given to such an action, of 
course, and the risk of getting planted communist agents in this short period seemed 
rather small. There was no intension of abandoning the screening altogether and all 
persons coming in would be checked later and any undesirables deported.
162
  
 
 
Cabinet conclusions from the meeting reveal that there was concern over the Immigration 
Minister’s proposal. It was suggested that it be checked with those responsible for security 
screening and that it seemed inconsistent to dispense with prior screening for persons from 
communist countries when this was required for countries such as Belgium.
163
 In the end, 
economic considerations trumped these other concerns for the East Germans.
164
 The point was 
raised within discussions that: 
The potential source of immigrants in Europe was drying up. Mining companies were 
sending representatives over to canvas for suitable employees, with the cooperation of 
Canadian immigration offices, but it seemed unlikely that they would have much 
success.
165
  
 
This further demonstrates the confluence of Cold War security concerns and economic needs in 
the selection of overseas refugees in the 1950s. The government chose to conceal from the public 
the decision to relax security screening as this was viewed as a contentious decision.  
  
The “Hard Core”  
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Throughout its operation, the International Refugee Organization ran what were called 
“care and maintenance” programs aimed at preparing displaced persons for potential resettlement 
offers through education, employment and vocational training.
166
 The International Refugee 
Organization developed an extensive system for testing and verifying refugee employment 
skills.
167
 As the organization was winding down its operation in the displaced persons camps it 
faced the problem of what were referred to as “hard core” refugees. These refugees were aged, 
sick or physically disabled, and were viewed by the International Refugee Organization as 
“permanently unfit for resettlement.”168 Few resettlement states were interested in selecting these 
refugees and Canada was no exception. For this reason, those placed in the category of “hard 
core” were amongst the last refugees remaining in the camps in Europe following WWII and the 
International Refugee Organization was desperate to find a solution for them. As Soguk reminds 
us, the main objective of the International Refugee Organization was to “facilitate order in the 
world, and that clearly meant the ‘reestablishment’ of the refugee with a space of particularity, a 
territorial inside, a country of origin, represented and protected by a state.”169 The fact that the 
International Refugee Organization was unable to return these refugees to a specific territorial 
space and identity led to the creation of the category “hard core.” 
Initially, the Canadian government did its best to contain these refugees within Europe 
suggesting that Germany and Austria absorb the remaining ones and by offering financial 
contribution to their upkeep.
170
 Instructions for the Canadian Delegation sent to the International 
Refugee Organization in 1949 recommended that it “should urge the desirability of examining 
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very carefully the extent to which the local economy, chiefly in Germany and Austria, could 
absorb these groups.”171 The delegation was instructed to reject any ‘fair share’ plan that 
“establishes a direct ratio between the number of settlers already taken and the number of hard 
cases allocated.”172 A government memo suggested that since most of the “hard cores” were in 
Germany and Austria, and given that there was already a large refugee population in these 
countries, then: 
It appears to the Canadian Government that the residue of the IRO operations would 
make comparatively little difference to the size of the problem already facing the 
Austrian and German authorities. Providing suitable arrangements can be made, 
therefore, the possibility of transferring the full responsibility for at least some groups of 
refugees to the local authorities should not be over-looked.
173
   
 
The Canadian government had no desire in resettling these refugees viewed as unfit. 
Desperate to resettle the remaining “hard core” refugees, the International Refugee 
Organization continually revised its proposals to resettlement states such as Canada.
174
 In 1951 it 
proposed that Canada allow the admission of 1,000 “hard core cases” with tuberculosis after they 
are cured in Canada. The Cabinet rejected this proposal and put forth an alternative one prepared 
by the Interdepartmental Committee on Immigration. The proposal included setting up an 
immigration team that would interview “hard-core” cases with a view to the selection of workers 
who could be placed or established in Canada and the acceptance of 125 tuberculosis cases, 
which would be selected by a special Immigration team in Europe and allowed entry to Canada 
as non-immigrants for treatment in the Department of National Health and Welfare at Rockhead, 
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Halifax, Nova Scotia.
175
 Even amongst these refugees, the consideration of labour skills guided 
the response of Canadian officials. Desperate to deal with the “hard-core problem,” the Director-
General of the International Refugee Organization agreed to the Interdepartmental Committee’s 
proposals, though they were eventually rejected by Cabinet.
176
 Dirks explains that one factor that 
may have led to this decision was the concern that a new strain of tuberculosis not be introduced 
into Canada. As he concludes, “during the life of the IRO, Canada did not accept any “hard core” 
tubercular refugees although some elderly non- T.B. refugees did arrive between 1949 and 
1952.”177  
The unease of officials surrounding the gaps in knowledge over the potential for a new 
strain of tuberculosis reflects the biopolitical concerns of the government at the time. The “hard 
core,” as a grouping, was viewed as a potential threat to the health and vitality of the Canadian 
population. This is in contrast to those refugees framed as “ideal types” that could be used to 
expand Canada’s resource economy. At the same time, the category “hard core” provides a clear 
example of why it is important to avoid reifying “groups.” Brubaker suggests the term groupness 
to highlight the variability and contingency of moments of extraordinary cohesiveness and 
intensively felt collective solidarity.
178
  Moreover, he proposes treating groupness as an event, as 
something that may or may not invest racial, ethnic, and national categories. The “hard core” was 
a statist and bureaucratic category ascribed to refugees with the assumed commonality of 
deficiencies in ability to settle. It was not based on a sense of collective solidarity and extreme 
cohesiveness amongst these refugees, although this is always a possibility as individuals that face 
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discrimination from an external threat based on their imputed commonalities may band together 
against that threat.
179
 
The 1956 Hungarian Exception  
In 1956 the unsuccessful uprising and subsequent Soviet occupation of Hungary led to 
several hundred thousand refugees fleeing to Yugoslavia and Austria. Various associations, 
organized religious groupings, as well as the press pressured the Canadian government to help 
the Hungarian refugees viewed as “anti-communist freedom fighters.”180 The Canadian 
government ended up accepting over 37,000 Hungarian refugees in a short period of time.
181
 
Dirks points to broad discretionary powers given to the Immigration Minister by the Cabinet in 
selecting the number of Hungarian refugees.
182
 Discussions within Cabinet at the time 
demonstrate the government’s preference for Hungarians. Similar to the earlier Baltic refugees, 
Cabinet was willing to relax the normal immigration requirements for entry to Canada. Among 
the measures taken were: instructing immigration offices that all Hungarian cases be given first 
priority; that no application by a Hungarian was to be turned down on account of any 
technicality; that the ordinary rules of sponsorship would not apply so that a request from 
anybody reasonably able to look after a refugee would be considered and dealt with promptly; 
and that the normal medical examination requirements abroad, including X-rays, be waived, and 
instead undertaken on the arrival of these immigrants in Canada.
183
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Alongside the Cold War strategic value in selecting Hungarian refugees was the 
perception by the Immigration Minister that they would easily integrate into the Canadian 
economy. Cabinet conclusions from the time period suggest that Minister Pickersgill referred to 
the Hungarians as “excellent types, most of whom could start work immediately.”184 In another 
meeting, while describing Hungarians who had escaped to Austria, the Minister remarked that 
“most of those who had come were healthy men, under the age of thirty-five, many of them 
single, and nearly all skilled in one trade or another. Once they learned English or French they 
would be eminently employable.”185  Unlike the loosening of security requirements for East 
German farmers, discussed above, the Canadian government was comfortable publicizing its 
efforts to accommodate the Hungarians.  
Initially, Canada selected Hungarians from Austria. However, in 1957, the Cabinet 
agreed to admit 1,000 Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia and up to 1,500 from Italy.
186
  Cold 
War strategic considerations influenced this decision. The Minister of External Affairs at the 
time felt that the selection of these refugees would send a positive signal to the Yugoslav 
government that had been standing up to the USSR. The belief was that this might influence both 
the Polish and other satellite governments.
187
  A memorandum to Cabinet delves further into the 
government’s reasoning on this matter:  
Yugoslavia’s national communism has, by force of example, had a strong influence on 
the present Polish Government and on the former Hungarian Government of Mr. Nagy in 
their efforts to free themselves from complete domination by Moscow. Marshall Tito has 
not hesitated to grant asylum to refugees from Hungary and has taken an independent 
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stand on the Soviet intervention in Hungary. As a result, friction between Yugoslavia and 
the U.S.S.R has led to the indefinite postponement of $250, 000, 000 in Soviet credits 
which had been promised to Yugoslavia and the virtual collapse of negotiations with the 
U.S.S.R. over economic aid. In these circumstances, Marshal Tito is turning more 
towards the West. Already the Yugoslav Government and press do not understand why 
Western countries have taken more than 120,000 refugees from Austria, while doing little 
to help those in Yugoslavia. A decision by Canada to accept refugees from Yugoslavia 
would therefore be very helpful politically.
188
 
 
The Cabinet agreed with this assessment, but stipulated that the government would prioritize 
those that declared a preference to be resettled in Canada and were agricultural and mine 
workers.
189
 Thus, even within chosen groupings of refugees the government carved out what it 
perceived as desirable subgroups.   
The Canadian government’s positive response to the Hungarians can be contrasted with 
its lukewarm and hesitant response to Polish Jews. During the Hungarian refugee crisis Minister 
Pickersgill had been approached about expanding the admissible classes in order to accept some 
Polish Jews. The Cabinet was well aware of the continued discrimination against Jews in Poland 
after WWII, concluding that “there had always been anti-Jewish feeling in Poland and the 
government there appeared to be trying to overcome this by getting rid of as many as possible of 
the Jewish population.”190  Despite this, Immigration Minister Pickersgill argued that:   
he could not consider doing anything for Jews alone, but thought it might be possible to 
extend the permissible categories to include brothers or sisters of Canadian citizens if 
they were satisfactorily sponsored financially and were recommended by the Canadian 
Polish Congress, the Canadian Jewish Congress or the Ukrainian—Canadian Committee, 
all of whom were strongly anti-communist. These persons would pay their passage and 
there would be less than 500 altogether. He would propose to make no announcement.
191
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The Minster’s statements suggest that being a Polish Jew escaping anti-Semitism was not 
enough; one also had to be associated with a strongly anti-communist organization while 
possessing the means to come to Canada. In contrast to the Hungarians, there would be no public 
announcement or suspension of normal immigration procedures.  
The large-scale selection of Hungarian refugees to Canada represents an instance where 
public pressure, geo-political, and economic interests came together to make this an ideal 
grouping of refugees to resettle from the government’s perspective.  
The Resettlement of the Tibetans: “An Experimental Program”  
Following the annexation of Tibet by China in the 1950s many Tibetans fled to India.
192
  
Shortly after this the Dalai Lama asked both Canada and Switzerland to accept Tibetan refugees. 
While Switzerland agreed, Canada declined. The former High Commissioner to India, James 
George, noted that Immigration officials had concerns over the purportedly nomadic nature of 
the Tibetans, arguing that there was no immigration category for them.
193
  George would end up 
being a key figure in Canada’s eventual acceptance of the Tibetans, convincing former Prime 
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau to influence immigration officials to be more open to their 
resettlement.
194
   
The government’s acceptance of the Tibetans was guided by concerns over nomads as 
well as settlement potential. In 1966 the UNHCR attempted to persuade Canadian officials to 
settle the Tibetans as a grouping, the hope being that this would help meet their spiritual and 
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cultural needs.
195
 The following year an interdepartmental committee was formed by the 
Canadian government to consider the plight of Tibetan refugees. According to a report in 1975 
by the Department of Manpower and Immigration that reviewed the Canadian resettlement 
program for the Tibetans, the interdepartmental committee “ruled out the idea of group 
settlement as contrary to immigration policy. It felt that this form of settlement would hinder the 
permanent integration of the Tibetans into the life of the country.”196 This line of reasoning is in 
contrast to contemporary group processing, which emphasizes that settling groupings of refugees 
in the same community “improves the chance that the refugees will integrate into Canadian 
society.”197 A Memorandum to Cabinet explains the government’s reasoning for initially turning 
down the request:  
In December 1968, the Prime Minister advised the Dalai Lama that every possible avenue 
for the movement and settlement of Tibetan refugees as a group had been explored and 
the conclusion had been reached that settlement as a self-contained group would not be 
practicable. The Prime Minister said, however, that the migration of Tibetans on an 
individual or family basis would be acceptable and viewed sympathetically.
198
  
 
While the government refused to formally recognize the Tibetans as a “self-contained” grouping, 
it implicitly treated them as a one in other ways, assessing their education, skills levels, and 
ability to adapt to Canadian life. Moreover, the assumption of groupness, informed by 
essentialist understandings of “Western” and “Tibetan” culture, influenced the Tibetan 
resettlement program.    
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The interdepartmental committee on the Tibetans based its recommendations on a review 
of the earlier Swiss program for the selection of Tibetans. The 1975 Department of Manpower 
and Immigration report explains that the Swiss program had demonstrated that the Tibetans: 
could adapt quite well to industrial society and that their children adjusted quite well in 
school. Taboos and practices which were alien or unsuitable to their new environment 
were readily abandoned as the material aspects of Western culture were adopted.
199
  
 
The report draws conclusions about the ability of the Tibetans to settle in Canada as a grouping.  
For instance, it considers the levels of literacy and education of the adults. The report notes that: 
“the Tibetans are thought to be conscientious and reliable employees by their employers. Based 
on their employment experience in Canada to date they have demonstrated particular aptitudes 
for mechanical construction and services trades. They will apply themselves willingly to any 
task.”200 Simultaneously ironic and telling, the report criticizes the Canadian resettlement 
program arguing that “the Tibetans are adults and are neither childlike nor dependent….It would 
have been more appropriate to treat them as individuals than as a group from the start.
201
 With 
these words, the report states the obvious, that in fact the Tibetans were selected as a “group.” At 
the same time, it fails to see the irony in criticizing this fact while making various generalizations 
about the Tibetans in its own western-centric and paternalistic tone.  
 The Canadian government carefully considered the integration prospects for the Tibetans 
based on the Swiss experience. The 1975 review explains that immigration officials felt that: 
 
Persons from towns and settled regions of Tibet or who had received some form of 
secondary education before arrival in Canada would be most suitable for resettlement. 
Persons from unsettled rural areas with little experience with urban life, they thought, 
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would be restive in employment and slower to become fluent or literate in English or 
French. Those who had lived in towns or settled areas would adjust more quickly.
202
  
 
At another point, it suggested that the interdepartmental committee felt that: 
Younger married couples with small families and single workers should be selected for 
resettlement in Canada. Younger persons would be preferable as older persons had been 
almost incapable of being retrained because of their low level of literacy and lack of 
education and language fluency. Those with smaller families would be preferable 
especially if the family would be dependent on the earnings of a single bread winner.
203
  
 
Despite this, the report argues that the interdepartmental committee felt it unfair to deprive India 
of the best and brightest from the Tibetans. It therefore was “moved to recommend a resettlement 
program on humanitarian grounds alone.”204 This of course was only a recommendation and in 
fact the various regions in Canada that settled the Tibetans argued that attempts should be made 
to select younger couples as well as those who were already established in India.
205
 Once again, 
the Canadian government subdivided selected groupings of refugees into preferential 
subgroupings. Despite the humanitarian gesture by the interdepartmental committee, 
immigration officials chose those they deemed the best and brightest.  
Concerns over the Tibetans purportedly nomadic nature continued to influence 
immigration officials even after their acceptance for resettlement. While many Tibetans were 
seen to quickly adapt to what was referred to as a “Western mode of life,” the 1975 report 
suggested that: 
Amongst the nomads the process of adaptation has been much more difficult. The 
nomads cling to the communal households that were set up to receive them. They are 
more dependent on official help and experience greater insecurity. Moreover they have a 
tendency to isolate themselves from Tibetans from other walks of life.
206
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Based on this assessment, it is not surprising that only two nomads were selected in Tibet.
207
  
The view that nomads are problematic reflects what Malkki refers to as a sedentarism in our 
thinking. This sedentarism takes for granted the territorializataion of identities and in the process 
frames displacement in pathological terms.
208
 In case of the Tibetans, the government’s concern 
over nomadism tainted its perception of the Tibetans as an acceptable grouping of refugees for 
resettlement in Canada.  
A Memorandum to Cabinet on the Tibetans in 1970 based on the Swiss experience reads 
like a contemporary UNHCR refugee group profile; albeit, it is much more concerned with 
settlement potential. It explains that:  
The Swiss experience suggests that the commonly held view that the Tibetans need a 
rigorous climate and yak pastures to become settled should be discarded as they are more 
likely to settle in areas where there is employment in light industry and agriculture. The 
experience gained in Switzerland and information from other sources suggests that 
initially the Tibetans should be settled in small groups consisting of ten to twelve families 
composed of approximately sixty persons and that these groups should be accompanied 
by a lama who is, according to their kind of Buddhism and way of life, very necessary as 
an advisor in almost every aspect of their daily lives. In view of the Swiss experience and 
the characteristics of the Tibetans, there is reason to believe that limited numbers can be 
successfully established in Canada.
209
  
 
 
The Memorandum reflected on potential alternatives to resettlement such as local settlement in 
India or the potential for return to Tibet. This is similar to contemporary group profiles that 
consider resettlement offers in light of other so-called durable solutions. It highlighted areas of 
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Canada in which the Tibetans could settle; areas with opportunities in agriculture, forestry, 
mining or light industry. In a Western-centric and paternalistic fashion, it argued that: 
 
because the Tibetans come from a culture which is in many respects years behind that of 
Canada and because of the importance of religion in their daily lives, their successful 
settlement is going to involve social, cultural, economic and psychological adjustments of 
the most difficult kind. Judging from the Swiss experience and problems encountered in 
India, the adjustment process will be slow and not easy.
210
  
 
 
The Canadian government’s unease in formally accepting the Tibetans as a grouping 
reflected the prevailing concerns at the time over the ability of overseas refugees to successfully 
settle in Canada. Still, it treated the Tibetans as a grouping in other ways, separating those 
perceived as easy to integrate and those deemed difficult. It acted as if “the Tibetans” were, to 
put it in Brubaker’s terms, a “substantial entity to which interests and agency [could] be 
attributed.”211 This was reinforced by how the government profiled and subdivided them along 
with its assumption of Western superiority over “Tibetan culture."   
 
The 1970s: Reflection, Unease and Rationalization   
It is widely held that the Canadian government responded positively to the plight of 
50,000 individuals of Asian origin expelled by the Ugandan leader Idi Amin in 1972.
212
 The 
“Ugandan Asians” were seen as desirable given their high levels of formal education and 
perceived self-sufficiency.
 213 
Dirk’s adds that “in terms of age and educational qualifications, the 
Ugandan Asians comprised one of the most desirable groups ever to gain admittance to 
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Canada.
214
 For these reasons, Canadian immigration officials were rapidly deployed to 
Uganda.
215
 This contrasted sharply with the delays experienced by Chilean refugees the 
following year. As Whitaker explains, the Chileans were left-wing refugees, including 
Communists, fleeing right-wing totalitarianism allied to the United States and tied closely to 
Western economic interests, including some Canadian interests. Canada responded negatively to 
this crisis as red and pink flags were raised.
216
 Dirks argues that the “high percentage of 
incomplete case investigations on the part of immigration personnel contrasted sharply with the 
rapid processing which had taken place during the Czechoslovakian and Ugandan Asian 
movements.”217 Both Whitaker’s and Dirks analyses highlight how the government used 
overseas processing times and requirements to express preferences for certain categories of 
refugees over others. 
 At the time of the Chilean refugee crisis, Canadian officials were eager to debunk the 
charge that Canada had responded more positively to other refugee movements. While cabinet 
correspondence at the time does not provide the smoking gun, it does display subtle differences 
in the government’s perception and approach to different groupings of refugees. In terms of the 
Chileans, the Cabinet in November 1973 declared that “the processing of these immigrants 
should be accelerated and special efforts should be made on the part of the RCMP to accelerate 
security checks….although the point system may be suspended, other regulations, including 
medical and security checks, will be enforced.”218  This suggests that the Cabinet did in fact relax 
some immigration requirements for the Chileans, though far less than was the case for the 
                                                     
214
 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, 243.  
215
 Whitaker, Double Standard, 255.  
216
 Ibid, 254.  
217
 Dirks, Canada’s Refugee Policy, 248. 
218
 LNAC, Immigration policy respecting refugees and others from Chile, Cabinet Conclusion, vol. 6422, 29
th
 
November 1973.  
68 
 
 
Hungarians in 1956.
219
 Despite the distinct responses, some Cabinet members were sensitive to 
the charges of favoritism by NGOs and wanted to expedite the processing of Chileans. Then 
Immigration Minister Andras along with several other members of Cabinet blamed the delays on 
security screening. Whitaker points to struggles between politicians, especially the immigration 
Minister, and the security establishment.
220
 The difference with the Chileans is that they were 
from the wrong side of the Cold War divide. In 1974, the Cabinet discussed a situation report 
that considered delays in the processing of Chilean refugees. Minister Andras blamed a lack of 
experience on the part of the Immigration Department in dealing with a large volume of 
applicants from South America as well as delays from checking the records of non-Chileans with 
other South American governments. However, Cabinet documents reveal that Andras felt that the 
criteria being used for security screening were too strict and that: “he was not getting the full 
story from the RCMP about the information they were using in making their security 
judgments.”221  The same Cabinet conclusion explains:  
 
The president of the Privy Council said that in his view the whole process of the security 
check is questionable since the criteria being used are outdated and the standards of 
political behavior in South America are quite different than in Canada so that the security 
check probably rejects individuals who would be good Canadian citizens.
222
   
 
A key question is what was meant by “standards of political behavior in South America”? 
Immigration Minister Andras’s statements in a memo to Cabinet provide some insight into what 
was meant by this: 
I believe security screening in this situation [with respect to Chileans] should be seen in 
light of the general political situation in Latin America, where violent overthrow is often 
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the only way to a change a government. There can be no doubt that many of the people 
seeking to leave Chile, especially non-Chileans, have participated to some degree in that 
kind of political action. The question, from a Canadian point of view, is whether we 
could expect such people to abandon violence when they become settled in a democratic 
country. In my opinion that is a question of judgment in each individual case.
223
  
 
 
Based on these statements, it appears that Andras did not want to make negative generalizations 
about the Chileans as a grouping.   
The Situation Report on the Chileans outlined the specific criteria used in the security 
screening process. The reasons for denying an individual entry into Canada were based on 
affiliations with communist organizations, political parties, and sympathizers.
224
 Given that 
Andras acknowledged the necessity in some instances for violent revolutionary action, it is not 
surprising that he recommended what was perceived as a narrowing of the discretionary power of 
the RCMP. In the end, the Cabinet agreed with Andras’s recommendations and dropped some 
elements of the security screening process, specifically those that were based on suspicion or 
speculation. It was suggested that: 
Emphasis should be placed on known subversive, revolutionary or terrorist 
activity…where there is doubt about an individual case, the review process should take 
into account the sources of information and, if the sources appeared dubious, give the 
benefit of the doubt to the applicant in the absence of supporting evidence concerning the 
nature or activities of the person.
225
   
 
In practice, political exclusion based on Cold War ideology was more limited than Whitaker 
suggests. Andras, a politician, was willing to challenge the discretionary power of the RCMP in 
cases where refugees were fleeing a regime allied to the West. While Whitaker points to 
struggles between politicians and security bureaucrats, they were in situations where refugees 
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were fleeing Communist regimes. In these instances, politicians wanted to score pro-Western 
points in the Cold War ideological battle, as was the case with the Hungarian refugee 
movement.
226
  
Still, subtle Cold War preferences can be seen in how the government answered the 
criticism from NGOs that it was slow in responding to the Chilean crisis relative to others. At no 
point does it admit to the influence of Cold War politics. Rather it highlights bureaucratic 
reasons. The report argues: 
 
Comparisons with earlier refugee situations cannot be validly made because the 
circumstances are quite different. In the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian situations, 
screening was carried out by security officers to the best of their ability in accordance 
with the criteria then in effect; the limited sources of information of which they could 
avail themselves meant that such screening as they could do did not take too long. In the 
Ugandan situation, no reliable sources of information were available respecting 
individuals; general knowledge of the Asian community indicated virtually no likelihood 
of any security risk, but even so immigration officers conducted a brief rudimentary 
screening. In addition to this, a name check was done through the British security 
organization in the few cases where doubt existed about the individual’s ability to pass a 
security background check. In the Chilean situation, however, sources of information are 
relatively readily available. Having regard to the extraordinary world wide growth of 
international terrorism in the past few years, security forces have exerted themselves to 
develop as much information as possible about known terrorists.
227
  
 
In this way, the report rationalizes the differences in the government’s response to the refugee 
movements in terms of the availability of intelligence information while making generalizations 
about the “Asian community.”  Despite the Immigration Minister and other Cabinet members 
concern to curb the discretionary power of the RCMP in the security screening of the Chileans, 
they still drew important distinctions between the Chileans and other groupings of refugees.  
Two years later, in 1975, Immigration Minister Andras submitted another situation report 
to Cabinet, this time comparing refugee movements from Chile, Cambodia and South Vietnam. 
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Once again, it considered criticism leveled against the government that it dragged its feet in 
responding to the Chilean crisis, except this time it was in comparison to the Indo-Chinese. In 
both the situation report and Cabinet discussions on it, Andras attempts to address this criticism 
by arguing that Canada had actually taken more refugees from Chile than had any other 
country.
228
  He suggested to Cabinet that a condensed report based on the situation report be 
created for circulation to both Members of Parliament and the media. The purpose behind this 
was to highlight the purported humanitarian measures that Canada had taken towards both the 
Indo-Chinese and the Chileans. Andras was eager to dispel the idea that Canadian officials gave 
preferential treatment to the Indo-Chinese. 
The report lays out the statistics for arrivals to Canada of Chileans, Cambodians and 
South Vietnamese. Conveniently sidestepping the Canadian State’s historical and 
contemporaneous consideration of Cold War strategic value, security concerns, integration 
potential, and economic needs behind its immigration and refugee selection practices, the report 
suggests that “in both cases, Canada’s response was designed solely to alleviate human distress, 
without regard to political or other considerations, and has compared favorably with the response 
of other countries.”229 In a section on similarities between the refugee movements, the report 
once again attempts to paint the Canadian government as acting on humanitarian grounds: 
 
Both movements were precipitated by sudden events causing large numbers of persons to 
seek refuge elsewhere. In both cases Canada’s response was designed solely to alleviate 
human distress, without regard to any political or other considerations. In both cases, 
Canada acted at the outset to admit, with the least possible delay, refugees in urgent need 
of assistance, either because their lives were in danger, as in Chile, or because they had 
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relatives in Canada anxious for their welfare or were in a precarious situation, as in the 
case of the Vietnamese and Cambodians.
230
  
 
Despite these claims, the reports own in-depth analysis reveals that the government was more 
receptive to the Indo-Chinese. It attempts to justify the government’s varying responses to the 
Indochinese and Chilean refugee movements by highlighting differences in terms of the intensity 
and effects of the conflicts, the availability of other options for refugees besides overseas 
resettlement, and family connections to Canada. It is worth quoting the report at length to 
demonstrate these points:  
 
The crisis in Chile arose from a political coup, in which a comparatively small proportion 
of the population was exposed to physical danger. The exodus from South Vietnam was 
caused by a violent civil war in which many thousands of civilians were killed, wounded 
or displaced from their homes. (e) in South Vietnam many thousands of persons had been 
associated with and/or employed by a foreign power, the United States—the hated enemy 
of North Vietnam and of the Viet Cong revolutionaries—and therefore feared for their 
lives after the war had been lost. The conflict in Chile was between Chileans, with no 
military presence by a third power. (f) At the time of the coup in Chile there were very 
few persons of Chilean origin in Canada. Consequently there was no demand for 
assistance for Chilean relatives. The 1,500 (approx.) South Vietnamese and Cambodian 
residents of Canada have so far provided us with the names of about 17, 000 relatives 
whom they wish to sponsor or nominate for admission to this country. Of these, only 
about a quarter are believed to have escaped before Saigon fell. (g) Chile and its 
neighboring countries are all signatories of the United Nations convention on refugees. 
The UN High Commissioner for refugees is therefore represented and active on behalf of 
refugees in these countries, none of which may expel a refugee unless he is found, by due 
process of law,[to be] a danger to national security or public order. None of the countries 
adjacent to South Vietnam to which refugees fled before the fall of Saigon is a signatory 
to the United Nations Convention. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees therefore 
has no jurisdiction in them. During the exodus from Cambodia and Vietnam several of 
these countries threatened to send back any refugees seeking admission. None have 
expressed willingness to accept refugees for permanent settlement.
231
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The statements in the above excerpt are ironic given that the main purpose of the report as well 
as the condensed public version was to demonstrate the absence of any such bias.  
 The report’s section on dissimilarities attempts to further justify the government’s 
different responses to the Chilean and Indo-Chinese crises. It claims that most Chilean applicants 
accepted by Canada applied in their own country and therefore are not refugees under the UN 
definition. It argues that despite this Canada still accepted them as members of an ‘oppressed 
minority’ referring to them as “quasi-refugees.” In contrast to this, it suggested that: 
No Cambodian or South Vietnamese can now apply for emigration in his own country. 
All applicants are refugees temporarily in other countries and awaiting resettlement. 
Many are destitute. Although not in physical danger, their need for resettlement is in most 
cases now much more urgent than that of the majority of oppressed minority applicants in 
Chile, or Chilean refugees elsewhere in Latin America.
232
   
 
In fact, a few years later, the government ended up using the designated classes to resettle the 
Indo-Chinese, something similar to the ‘Oppressed Minority Policy.’ Both worked beyond, or 
outside, the narrow definition of a refugee under the Convention. Convention status, therefore, 
did not necessarily determine Canada’s response to overseas refugees. I discuss the use of the 
designated classes for the Indo-Chinese in the next chapter. The same section on dissimilarities 
then addresses the issue of processing times and security screening. Once again, the government 
attempts to justify the differences without admitting to preferential treatment for the Indo-
Chinese over the Chileans. It does so by pointing to the fact that many of the Vietnamese 
refugees had relatives in Canada and were therefore sponsored:  
 
Because the Vietnamese were nominated relatives, we were able to apply the more 
relaxed security criteria from the outset thus enabling us to reduce processing time. In the 
case of the Chilean refugees, because they had no family here, we initially were required 
to apply the more stringent criteria used in independent applicants and it was only later 
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that we received Cabinet authority to apply the less stringent (nominated relative) criteria 
to the Chileans.
233
  
 
Despite the denial of bias, or rather the justification of bias, historically it has been the case that 
in most instances preferences for certain national, racial, and ethnic categories of refugees is 
expressed by suspending the normal requirements of immigration processing and security 
screening.  
The section of the report entitled “public relations considerations” suggests that the 
government planned to emphasize to the media and the public that it had accepted more Chileans 
than any other country. It intended to underscore “that hundreds of visas have been issued to 
Chileans who have chosen not to use them” and that “Government spokesmen should point out, 
at every opportunity, that the majority of Vietnamese refugees have come to Canada to join 
family members already in this country, while most Chileans have no relations here.”234 This last 
claim ignores the fact that the government was aware in 1973 of both individuals and 
organizations such as the Canadian Council of Churches and the New Democratic Party that 
were “urging the government to accord the Chilean expatriates the same ‘special treatment’ 
given to the Hungarians, Czechs and Ugandan Asians.”235 A Memorandum to the Cabinet 
acknowledges the activism of the Chile Solidarity Committee, which occupied immigration 
offices to protest the slow response from Canadian authorities.
236
  
The initial concerns of Immigration Minister Andras and other Cabinet members to 
lessen the criteria for exclusion used by the RCMP with respect to the Chileans suggest that Cold 
War ideology in practice did not completely dominate resettlement decision-making. This, 
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however, is overshadowed by attempts in the situation reports to mask Cold War preferences 
with bureaucratic technicalities while framing the Indo-Chinese as more deserving of Canada’s 
generosity. As will be seen in chapter four, the Canadian government uses similar tactics under 
its group processing program.  
Conclusion:   
Historically, the Canadian government has developed and relied on racial, gender, and 
ideological categories in its assessment, sorting, and response to overseas refugees. It played a 
balancing act between competing priorities, at times reconciling economic needs with security 
concerns. Preferences for specific categories of refugees were expressed by either relaxing or 
removing normal immigration and security screening requirements. Secrecy, as well as 
obfuscation, played, and continue to play, an important role in biopolitical determinations of the 
ideal grouping of refugees for resettlement. The Canadian government chose to conceal 
decisions that it felt would be contentious in the public’s eyes.  
Secrecy relates to the government’s sometimes uneasy relationship with the grouping of 
refugees. Behind closed doors officials were comfortable in proclaiming Canada’s right to be 
discriminatory, whereas in public forums they were sensitive to appearing this way. In other 
instances, unease related to relaxing security concerns, such as with the East German farmers. 
The government’s reflection in the 1970s on its varying responses to refugee movements further 
demonstrates this, notwithstanding its attempts to rationalize these variations to the public. Much 
of the criticism directed towards it focused on what were perceived as lengthy processing times, 
especially when it came to security screening. Subsequent chapters will reveal how eligibility, 
admissibility, and time requirements related to the overseas processing of refugees continues to 
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be a site of contention between the government and various civil society actors with an interest in 
these matters.    
Historical Selection of Groupings of Refugees in Canada: 1930s - 1975 
September 1930 Immigration of “Asiatic Races” banned with few exceptions such as: Christian 
Armenians fleeing Turkish persecution.
237
 
1939  Approximately 3000 Sudeten refugees accepted by Canada. 
June 1939  907 Jewish refugees aboard the St. Louis liner refused entry into Canada. 
June 1947  5,000 non-sponsored displaced persons accepted. The grouping included: 1, 400 
woods workers, 2,000 craftsmen, and 2,000 women for domestic work. 
July 1947 Grouping of Christian clergymen 
September 1948  145 refugees, mostly Baltic, arrive to Canada by boat and are accepted. 
September 1949 Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and one Irish person arrive to 
Canada on the S.S Sarabande and S.S. Amanda. All are deported with the 
exception of the one Irish individual. 
April 1956:  Selection of East German refugees for farm work. 
1956-57  Over 37, 000 Hungarian refugees come to Canada 
March 1957  500 Polish Jews accepted. 
1968-69   10, 975 Czechs come to Canada.
238
 
March 1971  228 Tibetan refugees arrive in Canada. 
1972 50, 000 Ugandan Asians selected. 
1973-75  1,188 Chileans arrive in Canada.
239
 
1975  Indochinese refugees begin arriving in Canada. Roughly 60, 000 selected. 
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Chapter Two: Inside/Outside the Circle: Group Processing and the Emergence of 
Contemporary Group Resettlement Schemes  
 
Introduction  
In this chapter I examine the conditions surrounding the creation of group resettlement 
programs. I trace the increasing formalization of grouping refugees according to considerations 
of self-containment, homogeneity, and clear boundaries. I begin the chapter by considering the 
development and reform of the Designated Class for the Indochinese. The passing of the 1976 
Immigration Act in Canada permitted the establishment of a Designated Class regulatory 
framework as a means to provide protection to persons not covered by the narrower 
individualistic Convention definition of a refugee. The framework was supposed to simplify the 
question of eligibility for resettlement and reduce processing times. As such, it shares some 
similarities with contemporary group processing. The chapter contrasts the initially open-ended 
designation of eligibility for the Indochinese to the subsequent preferences of governments for 
much tighter definitions of group membership under group resettlement. The aftermath of the 
Indochinese resettlement programs along with important reforms within the UNHCR in the 
1990s and early 2000s shaped the creation of contemporary group resettlement. The 
development of these programs was framed by humanitarian considerations, a focus on 
protection needs and situations of protracted displacement. However, equally important, were 
concerns over “pull factors,” fraud, and security. I conclude the chapter by highlighting some of 
the differences between contemporary group processing and the former Indochinese designated 
class. While both frameworks for grouping refugees aim to make resettlement processing 
efficient, under the latter this objective plays a central role as the state searches for self-contained 
and homogenous groupings of refugees that are perceived as easy to process and not a threat to 
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the Canadian population. I argue that contemporary preoccupations with boundaries, visibility, 
homogeneity, and efficiency under group processing provide the Canadian state with new 
variables of consideration in crafting grouping of refugees viewed as the right fit for Canada. 
The chapter begins by examining the response by Western countries to the plight of the 
Indochinese and the subsequent use of a loose definition of eligibility under the Designated 
Classes used to resettle them. It then considers the increasing skepticism towards what was 
perceived as the open-ended nature of the Indochinese resettlement programs in the buildup to 
the signing of the Comprehensive Plan of Action. During the initial post-Cold War period of the 
1990s resettlement became the least preferred durable solution and Western states increasingly 
sought to contain refugees closer to their point of origin. The chapter considers UNHCR reforms 
undertaken during this period and then again in the early 2000s when the organization, along 
with resettlement states, sought to revitalize the use of resettlement. It reflects on the UNHCR’s 
initial involvement with the United States’ Priority-2 system in the late 1990s during the Bosnian 
refugee crisis as a key moment that provided the template for the organization’s Group Profile 
and Proposal Document (GPPD) (or group profile) used in the referral of refugees for group 
resettlement schemes. I argue that while the decision to use a group profile for these refugees 
reduced perceived redundancies in the referral of individuals with similar refugee claims, the 
need to ensure that people correspond to a specific profile reflected the US government’s unease 
with grouping refugees.  
The contemporary preoccupation with visualizing and drawing boundaries around 
groupings of refugees reflects relations between biopolitical concerns over threatening elements 
in prospective groupings and the testing of groupness. Authorities consider the presence of 
terrorists and imposters within groupings of refugees and in the process test their internal 
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homogeneity and external boundaries. The unease surrounding fluid boundaries and the presence 
of heterogeneous groupings of refugees in camps shares similarities with earlier colonial 
anxieties in relation to racial mixing and fears of contamination. 
 
Big Circles: the Indochinese Refugee Movement and the Evolution of the Designated 
Classes  
 
The daily media images of the plight of the Indochinese refugees in the 1970s captured 
the general public’s attention in Western countries. And while Cold War ideological and 
geopolitical considerations guided Canada’s positive response to the Indochinese,240 so did 
humanitarian considerations. The international community formalized a system of “first asylum 
in the region” for permanent resettlement elsewhere, also known as “an open shore for an open 
door,” resettling over 350,000 Vietnamese and Laotion refugees, as well as half a million 
Cambodians.’241 The Canadian government resettled the Indochinese under the newly created 
Designated Classes system following the passing of the 1976 Immigration Act. This purportedly 
made resettlement processing more efficient by skipping refugee status determinations and 
focusing instead on considerations of admissibility (e.g. criminal background and security 
checks).
242
 Commenting on the Indochinese Designated Class, Girard explains: 
Given that none of the boat people in South East Asia were going to return to Vietnam 
and they could not stay any length of time in the countries of first asylum, the issue of the 
Convention status of the individuals was not crucial to their need for resettlement. This 
greatly enhanced the efficiency of our selection activities in the field.
243
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As will be discussed below, contemporary group resettlement schemes similarly streamline 
resettlement processing, whether through the skipping of refugee status determinations, the use 
of group profiles, or shortened (or abridged) resettlement registration forms (RRFs).
244
 The 
Designated Classes, however, differed from these schemes in that a key objective behind their 
creation was to allow the Canadian government to respond to individuals in need of protection 
but not necessarily considered refugees according to the rather narrow definition in the 
Convention.
245
 According to Basok and Simmons, the regulatory framework “gave authority to 
the Governor-in-Council to designate a group of people who do not qualify for Convention 
refugee status but who are, nevertheless, threatened by political, social or religious upheavals.”246 
Writing at the time, Lanphier explains “the use of "Designated Classes" overcomes the 
brittleness of a single definition, so that definitions used by Canadian visa officers can more 
closely fit the characteristics of the particular group of displaced or persecuted persons.”247  
According to Lanphier, “the existence of the definition of three different ‘Designated Classes’: 
Indochinese, Latin American, and Self- Exile (East European), each with differing specifications, 
indicates a distinctly innovative and flexible governmental approach in determining eligibility 
for selection under relaxed refugee admissibility criteria.”248  
It is important to note that this was not the first time that the Canadian government 
developed refugee policies outside the framework of the Refugee Convention. Dirks explains 
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that one of the reasons that the government was initially hesitant to become a signatory to the 
Convention in 1951 was the fear that it would lose the ability to deport or exclude refugees on 
national security grounds. In particular, the government was concerned about Soviet espionage 
and subversion.
249
 In 1969 the Canadian government ratified the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol. That same year it setup a special program for Ugandan Asians. Girard notes the 
selection of Ugandan Asians was not affected by Canada’s signing to the Convention since 
“while no one had any doubt that these victims of racial hatred were refugees, in fact most could 
not meet the Convention definition because they were still in their country of citizenship or usual 
residence.”250  Girard goes on to say that whether or not the Ugandan Asians were refugees was 
academic “since Idi Amin himself had defined the eligible group based on their ethnicity.”251  
The statements highlight how the grouping of refugees can simultaneously be inclusive and 
exclusive. On the one hand, the Ugandan Asians were excluded for their imputed membership in 
an ethnic grouping. On the other hand, the Canadian government reproduced this problematic 
ethnic category by using it as a category of eligibility for resettlement. During this same period, 
the government sought to move the refugee program away from its traditional focus on European 
refugees towards the selection of non-Europeans. As part of this move, the Federal Cabinet 
proposed the creation of an “Oppressed Minority Policy” which would allow the government to 
respond to groupings of refugees that were of interest to them but did not fall under the refugee 
Convention definition, specifically the requirement to be outside of one’s country of citizenship 
or habitual residence.
252
 For different reasons then, throughout the post-World War II period, the 
Canadian government responded to refugee movements (and worked) outside the formal 
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framework of the Refugee Convention. The Designated Classes are a continuation of this 
practice. The ability to adjust them according to changing social and political circumstances (and 
preferences) was an important element of their operation that would come into play as the 
Indochinese refugee movement evolved.  
There are examples in which state and UNHCR authorities in the present period have 
used different types of expedited resettlement processing. Canada resettled Iraqis throughout the 
first decade of the 2000s using a simplified referral form and designating them prima facie.
253
 
However, the government chose to process them as individuals as opposed to grouping them 
under the group processing program. Moreover, the rationale behind this decision differs from 
reforms of the Designated Classes to tighten or loosen eligibility for resettlement. I discuss the 
Iraqi case in further detail in chapter four.  
The sheer size of the Indochinese crisis and the visible urgency of the situation played a 
role in adopting a relatively open-ended definition of eligibility under the Designated Class 
framework. Individual refugees were included if they left their country of origin after April 30, 
1975 and passed immigration admissibility requirements.
254
 Under this system, Canada 
considered Vietnamese who simply fled their country to be ipso facto refugees.
255
 This amounts 
to a prima facie status, which has historically been used in situations of large-scale 
displacement.
256
 Under this designation, each member is regarded prima facie as a refugee in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. In fact, in 1984 some within the immigration department felt 
that the Indochinese Designated Class definition of eligibility was too narrow and was 
preventing the inclusion of individuals who had received permission to temporarily remain in 
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countries signatory to the Refugee Convention but intended to resettle to Canada.
257
 Officials 
aimed to loosen eligibility so as to include more Indochinese.  
The 1976 Immigration Act also made possible for the first time the extensive use of 
private sponsorship for refugees.
258
  Whitaker explains “a major difference between the boat 
people and previous large groups of immigrants was that 54 per cent of the Indochinese 
applicants were privately sponsored (43 per cent were government sponsored, and 3 per cent 
were sponsored by relatives).”259 In this way, the Canadian government encouraged private 
sponsors to partake in the grouping process with the Indochinese.  
The Circle is Getting Too Big  
As the crisis in Southeast Asia wore on, resettlement states increasingly viewed the 
movement of Indochinese refugees as motivated more by economic considerations than a 
genuine concern with safety.
260
 A position paper from the Indochinese Consultative Group 
Meeting in Ottawa in April 1988 in the lead up to signing of the Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(CPA) explains that resettlement was: 
initially the most immediate and simplest response to relieving the burden of first asylum 
countries. Now it is part of the problem identified with the continued outflow as many 
persons are seeking resettlement for economic or family reasons rather than in response 
to individual persecution. To maintain first asylum commitment throughout the region, 
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resettlement must remain part of the international response but not to the exclusion of 
encouraging other activities designed to deter the outflow.
261
 
 
Those “other activities” were the introduction of regional refugee status determination 
mechanisms and the encouragement of what was at first voluntary, but later on involuntary, 
repatriation under the CPA. This ended the use of what was referred to as ‘blanket 
resettlement’262 and the prima facie designation.263 As Bronee explains “the establishment of a 
procedure for determining refugee status brought an end to automatic resettlement.”264  
The CPA grouped Indochinese refugees into “long-stayers” and “late arrivals.” It worked 
by using specific cut-off dates in which “late arrivals” to countries in Southeast Asia would be 
subjected to refugee status screening mechanisms while the “long-stayers” that had been present 
in these countries up to these cut-off dates would continue to be automatically eligible for 
resettlement. An important issue for Canadian officials was to bring the Indochinese Designated 
Class in line with the CPA. There was recognition that the definition of eligibility under this 
system was inconsistent with the introduction of screening mechanisms under the CPA. At a 
preparatory meeting of the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Kuala Lumpur 
in March 1989, the Canadian High Commission noted that Canada has the weakest legislative 
basis for dealing with the issue of non-eligible individuals.
265
 At that same meeting, Vietnam 
proposed using the Organization of African Union definition of a refugee for screening purposes; 
however, the Canadian High Commission noted that this definition “is as broad as our 
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Designated Class Regulations and Canada should not support inclusion [of it].”266 A month later, 
a letter to the Minister of Employment and Immigration from the Associate Deputy 
Minister/Vice-Chairman explained to the Minister that in light of the CPA’s focus on 
Convention refugees the:  
 
Designated class regulations will eventually have to be reviewed, since their continued 
use would be both next to impossible in practical terms, and contradictory to the spirit of 
the common approach developed through the ICIR process.”267 
 
 
The Indochinese Designated Classes were eventually reformed so that eligibility was restricted to 
Vietnamese and Laotion “long-stayers” and “screened-in” recent Vietnamese and Laotion 
arrivals found to be Convention refugees. However, all Cambodians (both “long-stayers” and 
recent arrivals) would continue to be eligible under the Regulations. Part of the government’s 
communication strategy was to emphasize that: “these changes will help us concentrate our 
efforts on the “long stayer” population in refugee camps through Southeast Asia.”268 Some 
officials believed that the plight of these refugees would receive “considerable attention from the 
media and from interested groups in Canada.”269 
 The tightening of eligibility under the Designated Class included the closing of what was 
perceived as a possible loophole for Indochinese guestworkers working in Eastern Europe. An 
internal government memo explains that under the revised Designated Classes the wording may 
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allow Vietnamese, Laotion, and Cambodian guestworkers in Eastern Europe to apply for 
benefits.
270
 The document explains that:  
the guestworkers left their countries of origin legally in order to work abroad.  There 
should be no impediment to their return to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In order to 
prevent large numbers of guestworkers from qualifying under these Regulations it is 
imperative the changes be made as soon as possible.
271
 
 
The closing of this loophole contrasts with the decision in 1984 that sought to expand eligibility 
to individuals seeking temporary protection in countries that were signatories to the Convention 
prior to resettling in Canada. Such was the nature of the Designated Classes, which could be 
reformed to meet changing political preferences and circumstances. The use of the categories 
“long-stayers” and “screened-in” were an attempt by the Canadian government to reassert 
groupness, specifically a relatively homogenous and enclosed grouping of “Indochinese” 
refugees “deserving” of resettlement.  
While the CPA certainly did not end large-scale resettlement, its introduction of 
screening mechanisms, measures to deter “clandestine departures” from countries of origin, and 
consideration of involuntary repatriation (the most contentious aspect of the agreement),
272
 
reflected the belief of officials that many of the remaining Indochinese were no longer genuine 
refugees in need of resettlement. Moreover, resettlement was increasingly viewed as a “pull 
factor” linked to overly broad (or loose) definitions of eligibility under systems such as Canada’s 
                                                     
270
 LNAC, File: 8620-9, Immigration, Refugees and Displaced Persons –General Designated Classes. Covering 
Letter to Mrs. Nancy Hughes Anthony, Deputy Minister of Privatization and Regulatory Affairs entitled 
“Amendment to Indochinese Designated Class Regulations and Indochinese Designated Class (Transitional) 
Regulations. Sent by Nick Mulder, November 16, 1990. The document also includes the “Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement”. 
271
 Ibid.  
272
 LNAC, File 85-29-4 – Indochina part 2; File: 85-29-4-Indochina, part 4. Volume 12498. International 
Conference on Indochinese Refugees (ICIR), Geneva, Switzerland, June 13
th
 and 14
th
, 1989. Internal/Confidential 
Summary of “Tokyo ICG Meeting [Intergovernmental Consultations on the Indochinese Refugee Problem, Tokyo, 
14 – 15 November 1988] - November 14 Second Session”, 15 November 1988. Document titled “Basic Country 
Positions: Comprehensive Plan of Action”; LAC, File 8620-9, Vol. 1992, Immigration, Refugees and Displaced 
Persons –General Designated Classes. Letter to the Honourable John McDermid, P.C., M.P., Minister of State 
(Privatization and Regulatory Affairs), from Barbara McDougall, August 28, 1990. 
87 
 
 
Designated Classes. This can be seen in the UNHCR’s reflection on the response to the 
Indochinese refugee crisis in its 2011 resettlement handbook: 
After the CPA, the use of large-scale resettlement as a solution waned. In retrospect, the 
decision in 1979 to adopt blanket resettlement was seen as a major “pull-factor” causing 
very large numbers of people to leave Viet Nam primarily for economic and social 
reasons, rather than to seek protection. Meanwhile, elsewhere in the world, refugees in 
desperate need of resettlement suffered from lack of available places.
273
 
 
On top of the concerns over “pull factors,” in Canada, there was a belief by some officials that 
since it was increasingly becoming what was referred to as a “country of first asylum” it would 
have to scale back its resettlement numbers.  In the opening remarks at the Indochinese 
Consultative Group Meeting in Ottawa in April 1988, this concern was linked to the associated 
backlog of refugee claimants in Canada and calls to end open-ended resettlement 
commitments.
274
  In later chapters, I demonstrate how these concerns have gained prominence in 
discussions over Canada’s refugee program in both overseas resettlement processing and inland 
determination practices.  
The CPA also coincided with the end of the Cold War, which removed the political value 
in resettling large numbers of refugees fleeing communist regimes.
275
  The resettlement of anti-
communists such as the Hungarians in 1957 was no longer an option for Western states. Instead, 
these same states began to intensify efforts to pre-empt the arrival of refugees to their shores 
through expanded border control programs.
276
 As well, Western governments worked to contain 
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refugees in their regions of origin.
277
 In the 1990s resettlement had become the least preferred 
durable solution by the UNHCR.
278
 The organization came to view it as a protection tool targeted 
towards individuals and families that had become vulnerable in their country of first refuge and 
therefore needed resettlement.
279
 Skepticism towards large-scale resettlement within the UNHCR 
also stemmed from a perception that these programs were motivated by geopolitical 
considerations as opposed to a genuine concern for refugee protection.
280
 Reflecting on the 
lasting influences of the Indochinese refugee movement, Casasola explains:  
From the late 1970s onward, the Indochinese resettlement movement in many ways 
defined the international resettlement experience. As a result, two schools of thought 
developed. The ability of the Indochinese to integrate and achieve independence in new 
countries demonstrated to many the value of resettlement as a durable solution. At the 
same time, the Indochinese movement led to concerns in some quarters about a “pull-
factor”—that the availability of resettlement was allegedly encouraging people to flee. As 
a result, some suggested that resettlement should be left to only those in need of 
protection.
281
 
 
Despite the pressures against resettlement in the 1990s there was some movement within the 
UNHCR in the latter half of the decade to once again raise its profile as a viable durable solution. 
Sandvik points to the development of a comprehensive Resettlement Handbook beginning in 
1997 that set clear standards for referring refugees for resettlement. The organization aimed to 
emphasize rationality and transparency in its resettlement process in a bid to strengthen its 
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credibility and broaden the confidence of resettlement states, refugees, and other partners.
282
 
Sandvik explains that the idea behind the 2004 version of the Handbook “was that by 
constructing a rigorous procedure of individual selection, within the confines of asylum and host 
country quotas, only ‘deserving refugees’ truly in need of protection would be found eligible for 
resettlement.”283  The reforms stemmed from a perception within the UNHCR that its previous 
approach to resettlement was unorganized, ad hoc, prone to fraud, and disconnected from a 
broader analysis of protection situations involving refugees.
284
 A senior official explains: 
I have to say that you know that some time ago, 10 – 15 years ago, resettlement was a 
little bit marginalized within UNHCR operations. It was a bit on its own, identifying 
cases with not very scientific systems. Sometimes just identifying cases because they 
were found there, or were self-referring.
285
 
 
Given this perception of earlier resettlement programs within the organization, it is no surprise 
that the idea of refugees referring themselves for resettlement is now seen as problematic. The 
same UNHCR official equated these refugees with “trouble makers.”286 The statements reflect 
the UNHCR’s stance that individual refugees actively seeking resettlement runs counter to its 
proactive attempts to identify protection and resettlement needs in a fair and consistent manner. 
This position has led to the framing of refugee agency as instances of fraud to be mitigated by a 
myriad of practices designed to uncover only deserving refugees in need of resettlement. While 
resettlement has always been viewed as proactive compared to the reactive nature of inland 
determination practices,
287
 the drive within the UNHCR to mitigate fraud and be credible in the 
eyes of resettlement states has intensified this process. A serious corruption scandal in Nairobi in 
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1999-2000 that involved UNHCR staff members in the selling of resettlement spaces also 
contributed to the reforms in which “integrity is now a major theme of UNHCR’s resettlement 
program.”288 
By the early 2000s, there emerged a renewed belief in the usefulness of resettlement as a 
potential durable solution.
289
 This can be seen in the passing of the UNHCR Agenda for 
Protection (2003) and Convention Plus initiatives (2004,)
290
 which called for the expanded use 
of resettlement as a durable solution, particularly for groupings of refugees.
291
 These broad 
initiatives led to the signing of the UNHCR Multilateral Framework of Understanding on 
Resettlement
 that emphasized multilateral resettlement efforts focused on “protracted refugee 
situations” and the “strategic use of resettlement.”292 A key goal of contemporary group 
resettlement schemes is to specifically target groupings of refugees in situations of protracted 
displacement. A Canadian NGO official recalls: 
the whole discussion around group processing in the early 2000s actually evolved from a 
larger discussion on protracted refugee situations or as it was known at that time refugee 
warehousing, so that [group processing] was seen as one of the optional solutions to the 
idea of refugee warehousing.
293
 
 
Officially, the “strategic use of resettlement” attempts to create benefits that extend beyond the 
refugees being resettled in these situations such as strengthening the protection environment in 
the countries of first refuge, decongesting camps, and opening up other durable solutions such as 
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local integration.
294
  The idea is to utilize resettlement in tandem with other durable solutions as 
part of a purportedly comprehensive approach to dealing with “protracted refugee situations.” 
The Canadian government played an important role in these efforts during this period. 
Shauna Labman explains that “as co-chair of the resettlement strand of Convention Plus, Canada 
led the authorship of the MFU [Multilateral Framework of Understanding on Resettlement].”295 
In June 2003 at a forum that discussed resettlement the Canadian delegation tabled a discussion 
paper titled “Resettlement and Convention Plus Initiatives.” According to Van Selm, this paper 
had been developed in the Working Group on Resettlement under Canadian chairmanship. This 
is a forum for the UNHCR and Resettlement states to discuss priorities and needs in the area of 
resettlement. A UNHCR official noted that during this period the Canadian government was a 
very active chair of the Working Group on Resettlement.
296
  Based largely on the Canadian 
resettlement program, the discussion paper suggested that resettlement “can be a timely and cost 
effective durable solution.”297 Van Selm explains that the paper called for “protection-based 
criteria that go beyond the 1951 Convention [which] would help to make resettlement a more 
flexible tool.”298As noted earlier, there is a long history in Canada of developing policies that 
determine eligibility outside the Refugee Convention framework. The emphasis on protection-
based criteria is reflected in the passing of the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA) in Canada, which signaled a move towards a more liberal and non-discriminatory refugee 
system.  
Part of the revitalization of resettlement during this period also stemmed from the fact 
that states approached the UNHCR about increasing the referrals of refugees for resettlement. 
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The organization responded by revamping and strengthening its referral methodologies in a bid 
to proactively identify all refugees in need of resettlement globally as opposed to field officers 
being selective about referrals. 
299
   
As the discussion above demonstrates, attempts to revitalize resettlement in the early 
2000s were based on protection concerns, flexibility surrounding the Convention definition of a 
refugee, and responding to protracted situations. Yet, this is only part of the story. Equally 
important are heightened concerns by states over security and fraud. A UNHCR official recalls 
that in the aftermath of the September 11
th
, 2001 terrorist attacks the organization was forced to 
respond to these concerns by reinforcing identity and registration practices.
300
 At the same time, 
while the passing of IRPA in 2002 emphasized refugee protection, as Anna Pratt notes, it also 
ushered in a whole range of inadmissible classes based on forward-looking risk management 
techniques.
301
 In a similar vein, anticipating the effects of the passing of IRPA, Casasola argued 
that while “ability to establish” is increasingly less of a problem with Canada’s resettlement 
program, medical and security restrictions are likely to be the new obsessions.
302
 
The character of contemporary resettlement differs from earlier largescale programs such 
as the Indochinese. Despite efforts to revitalize it, lasting concerns over “pull factors” combined 
with obsessions over fraud and security have led to a much more limited and targeted role of 
resettlement. Commenting on the period of 1987 to 2002, Gary Troeller remarked that the 
“UNHCR witnessed various shifts of emphasis from what has been characterized as large-scale 
‘mechanised immigration—oriented resettlement’ (Indo-Chinese approach) to resettlement as an 
instrument of international protection, that is, to smaller scale, targeted, protection-related 
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resettlement according to well-defined UNHCR criteria.”303  In the context of the “strategic use 
of resettlement,” the targeted and strategic rationale of resettlement resonates with Valverde’s 
and Mopas’s concept of “targeted governance” and its associated reliance on risk management 
techniques informed by a neoliberal rationality.
304
 This rationality is reflected in group 
processing’s drive to make resettlement processing efficient. In part, this is achieved through the 
use of shortened UNHCR resettlement registration forms (RRFs), the skipping of refugee status 
determinations (the acceptance of prima facie basis), and group profiles. In this respect, group 
processing is similar to early versions of the Indochinese Designated Class as both work outside 
the Convention and simplify the question of eligibility for resettlement. However, it differs from 
later versions of the Indochinese Designated Class in that it is less concerned with ensuring 
refugee status under the Convention than with developing clear criteria for membership in 
chosen groupings. Moreover, bureaucratic objectives intersect with security concerns and inform 
the selection of specific types of groupings of refugees viewed as ideal for efficient forms of 
overseas processing.   
“Perfect Vision”: the Emergence of the Contemporary Group Profile   
The desire for clear criteria is reflected in the initial conceptualization of the UNHCR’s 
group profile, also known as the Group Profile and Proposal Document (GPPD), used in its 
group methodology. GPPDs streamline resettlement processing by permitting the use of either 
shortened (or abridged) Resettlement Registration Forms (RRFs) for members of chosen 
groupings or the direct transmission of basic bio data without RRFs under the United States P-2 
group referral. Among the things included in this profile are: the gender breakdown of the 
refugee population, it’s ethnic, religious, occupational and social makeup, exclusion concerns, 
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durable solutions analysis, the quality of registration, the need for resettlement, and possibilities 
for “pull factors.” The GPPD also lists commonalities amongst members of a refugee grouping 
such as common narratives of persecution and flight and the grouping’s purported distinctiveness 
relative to wider populations present in refugee camps.
305
 In this way, it tests the groupness of 
potential groupings of refugees for resettlement. In the next chapter I discuss in detail how state 
and UNHCR authorities produce GPPDs. For now I want to draw attention to the Bosnian 
refugee crisis in the late 1990s when the UNHCR first became involved with the United States P-
2 system. At that time, UNHCR officials felt that there was a substantial amount of unnecessary 
paperwork to process many individual Bosnian refugees with similar resettlement claims. To 
shorten the process, these same officials approached the US State Department which controls 
eligibility for resettlement to see how the process could be streamlined.
306
 A UNHCR official 
describes the request this way: “you know we worked it out with them [the US State 
Department]….let’s sort of build a profile and if people fit into that profile you already kind of 
know what they’re going to [look] like.”307 The decision was made that the UNHCR would only 
give US authorities’ basic information on individual members of the chosen grouping of Bosnian 
refugees such as their age and family structure.
308
 The aim was to lessen the perceived 
redundancy of submitting many similar individual profiles, especially in terms of refugee 
persecution narratives.
309
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The decision by US and UNHCR authorities to streamline the processing of the Bosnian 
grouping of refugees highlights what Walters refers to as a thinning-down of strategies of 
governance in the contemporary period. The reliance on basic bio-data shares similarities with 
Deuluzes notion of the dividual. The dividual, according to Walters, is partial, fragmented, or 
incomplete. 
310
 In the context of crafting profiles for groupings of refugees, the principle concern 
of authorities is to make sure that no “imposters” are included in chosen groupings. This has led 
to a variety of identification, verification, and anti-fraud techniques at work in group resettlement 
schemes. It is reflected in the types of groupings of refugees viewed as ideal for group 
resettlement. The 2011 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook suggests that refugee “groups” referred 
to resettlement countries under the group methodology should be easily identifiable and ideally 
have common characteristics, a shared refugee claim, and need for resettlement.
311
 Commenting 
on the makeup of the UNHCR’s group profile, Martin explains:  
The objective is to identify "finite groups" that can become the focus of resettlement 
efforts. Such clarity about the group’s dimensions is important, both to guard against 
fraud and to minimize any magnet effect generated by the resettlement activity. This 
theme was repeated to me many times during my interviews.
312
   
 
Martin suggests that the group methodology is reflective of how to overcome opposition to 
resettlement by some within the UNHCR ranks based on concerns over new “pull factors.”313 A 
UNHCR official’s remarks demonstrate why these programs focus on situations of protracted 
displacement in refugee camps as opposed to urban contexts:  
In a camp situation you have a group of people who are very homogenous, because they 
belong to the same ethnic group, they came out of the same protection situation…they 
escaped a particular ethnic strife in an African country, when a particular tribe attacked 
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another group…so you have a group of population which is very homogenous, in terms 
of not only their profile, their all the same country, same nationality, the same ethnic 
group, the same language, the same everything, but also their protection story is the same, 
unlike in an urban context where you have a mix-bag of cases which you have a refugee 
from Iran, who escaped because of religious persecution, a refugee from another country 
who escaped because of political activities.
314
  
 
The statements reveal that the desire for homogeneity and clear boundaries benefits from the 
very conditions that group resettlement schemes seek to resolve. Put another way, carving out 
finite and homogenous groupings of refugees relies on the immobility of refugees caught in 
situations of protracted displacement. Implicit in both Martin’s analysis and the official’s 
statements above is that these types of groupings of refugees already exist and that it is only a 
question of uncovering and encapsulating them.  
In a context where there are limited resettlement spaces, the decision to focus group 
resettlement efforts only on refugee camps has serious consequences for the millions of refugees 
living in urban centers. Moreover, even within the space of refugee camps, the desire for 
homogeneity and self-containment is confronted with fluid situations. Hyndman’s analysis of 
“ordering disorder” in Kenyan refugee camps highlights how the standardization efforts of the 
UNHCR fail to account “for local historical contexts” and to refugees that resist technologies of 
knowing such as headcounts.
315
 
The preference for finite and homogenous groupings of refugees can be seen in the initial 
discussions between the IOM, UNHCR, and Canadian Immigration authorities during the group 
processing pilot project in 2003. The UNHCR had approached the Canadian government about 
resettling two groupings of refugees out of the Dadaab refugee complex in Kenya. The first was 
what was understood as a “distinct” grouping of Somali Madhiban and the second was a 
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grouping of Christian Sudanese refugees. The UNHCR had determined that members of each 
grouping had similar refugee claims. As a result, Canada was willing to use the prima facie 
designation for them.
316
 However, authorities insisted that the UNHCR have safeguards in the 
process in order to insure there were no “imposters as part of the group.” A CBSA official 
emphasized the importance of being able to establish identity and to confirm that individuals are 
genuinely members of this grouping. State officials worked with UNHCR and IOM staff to 
verify membership in the chosen “group.” CBSA officials setup the guidelines of the screening 
process, determined who was in the chosen grouping, and contracted the IOM to do the initial 
pre-screening. The same official describes discussions between CIC and the IOM:  
What we said to the IOM is we want you to work with the UNHCR and what we want 
you to do is to define and encapsulate this group and once you have done that, nobody 
can be added afterwards and nobody can leave the group, as long as they are content to be 
a part of that group.
317
  
 
Demonstrating further the unease that governments sometimes have with group resettlement 
schemes, the same official exclaimed:  
It’s not just identifying the individuals. It’s identifying the individual within the context 
of the group. Refugees are no different than anyone else. If they can inject themselves 
into a group they will do that just because they are desperate enough to get out.
318
  
 
The officials’ use of term “group” several times reflects the assumption of groupism. What is at 
issue then is determining the level of groupness as measured by internal homogeneity, the 
thickness of boundaries, and the ability to distinguish those inside the grouping from those 
outside. 
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The government’s unease surrounding the grouping process is reflected in its reliance on 
identification and verification practices from its security and intelligence agencies, despite the 
UNHCR and IOM conducting similar exercises on the Somali Madhiban and Sundanese 
groupings of refugees. These practices were also applied to both the Karen and Bhutanese. While 
the Bhutanese was a much larger grouping of refugees compared to the Madhiban, discussions in 
both the Core Group on the Bhutanese (CGB) and the more routine Working Group on 
Resettlement (WGR) led to the belief that this refugee grouping was sufficiently self-contained 
given the particular location of the camps that house them in Nepal. This in turn minimized the 
potential for “pull factors” and the infiltration of what were perceived as unwanted elements into 
the camps.
319
 The same official discussed above remarked that because Nepal was not 
contiguous with Bhutan “it was a pretty encapsulated population, it was a big population, but it 
was essentially defined.”320  
Perhaps the clearest indication of the obsession over grouping in group resettlement 
schemes is reflected in the statements of a UNHCR official who explained that resettlement 
countries “like to draw a circle around the group in order to know who’s in it and who’s not.”321  
As David Newman explains, “borders are lines. They constitute the sharp point at which 
categories, spaces and territories interface.”322 The desire to visualize groupings of refugees is 
linked to the drawing of boundaries around them. The same official made the following remarks:  
It’s like if you had perfect vision at the moment you would know all the people that are in 
that group…to give you an example, one of the group definitions would be like Eritreans 
of Kunama ethnicity who are in the Shemelba camp who are registered between this date 
and that date, so in theory, even if you don’t have all those names right in front of you 
right then, it’s a finite group.323 
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The notion of “perfect vision” captures the logic of groupism at work in group resettlement 
practices.  It is the desire to uncover what are presumed to be already-existing externally 
bounded and internally homogenous refugee “groups.” In the absence of “perfect vision,” 
government officials turn to identification and verification exercises and the proactive production 
and analysis of group profiles.  
The desire for such clarity of group membership was less pronounced in earlier 
definitions of eligibility under the Indochinese Designated Class in which individual Vietnamese, 
Cambodians, and Laotions simply needed to demonstrate that they left their respective countries 
of origin after April 30, 1975. In contrast to this, contemporary group resettlement programs 
demand these very conditions. 
Even within the NGO sector there was some acceptance of the need for “finite groups”; 
albeit for different reasons than resettlement states and the UNHCR. During the initial 
discussions surrounding the creation of group processing, some within the Canadian Council for 
Refugees wanted to ensure that clear criteria be used in determining inclusion in the chosen 
grouping so as to prevent the possible exclusion of deserving individuals. Others emphasized the 
need to demonstrate the perceived distinctive vulnerability of chosen groupings of refugees, the 
aim being to justify their resettlement to other refugees present in the camps, but not included.
324
 
Some of these concerns could be seen in the US group resettlement of the Somali “Bantu,” 
something discussed in chapter four.  In some cases NGOs appear to be directly involved in 
grouping practices based on concerns over fraud and security. The Joint Voluntary Agency 
routinely screens refugees for resettlement to the US and was involved in the verification process 
for the group resettlement of the Somali Benadir out of the Dadaab refugee camps in 2004. The 
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UNHCR Resettlement Handbook indicates that “the verification questionnaire was designed by 
UNHCR with input from the Joint Voluntary Agency and US Department of Homeland Security 
[DOH].”325 At the 2004 UNHCR Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Robert 
Carey, then Vice President for Resettlement for the Refugee Council USA, suggested that the 
UNHCR draw on the expertise of states with large resettlement programs in dealing with issues 
of fraud and integrity and that the organization should enhance the fraud and integrity issues 
section under the composition of group and verification of membership section in the group 
profile document. Carey argued: 
Desperate refugees are often driven to desperate measures to secure a durable solution for 
themselves and their families. In order to ensure that such desperation does not taint the 
processing of an entire population, the methodology should include more specific 
questions about a group’s potential vulnerabilities to fraud.326  
 
The statements point to how the concerns of Refugee Council USA are in sync with the forward-
looking risk management practices of governments. The notion of “desperate refugees” driven to 
“desperate measures” is similar to the statements of the Canadian official mentioned earlier; that 
refugees that are desperate will inject themselves into a chosen “group.”  
A broad range of actors, therefore, supported the idea of crafting easily identifiable, 
homogenous, and finite groupings of refugees. For the UNHCR, it was the aspiration to be a 
legitimate and credible partner in the eyes of the major resettlement states that had grown 
dissatisfied with earlier resettlement programs prone to fraud and “pull factors.” In Canada, 
while group processing emerged in a context in which resettlement selection is formally based on 
protection needs, obsessions over fraud and security equally influenced its creation. For some in 
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the NGO sector, it was the fear that refugees that are genuinely members of a chosen grouping 
might be excluded. Despite the different motivations of each of these actors, all agreed on the 
importance of clear dimensions around groupings of refugees. For this reason, they all 
reproduced groupism by reifying ethnic, racial, or national “groups.”327   
Alongside the desire for homogeneity and clear boundaries is the concern to make 
resettlement programs efficient. Group resettlement schemes emerged within a context of neo-
liberal reforms.
328
 Under these schemes there is an emphasis on reducing perceived redundancies 
in overseas resettlement processing. Troeller notes that resettlement:  
is markedly resource-intensive because it requires extensive individual casework, both 
refugee status determination and resettlement assessment as it is directly linked to 
admissions to states and by nature entails often daily liaison with donor representatives at 
field, Headquarters and receiving state level.
329
  
 
As mentioned above, group resettlement aims to reduce these resource requirements through the 
use of group profiles, the skipping of refugee status interviews for individuals, and the selection 
of groupings of refugees that purportedly have common narratives of displacement. To use an 
expression encountered in several interviews with both UNHCR and Canadian immigration 
officials, the goal is to "generate efficiencies" in the processing of overseas refugees. Similarly, 
for the UNHCR, the group resettlement methodology is designed to improve operational 
efficiencies.
330
 The Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement suggests that 
“among the benefits of multilateral resettlement operations are the efficiencies that can be gained 
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by pooling resources and expertise.”331 It views the UNHCR group methodology as playing a 
role in these multilateral efforts. The creation of the group methodology within the UNHCR in 
the early 2000s coincides with the organization facing budgetary constraints. Writing in 2002, 
Troeller explains that the “UNHCR is not currently in a position financially to undertake the 
resettlement of large numbers of refugees as was achieved during earlier periods.”332  
The desire for firm boundaries under group resettlement reflects the twin objectives of 
these programs to mitigate fraud and security threats while making overseas processing more 
efficient. A CIC official explains that group processing is “a streamline process, shorter 
interviews, etc. Therefore, you want to make sure that you are dealing with a population that you 
know who they are, that it’s very well defined.”333  
Conclusion  
Throughout the post World War II period the Canadian government has developed 
different categories for grouping refugees. In many cases these worked outside the formal 
definition of a refugee under the Convention. While the government refused group settlement 
with the Tibetans, it treated them as a grouping in other ways, separating those perceived as easy 
to integrate and those deemed difficult. A different set of priorities was behind the creation of the 
Designated Classes. With the Indochinese, the concern was to make resettlement more efficient 
by streamlining eligibility and having the flexibility to work outside the narrow framework of the 
Refugee Convention. At the beginning of the Indochinese crisis, a mix of Cold War politics and 
humanitarian concerns supported a broad definition of eligibility for resettlement. As the crisis 
wore on, however, and circumstances changed, the government sought to tighten this eligibility.  
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The conditions surrounding the creation of Canada’s group processing differ and yet were 
influenced by the aftermath of the Indochinese resettlement programs. Similar to earlier versions 
of the Indochinese Designated Class there is less concern with ensuring refugee status based on 
the Convention; the state accepts the prima facie designation. This gives the Canadian 
government the flexibility to select groupings of refugees it desires regardless of whether or not 
members of these groupings fit the narrow definition of a refugee under the Convention. 
However, concerns over fraud, security risks, and “pull factors” have led officials to obsess over 
clear criteria for membership in groupings of refugees selected for resettlement. The state is 
preoccupied with visualizing and drawing boundaries around groupings of refugees. Moreover, 
the emphasis on creating efficiencies is much more pronounced compared to the former 
Indochinese Designated Class. While the Canadian government reformed definitions of 
eligibility under later versions of Indochinese Designated Class in response to concerns over 
“pull factors” and economic migrants, under group processing it avoids what are presumed to be 
risky, fluid, and heterogeneous groupings of refugees. The relations between the drive for 
efficiency, security practices, and the desire for homogeneity under group processing point to 
new variables of consideration in the Canadian state’s assessment of the ideal grouping of 
refugees for resettlement. Turning to Brubaker once again, we can say that the preference for 
easily identifiable, homogenous, and finite groupings of refugees is grounded in the assumption 
that “groups” such as these exist “out there” as substantial entities, with interests, and 
identities.
334
 From the state’s perspective, the issue is one of effectively visualizing them and 
“drawing” boundaries around them.   
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Chapter three: Building Circles  
Introduction  
This chapter further explores the drive for “perfect vision” and “drawing” boundaries 
under group resettlement schemes. It does so by focusing on registration, identification, and 
profiling practices used within the context of refugee camps. These practices act as inscription 
devices, making spaces to be governed such as the refugee camp visible.
335
 Along with the 
UNHCR’s group profile and proposal document (GPPD), they play a key role in operationalizing 
discursive binaries such vulnerable/risky, self-contained/open-ended, and common/complex 
narratives. The collection of registration and identification data in refugee camps produces an 
authoritative knowledge that permits group resettlement decisions to be made remotely. Practices 
of selection under group resettlement schemes invest multiple institutions and forums from 
Ottawa, Washington, and Geneva, to refugee camps in Thailand, Nepal, and Kenya. They 
provide the foundation for biopolitical risk management techniques that assess the suitability of 
groupings of refugees for resettlement. Risk management techniques test the homogeneity, 
fluidity, risk, and boundaries of prospective groupings.  
I begin the chapter by considering the preconditions for mapping refugee populations and 
creating UNHCR group profiles. I consider the gaps between the UNHCR’s formal group 
resettlement methodology and the actual practices of selection under group resettlement 
schemes. While NGOs, and more broadly civil society, help map global vulnerability, a select 
number of state and UNHCR officials play a key role in group resettlement decisions. The 
chapter then considers UNHCR profiles used in group resettlement schemes highlighting how 
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risk management techniques subdivide groupings of refugees, abstract particular forms of 
knowledge, and contribute to the writing of specific narratives of risk, persecution, and flight that 
serve bureaucratic and statist ends. The final part of the chapter considers the relations between 
profiling and mapping practices and the exercising of expertise under group resettlement.  
Pre-Circles: May 2007        
 In May 2007 the Core Working Group on the Bhutanese (CWG), which included state 
officials from Canada, Australia and the US, released a communique that announced the 
intention of the working group to resettle a substantial proportion of the Bhutanese refugee 
population out of Nepal.
336
 The largescale resettlement of the Bhutanese would involve the use 
of Canada’s group processing and the United States P-2 group referral. One of the preconditions 
for the CWG to reach this agreement was to obtain detailed census information on the Bhutanese 
refugees. This required permission by the Nepalese government for the UNHCR to enter the 
refugee camps and conduct registration exercises.
337
 Information obtained by the census could 
then be examined by the CWG. To give a sense of how important this information is, a Canadian 
Immigration official remarked that following the census and issuing of identity cards to the 
Bhutanese in Nepal it was as if they had been identified as human beings for the first time.
338
 
The statement highlights the importance of registration, identification, and mapping practices to 
the UNHCR’s management of refugee camps. These are the preconditions for creating the 
organization’s group profile and proposal documents.  
                                                     
336
 “Communique of the Core Working Group on Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal,” Embassy of the United States, 
Katmandu, Nepal, May 16, 2007,  http://nepal.usembassy.gov/bhutan_05-16-2007.html  
337
 CIC, Personal interview with author, 21
st
 July, 2011.  
338
 Ibid.  
106 
 
 
Census practices should not be viewed as an objective representation of reality. 
Moreover, they play a role in crafting groupings of refugees and reinforcing the assumption of 
groupism. As David I. Kertzer and Dominique Areal note, “the use of identity categories in 
census—as in other mechanisms of state administration—creates a particular vision of social 
reality. All people are assigned to a single category, and hence are conceptualized as sharing, 
with a certain number of others, a common collective identity.”339 In describing statecraft, Scott 
draws attention to the importance of making society legible and simplifying complex social 
processes. He views simplifications as akin to abridged maps, that “when allied with state power, 
would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade.”340 In a similar vein, Mark 
Neocleous argues “we need…to appreciate the political function of maps in constructing rather 
than merely reproducing the world and in creating rather than merely tracing borders.”341 
Benedict Anderson suggests that the map, along with the census, “profoundly shaped the way in 
which the Colonial state imagined its domain—the nature of the human beings it ruled, the 
geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry.”342 Mapping and census practices are 
the preconditions for operationalizing UNHCR resettlement submission categories such as 
“Women and Girls at Risk,” and “Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs.”343 These categories 
are designed to help authorities create a hierarchy of resettlement priorities. Mapping and census 
practices allow authorities to visualize and “draw” boundaries around what are presumed to be 
homogenous and finite groupings of refugees in camps. Prior to their registration and the census, 
the Bhutanese were outside the field of vision of the UNHCR. Hyndman emphasizes the 
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importance of visibility in ordering Kenyan refugee camps: “technologies of vision are used to 
calculate refugee populations and map the grid design of the camps onto the desert floor.”344  
Consider the potential political effects of conducting censuses. The 1988 census led by 
the Bhutanese government played an important role in displacing the Bhutanese that fled to 
Nepal.
345
 The purpose of this census was to construct categories of illegal immigration in the 
southern portions of Bhutan by adopting strict standards for documentation as proof of 
Bhutanese citizenship. This allowed the Bhutanese government to label over 100,000 Bhutanese 
as illegals.
346
 The census is similar to what Neocleous calls the “state’s cartographic violence” 
defining who is inside and outside the Bhutanese national identity.
347
 Yet, on the other hand, the 
UNHCR registration, mapping, identification, and census of the Bhutanese laid the foundation 
for their eventual resettlement. What seems a mundane exercise of collecting demographic 
information by different authorities has in fact played a critical role in the lives of the Bhutanese, 
from generating a sense of unease and ultimately flight to another country to the inclusion in the 
prized and limited group resettlement programs of Western states such as Canada.  
The registration of refugees factors prominently in the UNHCR’s consideration of 
“resettlement need.” Much of the discussion in group resettlement initiatives is based on the 
quality of registration, verification, bio-data, and fingerprints.
348
 The organization emphasizes 
continuous registration in an attempt to capture complex and fluid situations. Franke argues that 
the UNHCR is required to make refugee spaces thinkable through registration practices in an 
universalisable manner. Registration through the digitized and computerized spaces of the 
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organization’s ProGres system attempts to “find a way to establish a ‘fix’ on what comes to be 
known as the refugee population.”349 The UNHCR uses mapping techniques in what it views as a 
proactive manner. According to the Resettlement Handbook, 
Mapping identifies groups or categories of refugees with common needs and 
characteristics, and provides UNHCR with a clearer picture of the population profile. 
This facilitates the proactive identification of individuals or groups likely to need priority 
intervention, as well as refugees for whom resettlement may be the most appropriate 
durable solution. Mapping allows for pre-emptive risk mitigation.
350
  
 
Despite these sorts of attempts, as Franke demonstrates the UNHCR could never capture the true 
complexity and fluidity of refugees in camps and elsewhere.
351
 Moreover, the statements further 
demonstrate the assumption by officials that “groups” of refugees with commonalities exist and 
that with the aid of identification and mapping practices these “groups” can be uncovered. This 
overlooks how these practices bring into existence categories of refugees with commonalities 
and “needs.”  
The desire to “fix” refugees in what are otherwise fluid situations is reflected in the 
UNHCR’s suggestion that building profiles of both individuals and groupings requires in-depth 
registration, known as “level 3.” It can also be seen in the organization’s recommendations of 
inappropriate situations in which to conduct these exercises. Among these are “populations that 
are still moving” and “proximity to borders.”352 The messy and fluid situations that prevail in 
border areas frustrate the desire by government officials for “perfect vision.” The UNHCR 
suggests that in these areas “registration may have to be avoided for security reasons or to avoid 
mixing the refugee population with armed elements moving back and forth across the border. 
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There may also be mixing with local population living on both sides of the borders.”353 Thus, 
group resettlement schemes target refugees in camps as opposed to urban or border situations. 
The former are seen to provide a stable ground in which to actively carve out grouping of 
refugees deemed vulnerable and homogenous, while the latter are viewed as too fluid, 
heterogeneous, and prone to containing risky elements.   
Identification, registration, census, and mapping practices lay the foundation for various 
state and non-state actors to determine vulnerability, commonalities, and riskiness. In terms of 
vulnerability and need for resettlement, NGO’s such as Refugee Council Australia, Refugee 
Council USA, and the Canadian Council for Refugees can all list potential group resettlement 
candidates. As well as the UNHCR’s Annual Projected Global Resettlement Needs report, the 
designation of priority groupings of refugees by the UNHCR, the Working Group on 
Resettlement (WGR), and the High Commissioner’s dialogue. In the United States, the US 
Department of State, Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services produce 
the Annual Proposed Refugee Admissions Report to the Congress. Despite these many sources 
of identification (see Table One, Appendix A), most group resettlement identification is 
conducted in secret between UNHCR and state officials. This secrecy is motivated by the 
UNHCR’s unease in disclosing which groupings of refugees have been screened-out of 
consideration for group resettlement programs.
354
 In response to my request to the UNHCR for a 
list of refugee groupings identified for potential group resettlement, I received the following 
statement:  
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The UNHCR is not in a position to share information [regarding] refugee populations 
proposed for group resettlement that have not been resettled for whatever reason.
355
  
 
The refusal to share this information underscores the difficulty in uncovering how group 
resettlement decisions are made. Still, Table One in Appendix A demonstrates that many more 
groupings of refugees are identified as potential candidates than are actually resettled. It follows 
that for countries like Canada and Australia that have resettled few groupings, the decision 
carries enormous weight.  
Formally, the UNHCR has what are called internal, external, and joint sources of 
identifying group resettlement candidates.
356
 Officials in the field are encouraged to proactively 
identify resettlement need by linking it to what are called Country Operation Plans (COP) 
exercises, which are intended to provide a full picture of the UNHCR’s activities in its countries 
of operation across the globe.
357
 COP exercises help produce the organization’s Annual 
Projected Global Resettlement Needs Reports, which lists groupings of refugees deemed in need 
of resettlement. UNHCR headquarters instructs field offices to “subdivide each refugee 
population under their responsibility into large categories reflecting group characteristics, such as 
country of origin, ethnicity or religion.”358 Refugee populations are further subdivided according 
to political affiliations, the cause of displacement, and refugee experience.
359
 COP exercises 
assist the UNHCR in uncovering perceived commonalities amongst refugee populations.
360
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The Annual Projected Global Resettlement Needs Report, along with COP exercises and 
the identification of priority groupings of refugees by the High Commissioner, provide the 
foundation for what the organization views as joint sources of identification. This includes the 
Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCP), the Working Group on Resettlement 
(WGR) and Strategic Use of Resettlement initiatives.
361
 External sources of identification include 
refugee hosting States, embassies, NGOs, and refugees caught in protracted situations.
362
 In 
practice, a much smaller select group of agencies and individuals are involved in the process of 
referring groupings of refugees.  
While NGO’s play a role in identifying refugees “in need” of resettlement, when it comes 
to group resettlement decisions they are excluded. A UNHCR official remarked that resettlement 
states tend to hold back at meetings such as the ATCR, which include the participation of 
NGO’s. The same official explained that many group resettlement decisions are based on ad hoc 
formations of working groups such as the CGB discussed in chapter two or bilateral discussions 
between UNHCR and resettlement states.
363
 In some cases, resettlement states might initiate 
dialogue with the UNHCR on groupings of refugees that are of interest to them. Such was the 
case when US authorities approached the organization about expediting the processing of Lao 
Hmong in Thailand through group resettlement.
364
 The same official recalls having direct 
discussions with CIC staff at the ATCR meeting in Geneva on the selection of Karen for 
Canada’s group processing program.365   
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The bilateral nature of some group resettlement decisions is captured in a detailed 
explanation by a UNHCR representative of how group referrals unfold with US authorities. They 
explain: 
 
What happens is, usually there’s some initial discussion between a country and UNHCR, 
there’s this idea that maybe we will do this as a group, so there’s usually some initial 
sounding out of a country and [we would] say, would you be, do you think this would 
make a good group proposal? Would you be into it, you know, principally with the US, 
Canada and Australia; they [the UNHCR] would go and say, we’re thinking about doing 
this as a group, would you be a country who would be responsive to that?  
 
 
The statements highlight that initial discussions between the UNHCR and resettlement states on 
the prospects of resettling groupings of refugees are an important component of decision-
making, whereas later steps of the process are formal in nature. This stems from the belief by 
UNHCR officials that the process of preparing in-depth group profiles is complex and 
cumbersome.
366
 It is seen as a waste of time and resources unless a resettlement state expresses a 
high level of interest in a grouping of refugees being referred. One result is that group 
resettlement schemes are now focused on large refugee populations as opposed to small ones. 
Another UNHCR official explains: 
one of the things that’s always taken into consideration when you are looking at a 
submission of a group, a proposal for group resettlement, is the size of the population, 
because it is an awful lot of work at the front end to get the approval for a group 
resettlement methodology and I’ve had many different experiences with having to go 
through all that work and so it’s always this question of whether doing all this processing, 
getting all the approvals that are required at every level of the U.S government and within 
the UNHCR, is that worth all the time it will take everybody as opposed to just drafting 
individual resettlement submissions.
367
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The same official explained that US officials rejected a UNHCR group referral of Darfuris 
refugees from Sudan on the grounds that it was not large enough to warrant the use of the group 
methodology.
368
 The emphasis on size is now reflected in the UNHCR Resettlement 
Handbook.
369
 The concern of officials over too much paperwork reflects the official goal of 
group resettlement schemes to “generate efficiencies.”   
 If a government expresses interest in resettling a grouping of refugees it might request a 
more detailed profile of the grouping. A UNHCR official explains: 
 
At that point, you would…layout all these elements of explaining, you know, who these 
people are, what their needs for resettlement is, giving their history of the claim, laying 
out sort of an idea of how the group could be processed in way that is secure and etc.; 
timeframe and any potential pitfalls you could see. That document then, you know, 
written and usually presented to; in the case of the United States to the State Department, 
they review it first, there’s a little bit of back and forth if there are any glaring gaps, they 
then take that and internally discuss it with Homeland Security…[and ask] what do you 
guys at Homeland Security think about this?...They will then get some readout on it, there 
might be further discussions about…additional gaps or processes might be needed, then 
they’ll come back to us and say, at some point…we’re going to agree to this group or not. 
Often there is some sort of proviso on it, we’ll agree to this group once you have done the 
re-registration or verification or something like that.  
 
 
The concern over “gaps” along with the emphasis on verification highlights the unease of 
officials in relation to processes that fall outside their field of vision. The same official goes on to 
explain: 
then really at the very end of that process the US will usually issue some sort of very 
formal response back to us saying we will therefore take this group and they’ll lay out all 
the key elements…the definition…this group of Congolese, who lived in the X camp, 
who arrived between this and that date, who have been re-registered prior….after this 
date, whatever else they [specify]…and that will become their definition, so we will 
know…anybody who [is included] in the group is going to have to meet all those 
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requirements and then there usually will be with that some sort of agreement as to the 
documentation, which can vary. The easiest ones for us right now, let’s say the Burmese 
in Thailand. It’s literally a computer upload, I mean we just send, we upload just bio-data 
and when they get that bio-data the referral is done. So, somewhere between those two 
usually would be the document you give for a group.
370
 
 
The statements reveal a back and forth process between the UNHCR and resettlement states, 
focusing on the issues of defining the boundaries and membership of the proposed grouping of 
refugees. 
“Polaroid Shots”: Interim Group Profile      
Group profiles inscribe boundaries around refugees. They group them. Rose and Miller 
explain: 
By means of inscription, reality is made stable, mobile, comparable, combinable. It is 
rendered in a form in which it can be debated and diagnosed. Information in this sense is 
not the outcome of a neutral recording function. It is itself a way of acting upon the real, a 
way of devising techniques for inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in 
question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention.
371
 
 
Inscription devices allow authorities in places such as the UNHCR headquarters to shape the 
conduct of staff and refugees in camps. They abstract specific types of information from these 
conditions that are considered relevant to group resettlement decisions. Registration practices 
and group profiles provide Western governments and the UNHCR with the knowledge to make 
truth claims on groupings.  
To be sure, profiles can only attempt to shape the conduct of others. Both refugees and 
UNHCR field staff can and do resist profiling logics.  Refugees attempt to circumvent UNHCR 
anti-fraud techniques and include themselves in chosen groups for resettlement. Struggles and 
tensions occur between “centers of calculation” and those in the “field.”  
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I begin this section by examining what the UNHCR calls the interim group profile, which 
precedes the full GPPD. This shortened profile reflects the concerns of some UNHCR officials, 
as noted above, that the creation of full profiles is a waste of time and resources unless a 
government expresses a high level of interest in a particular grouping. Sandvik points to the role 
of informal administrative techniques within the UNHCR bureaucracy designed to manage 
caseloads and maintain control over camp populations, while giving the appearance of due 
process.  Her analysis of refugee resettlement in Kampala, Uganda draws attention to the mutual 
constitution of formal, informal, and illegal spheres in resettlement governance structures.
372
 The 
initial informal concerns of UNHCR officials in the “field” have led to the formalization of a 
generic interim profile now included in the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook.
373
  A UNHCR 
official describes the rationale behind its creation: 
How do we go from writing this 50 page document [the full GPPD] which takes a lot of 
work and many people and then you find out no country really wants to do it [i.e. group 
resettlement], you know, is there a way to do this, we developed this other interim 
document that was a quick sort of Polaroid shot of the group.
374
  
 
It is not the purpose of the “Polaroid shot” to capture all aspects of the messy reality of those 
caught in situations of protracted displacement. Instead, the complex and fluid narratives of 
entire refugee communities are reduced to a quick picture that can be easily transported and 
shopped around to prospective resettlement states. The official’s use of the analogy of a 
“Polaroid shot” captures the reification of “groups” under group resettlement schemes. The 
interim profile is a technique that attempts to substantialize “groups” and convert them into a 
mobile inscription device. According to the UNHCR Handbook, the interim profile includes: the 
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identification of resettlement need, the strategic benefits of resettling a grouping such as opening 
up other durable solutions in the country of first refuge, the basis for the groupings common 
refugee claim, or narrative, what makes them a grouping (their commonalities), and how the 
UNHCR can identify which individuals belong or don’t to the group.375  The interim profile is 
then sent to headquarters of the UNHCR for analysis and evaluation. This includes a 
consideration of potential pull factors and whether or not the population in question is stable or 
fluid. In deciding whether or not to refer a group proposal to a resettlement state, the Handbook 
continues, the headquarters considers the size of the grouping, the commonality and complexity 
of the refugee claim, the quality and accuracy of registration, resources required for verification, 
security concerns, whether or not group or expedited processing is most efficient and economical 
in terms of time and resources and what the organization refers to as “resettlement country 
preferences and capacities.”376 A substantial portion of the interim profile relates to security 
concerns and the potential for fraud as officials attempt to anticipate and identify potential 
problems that are of concern for state authorities.  
The interim profile can be seen as a mobile inscription device that attempts to abstract 
specific forms of information from the complex conditions that prevail in refugee camps. As 
Scott suggests, “no administrative system is capable of representing any existing social 
community except through a heroic and greatly schematized process of abstraction and 
simplification.”377 He explains that is unnecessary for the state to capture all aspects of social 
reality given that up until the nineteenth century its principle objectives were taxation, political 
control, and conscription.
378
 Profiling logics reflect statist practices based on abstraction, 
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simplification, and legibility. These logics play a role in crafting narratives of groupings of 
refugees based on a mix of humanitarian, security, and bureaucratic logics. They reflect colonial-
like anxieties surrounding perceptions of heterogeneity and the contamination of a presumed 
space of vulnerability.  
Completing the Circle: Group Profile and Proposal Documents (GPPDs)  
 If Western governments express interest in a particular group referral then the UNHCR 
will proceed to create the fuller profile, the GPPD.
379
 The GPPD is produced in the course of 
what have become prolonged discussions between governments and the UNHCR. A UNHCR 
official recalls that discussions on both the Bhutanese in Nepal and the referral of the Somali 
“Bantu” to the US lasted roughly 4 years each.380 As noted above, this has led to the 
development of the interim profile and a focus on larger groupings of refugees.  
 GPPDs attempt to divide refugee populations in camps into various subgroupings of 
interest to authorities. In the remainder of this section I consider how framings of vulnerability, 
security, and commonalities are employed in these profiles. 
 To begin with, refugees are grouped based on the presumed presence of common 
narratives of flight and persecution. The crafting of these narratives is an important element of 
group resettlement schemes. It is something unique to the process of grouping and differs from 
inland determination practices and resettlement based on the individual. For example, Malkki’s 
analysis of Burundi Hutu living in refugee camps in Tanzania demonstrates how humanitarian 
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organizations regard the historical knowledges and political narratives of refugees as irrelevant, 
unusable, and even threatening to the daily management of camps. She argues that the emphasis 
on physical and non-narrative evidence silences refugees.
381
 There are examples of this in group 
resettlement too. The Resettlement Handbook explains that when identifying groupings of 
refugees for resettlement:  
Preferably, the characteristics used to define group membership should be verifiable by 
some concrete or objective data. Facts such as nationality, date of arrival, or residence in 
a certain camp during a certain period of time, can frequently be determined from 
information UNHCR has gathered in a non-resettlement context.
382
  
 
Within GPPDs, however, there is an emphasis on the need for common narratives of persecution 
and flight amongst groupings of refugees. The Bhutanese profile prepared for US authorities, for 
instance, makes reference to the census organized by the Royal Government of Bhutan in 1988 
as the root cause of the displacement of the Bhutanese. It draws attention to the creation of the 
Bhutan People’s Party in 1990 by ethnic Nepalese that had fled to West Bengal, India, and notes 
that in August 1990 this organization called on the King of Bhutan to unconditionally release all 
political prisoners, establish a constitutional monarchy, amend the Citizenship Act of 1985, and 
to acknowledge freedom of religious practice and freedom to form political parties. The profile 
quotes academics such as Michael Hutt, Amnesty International, and government reports.
383
 
While it abstracts specific facts and elements of the flight of Bhutanese, it does emphasize the 
collective experience surrounding this, as well as the political resistance by some Bhutanese to 
their persecution at the hands of the King of Bhutan. GPPDs produce narratives based on 
groupings of refugees in ways that reflect the interests of resettlement states. Therefore, it is less 
a question of how refugees are silenced through the reliance on visual evidence of trauma and 
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facts, and more a question of how individual narratives of persecution get incorporated into (or 
excluded from) the crafting of collective narratives by state and UNHCR authorities.  
In part, these narratives highlight purportedly distinctive vulnerabilities of groupings of 
refugees under consideration for resettlement.  The GPPD submitted to Canadian government 
officials explains that the Karen refugees selected for group processing are distinct from the 
larger refugee population in the camps along the Thailand/Burma border. Linking vulnerability 
to the specific location of the grouping, it suggests that:  
The refugees in Mae La Oon Camp share a similar background and refugee experience 
with the majority of the [Burma] population in Thailand. This group can, however, be 
seen as having particular vulnerabilities distinct from the overall population in that the 
camp is situated in an extremely precarious location, with houses built on steep hillsides 
that are susceptible to landslides and other natural disasters.
384
 
 
The profile adds that the 800 chosen Karen are located in a single camp as opposed to multiple 
ones or an urban situation, making identification and verification easier for authorities. It 
considers whether or not the Karen refugees are subjected to a policy of encampment. The 
inability to seek employment and other amenities of life outside the confines of the camp 
demonstrates the sometimes thin line between vulnerability and security in profiling practices. 
The profile explains:  
Refugees from [Burma] are housed in camps under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Interior. The camps are closed and refugees are prohibited from leaving the confines of 
the camps. Refugees found to be in violation of the encampment policy are subject to 
arrest, detention and deportation; once deported, refugees are de-registered.
385
  
 
The need to visualize and “draw” boundaries around groupings benefits from the refugee’s 
condition of encampment. When refugees choose to leave camps they are no longer within the 
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field of vision of resettlement states and the UNHCR. It is for this reason that being registered is 
the minimum requirement to be considered for inclusion in a group resettlement initiative. 
Considerations of vulnerability, commonalities, and riskiness in profiles can also been 
seen in the Bhutanese GPPD prepared for US authorities. The profile details human rights abuses 
experienced by the Bhutanese in Bhutan such as beatings, public humiliations, arbitrary arrests 
and detentions, and political repression.
386
 These occurrences are linked to what is referred to as 
a “common claim of flight.”387 At the same time, it explains to its readers that the Bhutanese:   
have endured a prolonged period of ‘warehousing’ in refugee camps, where restricted 
mobility, idleness, and dependency of humanitarian assistance force refugees to place 
their lives on indefinite hold…Accordingly, UNHCR finds that the refugees in Nepal are 
indeed in need of resettlement on the basis of legal and physical protection needs and 
because of the lack of local integration prospects in Nepal. As neither voluntary 
repatriation nor local integration is presently available, resettlement is a viable solution 
for the population at this stage.
388
  
 
While it is understandable that the UNHCR would emphasize conditions of encampment and 
immobility to justify the resettlement of the Bhutanese, lost in its analysis is the fact that these 
same conditions provide the ideal ground for identification, verification, census, and mapping 
practices to operate. Moreover, these practices can be exclusionary as they seek to craft 
homogenous groupings of refugees from wider refugee populations, encapsulating them, and 
denying resettlement opportunities to those on the outside.  
As noted earlier, grouping relies on registration practices. This is reflected in the GPPD, 
which refers to “potential mechanisms permitting verification of membership in group(s).”389 
This includes: “prior or planned registration” and “empirically identifiable characteristics and 
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commonalities.”390 The Karen group profile assesses the quality of the registration as well as 
whether or not individual members have been issued identity cards. It explains to the reader: 
 
The population was originally registered in April 1999 jointly by UNHCR and the Thai 
government. A re-registration exercise was conducted in May 2005 and all data was 
collected and input into UNHCR’s ProGres database. Digital photographs and 
thumbprints were collected and are included in each individual record in the database. 
Each household was issued a new household registration document, which includes basic 
biodata and individual photographs…Household registration documents were issued 
during the re-registration exercise in Mae La Oon camp in May 2005. Registration data is 
updated on a monthly basis, and new documentation is issued whenever any changes to 
the household information occur (such as new births, deaths, or other changes in family 
composition) or corrections are made to data previously collected (such as spelling of 
names, dates of birth, etc.). UNHCR considers the registration data to be highly reliable; 
however, all data will be verified prior to the referral of individual cases for 
resettlement.
391
  
 
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, UNHCR and state authorities obsess over the perceived 
quality of registration when making group resettlement decisions. Registration plays an 
important role in “drawing circles” around groupings of refugees; in determining who is inside 
and who is outside chosen groupings.  
The same Karen GPPD considers what it calls “challenges and obstacles to group 
processing” such as “associated refugee movements (pull factors)”. It explains:  
In addition to the official refugee population in the nine camps in Thailand, there are an 
estimated 36, 810 individuals residing illegally in the camps pending formal admission 
by the Thai government. There are also an estimated 1, 000, 000 illegal migrants workers 
from [Burma] in the country, as well as some 800,000 who are registered migrant 
workers with temporary visas. It is possible that individuals from among these groups, as 
well as new arrivals from [Burma], may make attempts to enter the camps to seek 
inclusion in the ongoing resettlement operation. However, mechanisms are in place to 
ensure the identity of individuals submitted for resettlement, and therefore any new 
arrivals seeking inclusion in the group will be unable to gain access.
392
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The statements assume the existence of groupings of “illegal migrant workers” and “registered 
migrant workers with temporary visas” as distinguished from the “identities” of members of the 
chosen grouping of Karen. Brubaker suggests, “understood as a specifically collective 
phenomena, ‘identity’ denotes a fundamental and consequential ‘sameness’ among members of a 
group or category.”393 For this reason, he takes issue with use of the term “identity” in academic 
and other analysis. This includes constructivist and post-structuralist accounts that emphasize the 
contingent, fragmented, and fluid nature of “identities.” Despite these efforts to overcome what 
Brubaker refers to as strong conceptions of “identity,” he suggests that the term implies the 
persistence of some level of internal sameness amongst bounded “groups.” Brubaker suggests 
using the terms identification and categorization instead as these lack “the reifying connotations 
of ‘identity.’”394 
Within the Karen profile, the fluid nature of the border between Thailand and Burma as 
well as the constant flow of persons into and out of the camps are considered to make accurate 
estimates of “pull factors” difficult. While the UNHCR attempts to assure government officials 
that mechanisms are in place to verify the identities of the chosen 800 Karen, these sorts of 
conditions obviously run counter to the desire of governments for “perfect vision.”  
 The UNHCR’s attempt to manage fluidity, as well as heterogeneity, in refugee camps is 
reflected in Turner’s analysis of refugees in Tanzania. He argues that “in spite of the 
heterogeneous composition of the refugee population, the bureaucratic space of the camp was 
homogenous and homogenising, and the governing techniques of the relief agencies tended to 
‘flatten’ the population.”395 As the statements above demonstrate, the UNHCR, IOM, and 
government officials can only aspire to order, homogeneity, and firm boundaries. Registration, 
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identification, and census practices are constantly confronted with fluid and messy situations 
both inside and outside refugee camps.  
 The grouping of refugees also relies on state security and intelligence agencies. During 
the piloting of Canada’s group processing program in 2003 with the resettlement of what was 
referred to as a “distinct group of Somalis” out of Dadaab Kenya, government officials worked 
with UNHCR and IOM staff to verify membership in the chosen grouping. The CBSA setup the 
guidelines of the screening process, defined the chosen grouping of refugees, and contracted the 
IOM to do the initial pre-screening. Security and intelligence officials verified that individual 
Somalis were in fact members of the chosen groupings and then compared the verification list 
with the initial UNHCR list of members. Though, according to a CBSA official, field staff 
“could have been duped at the frontend.”396  Canadian government officials subjected the chosen 
refugees to medical and security screening. If individuals failed either one of these tests they 
were excluded from the program. The same CBSA official explained that these procedures 
became the standard practice for Canada’s group processing program and were applied to both 
the Karen and Bhutanese refugees.
397
 While the UNHCR’s group profiles are an integral part of 
group resettlement schemes, equally important are the immigration, security, and intelligence 
practices of governments. 
In some instances the drive for self-containment benefits from the geographical locations 
of refugee camps targeted for group resettlement schemes. This can be seen with the selection of 
Bhutanese groupings of refugees by both the Canadian and US governments. The GPPD 
submitted to US authorities provides a formal definition of the grouping that is much larger than 
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the approximately 800 Karen refugees selected by Canadian government officials. The profile 
states:  
UNHCR proposes for submission the population of refugees from Bhutan in Nepal who 
are formally registered with the Government of Nepal and UNHCR, who reside in one of 
the seven refugee camps in Nepal or outside the camps, and whose membership in the 
group is verified by UNHCR. Refugees meeting this group profile definition would be 
referred to the United States resettlement program for consideration provided that in 
advance the refugee has signed an Agreement to Resettlement Referral (ARR).
398
  
 
Despite the relatively open-ended definition of “group” membership, as noted in the previous 
chapter, discussions within both the Core Group for the Bhutanese and the Working Group on 
Resettlement led to a belief amongst officials that the Bhutanese refugee population was 
sufficiently encapsulated given the particular location of the camps in Nepal that housed them. 
From the perspective of authorities, this minimized the potential for “pull factors” and the 
infiltration of unwanted elements into the camps.
399
 In this instance, an accident of geography 
played a role in fixing the fluidity of refugee movements.   
Carving out Vulnerable Circles 
UNHCR authorities craft subgroupings of refugees from the wider refugee population in 
camps. The organization has specific categories of vulnerability that are prioritized for 
resettlement. These include: ethnic minorities who suffer discrimination in the camp, individuals 
with urgent security concerns, those with serious medical conditions that cannot be treated in 
camps, and women-at-risk.
400
 The Bhutanese profile singles out individual women-at-risk as well 
as separated or unaccompanied children for priority resettlement. It identifies “broken or non-
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traditional, disproportionate or large number of absent male/female heads of family, separated or 
unaccompanied children.”401  
The crafting of homogenous groupings of refugees relies on order and fixity. For this 
reason, there is a preference for refugees located in camps. Hyndman and Giles argue that 
refugees in protracted situations are feminized based on their location away from developed 
states and their lack of Convention status. These refugees are framed as genuine, immobile, and 
yet depoliticized. In contrast to this, those “on the move are largely seen as a threat, to prosperity 
and the viability of welfare states in the global North and to security in those same states.”402  
They explain: 
When individual refugees decide to divorce themselves from the scripts of sedentarist 
camp life and move on, they become potentially threatening as ‘asylum seekers’ or 
‘migrants’ who are seen as simply seeking a better life, not necessarily protection. The 
legitimacy of a refugee on the move, beyond such spaces, changes political valence 
dramatically, from innocent, helpless and deserving to politically dangerous, self-
interested and undeserving.
403
  
 
Within group profiles there are similar framings between those that remain in camps and those 
that chose to leave them. The Karen profile notes: “many men are absent from the camp because 
of continuing involvement in armed combat inside [Burma], or because they are outside the 
camp working illegally in other locations of Thailand.”404 Resettlement states prefer refugees 
that remain in camps subjected to the bureaucratic gaze of the UNHCR.  The Karen GPPD 
prepared for Canadian government officials explains: 
Only persons who are officially-recognized camp residents are eligible for resettlement 
submission. In the event a family is identified for referral in which one or more 
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immediate relatives are pending admission by the Thai government, the case will not be 
included in the submission.
405
  
 
From the perspective of authorities, broken-up families and those outside refugee camps present 
problems for ordering and fixing practices that seek to craft homogenous groupings of refugees. 
“Risky” Circles  
Under group resettlement schemes, individuals deemed fraudulent or a security risk 
threaten the conception of a vulnerable and deserving grouping of refugees. GPPDs attempt to 
identify potential problems, referred to as exclusion concerns. UNHCR field representatives are 
instructed to list the profiles of risky individuals and to provide a breakdown of the age and 
gender of these profiles. These include: armed combatants, individuals that have committed 
torture in a position of authority, individual acts of violence, and inciting others to violence.
406
 
According to one UNHCR official, groupings of refugees that have fled ethnically framed 
conflicts and violence present problems for group resettlement since these groupings may 
include these sorts of “risky” individuals. The same official singled out “African situations” for 
this problem, remarking that if “there are elements that present exclusion concerns…then you 
have to breakdown and isolate the different profiles.”407 Officials would prefer the selection of 
groupings that would not require the disentanglement of vulnerable profiles from risky ones. 
GPPDs attempt to gage this problem by providing an estimate of the number of individuals with 
potential exclusion concerns and indicating whether or not these individuals are identifiable by 
other refugees, UNHCR staff, official records, or human rights reports.  
The Bhutanese profile submitted to US government officials demonstrates how exclusion 
concerns are articulated in these profiles. It contains a detailed assessment of risk that deals 
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primarily with whether or not refugees in the camps in Nepal are affiliated with resistance 
organizations that have been accused of violent activities or are considered terrorist groups by 
Western governments. It explains that the UNHCR “does not think that exclusion issues may in 
general apply to this refugee caseload, although it cannot rule out that it may be applicable to 
some individuals within the population.”408 This conclusion is based in part on discussions 
within the Core Group on the Bhutanese, and in the case of Canada on security assessments 
conducted by agencies such as the CBSA and CSIS. 
409
 Despite this, the group profile does 
attempt to isolate and identify what are perceived as potentially threatening elements. It suggests 
that some refugees in the camps were, or are, members of organizations such as the Bhutanese 
People’s Party, which according to the profile has been accused of terrorist activities by the 
Royal Government of Bhutan. It concludes, however, that it “has no clear evidence or 
information suggesting that members of the Bhutanese People’s Party who are refugees in the 
camps in Nepal have committed any excludable acts in Bhutan… [and] to the best of UNHCR’s 
knowledge, none of the Bhutanese political opposition organizations are considered as terrorist 
organizations by resettlement countries.”410 The profile considers in detail what it views as 
strategies of violence and intimidation by anti-resettlement and pro-repatriation organizations 
such as the Bhutan Revolutionary Youth Organization (BRYO) and the Bhutanese Communist 
Party-Marxist Leninist Maoist (BCP-MLM). It explains that in the weeks following serious riots 
in the Beldangi camps, members of both of these organizations “were reportedly carrying out 
acts of intimidation against individuals known to be in support of resettlement.”411 It also 
considers support for the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPNM) within the camps since 
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this is a designated terrorist organization by some resettlement states. The UNHCR’s position on 
these issues was that if support for these organizations occurred, it was most likely within a 
context of intimidation and threats. It explains:  
Refugees have reported to UNHCR that they have experienced varying degrees of 
pressure for financial contributions and extortions by members of the CPNM. The close 
vicinity of three cantonments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the military wing 
of the CPNM, nearby the refugee camps could increase this risk as the level of assistance 
in the cantonment sites is lower than in the camps.
412
  
 
The UNHCR attempts to assuage potential concerns on the part of US government officials on 
this matter by insisting that it has maintained a sealed humanitarian space. The GPPD explains 
that the: 
UNHCR has made repeated interventions with the CPNM on the need to maintain the 
civilian and humanitarian nature of the camps, and there is no evidence that refugees in 
the camps were ever subjected to systematic extortion by the CPNM. According to 
reports, any such practices ceased at the end of November 2006 and the CPNM has 
repeatedly stated that its policy is not to ‘tax’ or recruit refugees.413  
 
In the event that refugees did pay the CPNM, the GPPD stresses that it is a safe assumption that 
this was done under duress or intimidation.   
The statements above reinforce Turner’s conclusions regarding the UNHCR’s 
management of refugee camps in Tanzania. Namely, that the organization attempted to create a 
de-politicalized space populated by passive victims of violence lacking political subjectivity. 
Turner shows that “attempts to void the camp of power and politics paradoxically created a space 
that was hyper-politicised. To the extent that political activity was recognized by the UNHCR 
within the camps, it was viewed as introducing divisiveness and selfishness.”414 The discussion 
of exclusion concerns in the Bhutanese profile suggests that in many cases political agency is 
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confused with the intimidation of passive victims. Malkki points to a similar situation where the 
UNHCR and the international press presented the refusal of refugees to repatriate to Rwanda 
following the massacres in the 1990s as the result of intimidation.
415
 Barnett recalls that the US 
Department of Homeland Security initially found many of the Karen refugee population to be 
inadmissible under the US Patriot Act and Real ID Act, specifically as it relates to material 
support for terrorist organizations, in this case support for the Karen National Army.
416
 A 
UNHCR official explained that at the request of the US State Department, the organization went 
ahead and referred the Burmese since US authorities had agreed to grant waivers, or exemptions, 
to those initially found excludable.
417
 The same official noted that in the US, terrorism laws have 
a particularly wide definition of material support which has contributed to the inadmissibility of 
many Karen. Barnett explains that “just before resettlement was to begin in June [2006], [now 
former] Secretary of State Rice waived the Patriot Act terrorist provisions for the entire 
resettlement grouping, ignoring the concerns of some at the Justice Department.”418 He adds that 
supporters of the Burmese resettlement effort “point out that, among the refugees, ‘material 
support’ is more often than not provided unwittingly or under coercion.”419  Implicit in this claim 
is that political subjectivity is tolerated in framings of refugeeness only insofar as it is imposed 
unwittingly on them.  
Despite the UNHCR’s tendency to minimize political subjectivity within refugee camps, 
as noted above, the GPPD contains relatively detailed accounts of politics and resistance 
movements. In dealing with resettlement states, the organization, through the group profile, 
attempts to re-order politics, resistance, and violence inside and outside camps to fit a specific 
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narrative of justification. Within refugee camps selected for group resettlement, UNHCR 
authorities must manage heterogeneity even while they seek relatively homogenous and 
vulnerable grouping of refugees. Part of this process involves recognizing political subjectivities 
within the camps.   
It is worth noting that the Karen GPPD provided for this dissertation was missing several 
sections, including the one that outlines exclusion concerns. That being said, it does contain a 
small section that deals with rebel groups, police harassment, and incidents of refoulement. The 
profile highlights reports of abuse by the Thai military and police against Karen refugees in the 
camps, including incidents of refoulement. 
420
 These refugees could easily be placed into one of 
the categories of vulnerable subgroupings outlined at the beginning of the Karen GPPD, 
specifically “individuals with urgent security concerns in the camps.”421 Instead, they are lumped 
into a section that considers security concerns such as the influence of the KNU and other 
insurgent groups in Burma on the refugee population in Thailand. The profile explains that:  
The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC), a border-wide organization made up of refugee 
leaders, and responsible for overseeing the management of the camps, is closely linked to 
the KNU. As such, the KNU exercises a great deal of indirect influence on the camps, 
including matters relating to the camp justice system.
422
 
 
As noted above, US security and intelligence agencies were initially concerned about the 
presence of Karen individuals involved with insurgent and rebel groups in the camps. Despite 
this, Canadian government officials approved the group processing of Karen. An immigration 
official recalls that both the CBSA and CSIS had determined that were minimal risks associated 
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with resettling Karen. In fact, the same official referred to both the Karen and Bhutanese as 
“clean populations,”423 something discussed further in the next chapter.  
Expertise under Group Resettlement Schemes 
The Governmentality approach is concerned with how different locales are established as 
authoritative and powerful, how different agents are assembled with specific powers, and how 
different domains are constituted as governable and administrable.
424
 Registration information, 
profiles, and bio-data make refugee camp spaces visible and susceptible to intervention by 
UNHCR and government officials. They assist authorities in making group resettlement 
decisions in forums such as the Working Group on Resettlement in Geneva, the Protracted 
Refugee Situation (PRS) group in Ottawa, and the Resettlement Service at UNHCR 
headquarters. Institutions and forums that are far removed from refugee camps are made 
powerful and authoritative. In this way, the construction of profiles based on the grouping of 
refugees acts as a mobile inscription device that permit governing “at a distance.”425  
Profiles invest agents with specific forms of knowledge on refugee populations. This 
knowledge becomes authoritative through its connections to the exercising of expertise in group 
resettlement decisions. It permits “truth claims” to be made in relation to the consideration of 
what are perceived as groupings of refugees with commonalities. Rose and Miller emphasize the 
central role of expertise to governing in advanced liberal democracies. They note:  
The complex of actors, powers, institutions and bodies of knowledge that comprise 
expertise have come to play a crucial role in establishing the possibility and legitimacy of 
government. Experts hold out the hope that problems of regulation can remove 
themselves from the disputed terrain of politics and relocate onto the tranquil yet 
seductive territory of truth.
426
 
                                                     
423
 CIC, Personal interview with author, 21
st
 July, 2011.  
424
 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule.  
425
 See Rose and Miller, “Political power beyond the State.” 
426
 Ibid, 188.     
132 
 
 
 
This holds especially true with respect to Canada’s group processing, where most elements of the 
selection process are hidden from the public. In this final section of the chapter I consider the 
types of expertise involved with both this program and group resettlement in general.  
To begin with, the consideration of risks within the GPPD forms only one part of the 
security screening process under group resettlement schemes. Government officials are reluctant 
to fully rely on the UNHCR’s and IOM’s screening process. This is reflected in the statements of 
a CBSA agent while describing the UNHCR’s ability to conduct security assessments under 
group processing: 
Well UNHCR tries…but they are not very good at it, and the reason they are not very 
good at it is because they don't really have the intel to really support their assertions. Its 
face value, so if somebody comes in and says this is me and this is who I am and I've 
never been involved in this thing or that thing [e.g. terrorist activities or war crimes], they 
just accept it at face value, they really don't have any intel to support it, so we [CBSA] 
have significant intel on a lot of different organizations and groups, that's just the nature 
of what we do, because the primary purpose is to protect Canadians so you are not 
bringing in immigrants and visitor's and stuff like that there are a threat to Canada. So 
we've got the wherewithal to do that...with the Bhutanese population we never had any 
problems at all, same with the Karen, very little problems with the Karen.
427
 
 
The security official’s statements resonate with Didier Bigo’s theorizations on the global field of 
in-security. The professional managers of unease are invested with the knowledge and power of 
statistics to make truth claims as to what counts as legitimate threats; to classify and prioritize 
these threats.
428
 The perception by security and intelligence experts that the UNHCR does not 
possess this knowledge places it in the category of amateurs. As Bigo explains, “amateurs always 
need to "prove" their claims, whereas professionals, whether public or private, international, 
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national, or local, corporate or public, can evoke without demonstrating.”429 It is for this reason 
that knowledge accepted at face value from those outside “the game” is simply not enough from 
the perspective of the security professional as are statements such as “to the best of the 
UNHCR’s knowledge” in the Bhutanese GPPD. It is the same reason that security and 
intelligence agencies in Canada perform their own security, identification, and verification 
exercises despite similar UNHCR practices.  
 Security expertise plays an important role in determining risky groupings of refugees. 
CBSA in consultation with CSIS and RCMP run the names of chosen refugees for group 
processing initiatives in intelligence databases and examine their histories. According to the 
CBSA, individual assessments of national security threat by CSIS are used in combination with 
CBSA considerations of inadmissibility under sections 34, 35, and 37 of IRPA as well as 
criminality checks. Taken together, these form part of the overall assessment of chosen 
groupings of refugees.
430
 The section on exclusion concerns contained within the GPPD is 
examined by the intelligence directorate of the CBSA along with profiles on particular 
groupings, studies on groupings within particular areas of countries, and admissibility patterns, 
something that will be discussed further in the next chapter.
431
 The UNHCR and IOM perform 
pre-screening and verification exercises that provide the names of chosen refugees to security 
agencies such as CSIS and CBSA, who in turn re-examine the histories of these individuals and 
run their names through security and intelligence databases.
432
 CBSA assess refugee populations 
based on information provided by countries of origin as well as internal intelligence reports, 
trends, and analysis. The CBSA’s intelligence and national security directorate receives 
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intelligence reports on particular groupings of refugees from CSIS. According to a CBSA official 
“[CSIS] are on the ground, they have the expertise more so than we [CBSA] do...they provide 
the analysis, the data...so that we’re able to compile [it], so CSIS would give us that 
information.”433 CBSA obtains information on criminality concerns from the RCMP who works 
with Interpol. On top of the IOM and UNHCR, the Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian 
Red Cross, and UNHCR Canadian office are also consulted by the CBSA.
434
 As to whether or 
not Canadian security and intelligence agencies work with their foreign counterparts in countries 
such as the US, a CBSA official remarked: 
If it’s needed… But CSIS has a lot of very good Intel, we have a lot of very good Intel, 
and…very often we will do things that are different than other countries… if other 
sources have to be accessed in terms of verifying information and things like that, it will 
be [done].
435
   
 
Once again Bigo’s insights apply here as the statements reflect both the struggles and 
cooperation, if necessary, within the broader field of in-security professionals. The assumption is 
that security and intelligence agencies have the knowledge and expertise, which allows them to 
make truth claims on the potential risk of candidates for group processing. Despite this, security 
and intelligence experts are not completely removed from what Rose and Miller refer to as the 
“disputed terrain of politics.”436 This is reflected in the struggles between the US State 
Department and Department of Homeland Security over the potential inadmissibility of Karen 
refugees. Political preferences, or exemptions, still play a role in selecting groupings of refugees. 
It should be noted that the increased formalization and lengthy process of group resettlement 
schemes throughout the 2000s has coincided with much earlier security assessments of refugee 
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populations. Already mentioned is the fact that under the US’s P-2 group designation the 
Department of Homeland Security has become involved in group proposals and discussions at 
much earlier stage.
437
 The implications of these issues will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
Foreign policy plays a role in group resettlement decisions as well, especially under the 
US’s P-2 program. The U.S. Department of State explicitly acknowledges that foreign policy 
considerations guide its selection of refugee populations caught in protracted situations.
438
 
Labman argues that “more overtly than is the case in Canada, American resettlement selection 
aligns with foreign policy preferences.”439 Still, in Canada, foreign policy can influence group 
processing decisions. The Canadian government may choose to focus resettlement efforts on 
countries in which there are perceived economic interests or security concerns at play. The Prime 
Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs may have specific countries that are of interest to them, 
what one might call political preferences or priorities.
440
 CIC officials rely on the perceived 
foreign affairs expertise of DFAIT as it relates to the humanitarian situations in countries that 
host refugees, the chances for voluntary repatriation, conditions in the country of origin, conflict 
analysis, and multilateral trends around refugee movements.
441
 DFAIT builds its knowledge of 
these situations from several sources. Embassies within refugee countries of origin provide 
analysis of the political situation facing specific populations. In countries of first refuge, DFAIT 
considers whether or not refugee populations are receiving the services they require, if there is 
the potential for refoulement, and if there are tensions between the refugee population and local 
communities. These sorts of considerations by DFAIT assist Canadian immigration officials in 
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determining the need for resettlement for specific populations in the absence of alternative 
durable solutions. Immigration officials rely on the identification of what are referred to as 
priority refugee populations by the UNHCR in need of resettlement. DFAIT consults with 
experts within the UNHCR, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Forced Migration Review, and 
a whole host of civil society actors involved in the field of forced migration/refugee studies. A 
DFAIT official explains “we do try to develop an expertise in-house but we know exactly who to 
go out to talk to, to get expertise as well, and we’re not shy about going out and doing that.”442   
DFAIT plays a role within the PRS working group mentioned earlier. The PRS considers 
specific refugee situations that are viewed as matching Canada’s foreign policy interests and 
priorities. According to one official, the types of questions posed by DFAIT within the PRS 
include: is Canada engaged there? Are there good relations with the government? Does Canada 
have development programs there?
443
 DFAIT provides diplomatic support to the PRS through its 
contacts with donors, host countries, and what it refers to as “likeminded countries” within 
Geneva and New York. It is informed of and consulted on multilateral discussions within 
Geneva such as the Core Group on the Bhutanese and the Working Group on Resettlement. The 
Humanitarian Affairs Section at the Canadian permanent mission in Geneva attends these sorts 
of meetings. While delegations that deal with UNHCR affairs comprise 2 CIC and 1 Canadian 
International Development Agency staff member, DFAIT does liaison with the Humanitarian 
Affairs Section very closely.
444
 The PRS adopts what is referred to as a “whole of government” 
approach aimed at resolving protracted refugee situations. Rather than rely exclusively on 
resettlement, the working group aims to resolve these situations through a range of governmental 
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measures including development assistance, which is used to influence countries of first refuge 
to increase local integration of refugees.
445
  
DFAIT, for the most part, plays a secondary role in group processing, ensuring that 
certain conditions prevail within countries that host groupings of refugees under consideration 
for resettlement. This can range from proper diplomatic relations to identifying the absence of 
alternative durable solutions outside resettlement. It should be noted however that this seems to 
be changing. Recent reforms to the Canadian government’s entire resettlement program suggest 
a more prominent role for foreign policy considerations in selecting groupings or populations of 
refugees, something discussed in chapter five. 
Conclusion  
Under group resettlement schemes, authorities are confronted with messy and fluid 
situations within refugee camps. Biopolitical practices based on visualizing these spaces and 
producing order out of disorder, 
446
 attempt to craft collective narratives of relative vulnerability. 
These narratives are attached to what are perceived as self-contained groupings of refugees with 
firm boundaries.  Census, identification, and profiling practices play an important role in sorting 
messy and fluid groupings with risky elements from internally homogenous and self-contained 
groupings considered relatively safe, vulnerable, and “deserving.” Taken together, these 
practices reify refugee “groups” under consideration for resettlement. They simplify, abstract, 
and manage heterogeneity while being uneasy about it.  “Drawing circles,” along with the 
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aspiration for “perfect vision” reflects the logic of sovereignty to stabilize “territorialized 
relations, institutions, and identities” and reaffirm the “citizen/nation/state ensemble.”447  
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Chapter four: “Clean Population”   
Between the years 2006-2012 the UNHCR identified roughly fourteen potential group 
referrals for either the organization’s group methodology or priority situations in need of 
resettlement. Among these were:  Burundians in Tanzania, Eritreans in Sudan, Congolese, 
Afghans in Russia, Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, Iranians in Turkey, Burmese (Rohingya) in 
Bangladesh, Bosnians and Croatians in Serbia, Bhutanese in Nepal, and Burmese in Thailand.
448
 
Beyond this list, even a cursory look at the UNHCR website reveals that there are many other 
refugees in both camp and urban contexts that could be described as in need of resettlement. 
Despite this, only a select few have been chosen for group resettlement schemes. In this chapter I 
begin to piece together this gap by drawing on several examples of grouped refugees either 
included or excluded from these schemes. While the chapter concentrates on Canada’s group 
processing program, like previous chapters it considers examples within the US’s P-2 group 
referral and draws on the UNHCR’s group methodology.   
Resettlement programs by their very nature are discretionary. The UNHCR resettlement 
handbook reminds its readers of this fact stating:  
 
Resettlement is not a right, and there is no obligation on States to accept refugees through 
resettlement. Even if their case is submitted to a resettlement State by UNHCR, whether 
individual refugees will ultimately be resettled depends on the admission criteria of the 
resettlement state.
449
  
 
The voluntary nature of resettlement has been the target of much criticism. Many authors point to 
the self-interests of states that motivate large-scale resettlement decisions such as foreign policy 
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considerations and the influence of lobbying groups.
450
 Some of the literature on resettlement 
highlights how states frame overseas refugees as “genuine” in relation to “risky” or “bogus” 
refugees.
451
 These sorts of distinctions can be seen in House of Commons debates in Canada. In 
May 2007 Conservative Party member Nina Grewal equated Canada’s purportedly 
compassionate and humanitarian nature with the resettlement of Karen refugees from Burma 
while questioning the need for an Appeals Division for inland determination.
452
  In 2008 during 
the proceedings of the Standing Committees on Human Rights, former Immigration Minister 
Finley equated increased applications for refugee status from Mexico and Haiti with “illegal 
migrants,” “flooding across the borders,” “taking advantage of this good system,” and “economic 
migrants.” The argument was made that:  
Those people are not legitimate refugees compared to individuals who have been in 
camps for many years…it is an abuse of the system, and Canadians do not want to see 
that. They do want to help those who need and deserve our help, such as the Karen 
refugees to whom we have opened our doors, the Bhutanese and the Iraqi refugees, 
whose numbers we have committed to doubling this year. They are truly refugees.
453
  
 
An internal document that outlines the government’s media strategy regarding the resettlement of 
Karen refugees provides insight into how it frames group processing initiatives. The document 
emphasizes the specific vulnerabilities of the chosen Karen refugees while pointing out the 
perceived benefits of group processing such as reducing “the time associated with identifying, 
processing and resettling refugees,” a questionable claim in light of what was discussed in 
chapter three; namely the protracted nature of many group resettlement discussions. The same 
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document poses a hypothetical question from the media: “why are the Karen considered 
vulnerable?” The prepared response goes on to explain that: 
We know that many refugees are in genuine need of protection and are considered 
vulnerable. However, some refugees are in greater need of our protection than others. For 
example, some refugees are in greater physical danger due to their personal 
circumstances within the larger camp population.
454
 
 
What is implied from this statement is that group processing decisions are based on a hierarchy 
of humanitarian needs. Still, the media strategy emphasizes that the Karen refugees selected have 
been thoroughly screened by both the CBSA and CSIS. At one point it states that “a rigorous 
identification and verification process was used to verify individual identity, credibility and 
admissibility (security and criminality). Medical screening is also taking place prior to approving 
travel to Canada.”455 While the Canadian government is comfortable in publicizing groupings of 
refugees already selected for group processing such as the Karen and Bhutanese, it is reluctant to 
reveal how decisions are made under this program.  
Group processing schemes are shrouded in secrecy. This is reflected in one of my first 
attempts made to obtain information for this dissertation on the inner workings of the Core 
Group on the Bhutanese and the Working Group on Resettlement. I posed questions by email to 
an official that worked at the Canadian Humanitarian Affairs Section of the embassy in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The Humanitarian Affairs Section represents Canada’s position on refugee issues at 
both the Core Group and the Working Group on Resettlement meetings. Here is a sample of 
some of the questions I asked and answers given in correspondence with this official: 
Question: Are there discussions [at the Core Group Meetings] on the potential security 
implications of the resettlement of large refugee populations?   
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Answer: “This topic is discussed during Core Group meetings but we are not in a 
position to provide you with more information in this regard due to confidentiality 
constraints.” 
Question: Are there discussions on medical or public health issues?  
Answer “This topic is discussed during Core Group meetings but we are not in a position 
to provide you with more information in this regard due to confidentiality constraints.” 
Question: Are there discussions on the foreign policy implications of group resettlement? 
 Answer: “This topic is discussed during Core Group meetings but we are not in a 
position to provide you with more information in this regard due to confidentiality 
constraints.” 
Question:  Could you elaborate on what was discussed at the meeting(s) of the Core 
Group on the Bhutanese?  
Answer: “No (for reasons of confidentiality).”  
Question: Did the Core group discuss the resistance to resettlement from some members 
of the Bhutanese refugee community in Nepal?  
Answer: Yes.  
Question: What was the Core group’s position in relation to this resistance? 
 Answer: “This is confidential.” 
Question: What role did the United Stated play in these Core Group discussions?  
Answer: “This is confidential.” 
Question:  From what I understand, in 2005 or 6, the high commissioner for refugees 
pronounced on 5 protracted refugee situations that were identified as being as a priority. 
Does/did the Core group discuss these sorts of announcements by the high 
commissioner?  
Answer: “Yes.” 
Question: If so, what was the nature of these discussions?  
Answer: “Confidential.”456  
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From a research perspective my initial reaction was concern that obtaining information on group 
processing was going to be challenging to say the least. The refusal to answer the questions 
along with numerous instances of resistance from other officials when asked about group 
resettlement decisions (beyond limited publicly available information) demonstrates that the 
Canadian government shrouds these decisions in secrecy in a bid to maintain discretion over the 
assessment, sorting, and selection of groupings of refugees. Despite the official’s constant 
reference to confidentiality issues, the short answers do indicate that decisions are based on 
security assessments, foreign policy considerations, and health implications. Yet, revealing the 
details of these assessments would present problems for the government’s framing of group 
processing as based on efficiency, humanitarian gestures, and international burden-sharing. This 
chapter is based on the few instances, after much effort, in which officials were willing to discuss 
these matters in greater detail.  
I begin the chapter by highlighting the prominent role of bureaucratic objectives in group 
processing, pointing to how these intersect with security practices in unique ways. Governments 
desire homogenous and self-contained groupings of refugees with minimal security screening 
requirements and risks. The chapter reveals risk management techniques informed by a 
neoliberal desire to create efficiencies in overseas resettlement processing. These techniques are 
less concerned with ordering and making refugee camps visible than with examining specific bits 
of information deemed relevant to determining the risk and efficiency of processing groupings of 
refugees.  
Drawing on the examples of the Burmese, Somalis, Sudanese “lost boys”, Liberian 
“women-at-risk,” and Chechens, the chapter considers how assessments of groupings of refugees 
are gendered and influenced by cultural biases, which play a role in the construction of collective 
144 
 
 
narratives. Cultural biases and gender assumptions influence the perception of authorities as to 
which groupings of refugees possess the qualities to become self-governing liberal subjects; to 
integrate easily into Western liberal democracies. The multilateral nature of many group 
resettlement schemes allows the Canadian government to base selection on these preferences and 
concerns. It is afforded discretion in discriminating between groupings of refugees on the basis 
of religion, nationality, health, security risk, and education. Similar to security practices, 
considerations of “integration potential” in multilateral resettlement efforts express, or produce, 
cultural and religious preferences. In the final section of the chapter I consider the official claim 
that group resettlement focuses on “protracted refugee situations.”  I point to pre-emptive 
security practices in the Canadian government’s “whole of government” approach to the 
resolution of these situations. The formation of working groups such as the PRS can be seen as 
another form of “targeted governance” in which group processing is one tool designed to deal 
with the perceived security implications of protracted displacement.  
“Generating Efficiencies”: Group Processing and the selection of a “Clean Population” 
 While describing the selection of Burmese Karen for group processing, a Canadian 
official explained “we [CIC] were able to secure assurances from our partner agencies, the 
CBSA, CSIS, etc., to say, you know, that this, probably not a nice word, but you know, ‘a clean 
population,’ you don’t have hidden terrorists hiding in these camps and so it’s a safe population 
to go in and do expedited processing.”457 The same official remarked:   
 
the Bhutanese were a clean population, there’s never been a rebel force that goes back 
into Bhutan to blow things up, the only element that they had that was of concern and 
remained a concern for a long time, was that the group as a whole, there was some very 
strong leaders in the camp that did not want to see resettlement take place and had 
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lobbied very hard and violently for no resettlement to take place, arguing that they all had 
the right to go back to Bhutan and they were not leaving until Bhutan would let them 
back in.
458
 
 
The officials’ use of the expression “clean population” and reference to CSIS and CBSA 
highlights the operation of biopolitical security practices under group processing. The notion of a 
“clean population” is relative; it is based on comparisons of different groupings of refugees, both 
within refugee camps and between them. For this reason, the idea of a “clean population” free of 
any problematic elements is a hypothetical ideal situation, something that authorities strive for. 
Foucault suggests that biopower inscribes racism into the mechanisms of the state, fragmenting 
the biological field and subdividing the species. Sovereign power, in the form of the right to kill, 
works through the biopower system by eliminating both internal and external threats to the 
population with the aim of improving the health and vitality of the population. Foucault notes 
that “racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination 
of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.”459 While it is unclear 
why the official quoted above hesitated in using the expression “clean populations,” it does 
evoke notions of racial purity. Mawani’s examination of the colonial management of, and 
anxieties surrounding, the intermingling and proximity of Aboriginal peoples, White settlers, and 
Chinese migrants in nineteenth century British Columbia extends Foucault’s conception of state 
racism. She suggests that racial superiority and inferiority were: 
internally fragmented and marked by degrees of difference. Although some racial Others 
(aboriginal peoples) could be tolerated in the settler regime and eventually civilized 
through moral training, there were other Others (Chinese and mixed-bloods) who were 
deemed to be too distant from the values of European modernity to be improved and 
assimilated and who thus needed to be expunged. Importantly, distinctions between ‘fit’ 
and ‘unfit’ were determined with reference to longevity not only of northern European 
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populations but also of aboriginal ones. Thus inferior races were those who imperilled 
whiteness and Indianness, albeit in different ways.”460 
 
While this is a much different context than contemporary group resettlement, the idea of degrees 
of difference is reflected in the belief of the official that the Bhutanese and Karen are relatively 
“pure” populations that not only pose minimal biopolitical risk to the “Canadian” population, but 
are capable of integrating and becoming fully functional liberal subjects. Moreover, the notion of 
degrees of differences relates to the comparisons of different groupings of refugees that may 
potentially be resettled to Canada.  
Officially, group processing is aimed at expediting the processing of chosen groupings of 
refugees through the use of shortened resettlement registration forms (RRFs) and the skipping of 
individual refugee status determinations (the acceptance of prima fascia basis). The creation of 
this program was influenced by the urgent protection program following the passing of IRPA in 
2002. The goal behind the urgent protection program is to make overseas resettlement processing 
efficient by having CIC, CBSA, and CSIS screen resettlement candidates deemed in urgent need 
of protection within 48 hours. Rejected individuals are sent back to the UNHCR to be forwarded 
to other resettlement states for consideration. The logic of expediting the security screening for 
urgent cases was then applied to a second category of refugees considered vulnerable cases. 
Under this category, the same screening process needed to occur within 4 months. This was 
referred to as the “4 month envelope” and was then applied to all group processing initiatives. A 
CBSA official remarked that the decision to apply the vulnerability definition to group 
processing was “part of improving the overall timeline process for our processing of 
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refugees.”461 The goal was to force agencies such as CBSA and CSIS to rethink how individual 
members of chosen groupings could be processed faster. The same official explained that: 
all of our missions abroad said well we can't do it with the resources we've got, so you 
guys have to send in teams from Ottawa or we have to constitute a team in the region that 
can go in and actually do this processing all at once....and we said fine, let's do it, and 
that's how we set it up. So when we actually set up group processing it was in line with 
the vulnerable definition.
462
  
 
These teams would go into what is referred to as the “theatre” for 3 weeks at a time in order to 
rapidly process individuals selected for group processing, including the Karen and Bhutanese.  
The idea of the “theatre” has several meanings. First, it resonates with the post-colonial 
act of going into the “field,” whether to conduct academic research or work for a humanitarian 
NGO. Hyndman explains that within the UNHCR “depending on one’s post and location, ‘the field’ 
has a multitude of meanings, most of which are predicated on geographical distance from a perceived 
center.”463  Second, the word “theatre” evokes colonial anxieties surrounding the management of the 
“peripheries.” For Hindess, this anxiety manifests in settings that are perceived as outside the liberal 
order, where subjects are viewed as not yet fully developed rational self-governing citizens. He explains 
that:  
The fate of colonial administrators is to imagine that they belong to one setting while being 
required to inhabit the other. Like police and other officials in deprived areas of contemporary 
Western societies, they find themselves surrounded by people who, they have come to believe, 
cannot be trusted to behave as autonomous social agents.
464
  
 
Finally, the idea of the “theatre” can imply a situation of war or combat. Here, security professionals must 
temporarily go into the “theatre” and perform security acts, ensuring relatively “clean populations.”  
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In describing this process, the same CBSA official loudly proclaimed that “they’re 
vulnerable, get them out” in order to emphasize the purported urgency of the situation.465 The 
official recounted how the security process unfolds under group processing:  
When the assessments are going for the group processing you've got to make sure it's a 
very tight process, so everything would be brought into a working group, a very focused 
working group within my division and we would take those applications and simply walk 
them around and say, okay, you've got this processing period, for this number of people 
and get it done and we would go to the next group and the next group...until it was all 
done; this is all within the organization [CBSA], it was all within my division, I had 150 
people working for me in national security screening at that time, so we had significant 
responsibilities for immigrant and visitor screening and…the refugees being a key 
component of that and because we made a commitment to the timelines, we had to make 
sure that everybody was onside with that.
466
    
 
As the statements above demonstrate, designations of vulnerability under group processing are 
more than a humanitarian gesture to needy refugees. They are a bureaucratic category designed 
to streamline and expedite overseas resettlement processing. More important, in some instances 
they play a role determining what constitutes a “clean population.” A Canadian Immigration 
official’s remarks demonstrate this:  
 
We only go to the CBSA once we have figured that this is a population that we might be 
interested in, that we actually could have the capacity, the resources that we could get to 
them. We ask them is there a real reason why we shouldn’t [chose them], do they have 
flags; if they tell us that 30% of that population you are going to have to send for an in-
depth clearance process; much more scrutiny, where there is a CSIS interview, then 
obviously we are not going to get any savings there, no efficiencies to be generated, 
people would be sitting in limbo waiting for clearance.
467
  
 
The fact that members of the rejected population will continue to wait in limbo seems to be lost 
on the official. Of particular importance in the statements above is the idea that refugee 
populations can be screened out of group processing for requiring lengthy security assessments, 
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as opposed to having a high percentage of “group” members that would be inadmissible under 
Canadian immigration laws. This represents a unique way to conduct security assessments of 
potential candidates for group processing. From the perspective of the government the need for 
lengthy security screening runs counter to the bureaucratic goal of expediting the processing of 
groupings of refugees. In these cases, security practices are framed by a neo-liberal rationale 
based on risk management techniques. The reliance on these techniques suggests that the state 
has abandoned what is perceived as the burdensome task of sorting the at-risk from the risky in 
groupings of refugees.  
In other instances, assessments of admissibility on group processing candidates are made 
and these occur at an early stage. Such is the case in the PRS interdepartmental working group, 
mentioned last chapter, which examines what are referred to as the “inadmissibility patterns” of 
different groupings of refugees. A security official explained that based on these examinations 
the CBSA would ask "is this a good group to choose based on their inadmissibility patterns.”468 
This suggests that with group processing, profiling involves not only the comparison and 
contrasting of different groupings of refugees but also the same grouping across different time 
periods. The “inadmissibility patterns” of earlier inland refugee claimants and resettlement 
applications from a refugee population play a role in determining the viability of offering 
resettlement to present-day groupings of refugees from the same population. In describing the 
PRS’s consideration of resettlement, the same security official put forth the following question: 
"is this a good population for Canada to choose given the security risk, are we going to be able 
to…if we choose to resettle 1000 refugees are half of them going to be inadmissible.”469  
                                                     
468
 CBSA, Personal interview with author, 3
rd
 November, 2011.  
469
 Ibid.  
150 
 
 
The examination of “inadmissibility patterns” under group processing reflects “targeted 
governance.” Once again, Walters’s thoughts on contemporary re-bordering practices and the 
dividual are suggestive here. The dividual “signifies an apparent thinning-down, or even 
hallowing-out of strategies of governance”. He explains: 
Control de-emphasizes or even abandons the quest to train, moralize, reform and remake 
the individual. It relinquishes the dream of an all-encompassing, normalized society. It is 
less bothered with reforming the young offender, than with securing the home or the 
shopping mall against their presence.
470
   
 
Under group processing, the assessment of “inadmissibility patterns” reduces members of a 
refugee grouping to dividuals with commonalities; a consolidation of basic bio-data to form the 
group profile. These types of practices are less concerned with moulding refugees into self-
governing liberal subjects than with protecting the Canadian population from perceived 
biopolitical threats. Moreover, they sort risky heterogeneous groupings from relatively 
homogenous and safe ones.   
A similar security rationale can be found in the US’s P-2 group referral program and the 
UNHCR’s group methodology. When examining the interim group profile document, referred to 
as a “Polaroid shot” by one official, the UNHCR Resettlement Service at headquarters considers 
“whether or not group or expedited processing is most efficient and economical in terms of time 
and resources.”471  The aim here is to anticipate potential problems with group referrals such as 
lengthy security assessments. An example of this occurred in late 2009 when the US government 
rejected a UNHCR group referral of Somalis out of Dadaab because of security concerns, 
including the fact that both the Somalis and Iraqis have the longest security clearance process. 
The US Department of Homeland Security evaluates the history of P-2 candidates, including 
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whether or not groupings of refugees will pass the screening process.
472
 Another factor for 
rejecting the grouping of Somalis, according to a UNHCR official, was the “tirade of fraud in the 
Somali caseload.” The same official remarked: 
so because of these two reasons they [the US] didn’t feel that group resettlement was 
appropriate, because that’s one of the things they always have to look at is with this kind 
of simplified methodology there is always a higher risk of fraud, although generally we 
try to make sure that the methodology that we put into place, the procedures that we have 
are good enough to make sure that people are not able to sneak in, but there is a very high 
incidence, especially identity fraud and family composition fraud among the Somalis, 
their known for it [interviewee laughs].
473
 
 
The official’s statements regarding the committing of fraud by Somalis are deeply problematic 
and are explored in more detail later on in the chapter.  
Under targeted resettlement programs such as group processing designed to “generate 
efficiencies” in the processing of overseas refugees, authorities would rather avoid risky 
groupings of refugees than sort the good from the bad, the risky from the at-risk within a chosen 
grouping. The latter is viewed as to costly and inefficient.  
Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kenya are also viewed as problematic by Canadian 
authorities. There is a belief by government officials that as a grouping there are threatening 
elements, specifically members of the listed terrorist organization Al Shabaab.  An immigration 
official explained “bottom line we cannot claim that the entire Somali population is problem-
free.”474 According to this same official, the mixed nature of the refugee population in Dadaab, 
some are fleeing famine as opposed to persecution under the Convention, makes Somalis in 
Dadaab an unlikely candidate for Canada’s group processing. From the perceptive of authorities, 
this would frustrate efforts to carve out self-contained, homogenous, and vulnerable groupings of 
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refugees. Iraqi refugees were similarly viewed as to mixed, or lacking a common narrative, to 
warrant group processing. A Canadian immigration official explained that there are twelve 
different tribes as well as different reasons for fleeing Iraq.
475
 The UNHCR echoed this concern 
in 2007 explaining that “resettlement using the group methodology is not envisaged at this time 
as the profile of the population is diverse and complex.”476 The decision against group 
resettlement relates as much (if not more) to security concerns expressed about Iraqis. The same 
Canadian immigration official remarked “there are a lot of Iraqis that have been killing Iraqis 
and those aren’t the people you want, you didn’t have Bhutanese killing Bhutanese… very clear 
security issues with the Iraqi population.”477  Similarly, a CBSA official explained that with the 
Iraqis:  
Security screening was difficult, as a group, and it became problematic; it became a 
concern both from our perspective [CBSA]...let's just say the security community within 
Canada was less than impressed with the whole notion of doing group processing for 
Iraqi refugees... we were fully prepared to engage...and the numbers show that we are 
engaged with taking significant populations out of both Jordon and Syria and I think to a 
certain extent Lebanon; but group processing simply was not a part of that process.
478
 
 
The statements reveal that authorities perceive the grouping of refugees as more prone to security 
risks. The decision by the Canadian government to still accept large numbers of Iraqis highlights 
the differences, and tensions, between politically motivated largescale resettlement based on 
individual selection, the bureaucratic rationales behind expedited forms of overseas processing, 
and security concerns.    
In explaining the political motivations behind the multilateral decision to resettle the 
Bhutanese, Banki argues that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks:  
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There was a need to find refugee populations that would allow Western countries to fill 
their resettlement quotas without turning to those populations viewed as potentially 
dangerous—that is, the Middle East refugees.479  
 
Yet, as noted above, this overlooks the fact that Western countries such as Canada resettled 
significant numbers of Iraqis; more than 9,000 between 2009 and 2011.
480
 A compromise was 
reached between the concerns of security professionals and the political desire to respond to this 
grouping of refugees. Authorities used an expedited form of individual processing as opposed to 
group processing. A CIC official explained “what we’re using with the Iraqis is a simplified 
referral form and designated Iraqis as prima fascia; it simplifies things a lot; different 
methodology trying to ‘generate efficiencies’ like group processing; it shortens the interviewing 
process.”481    
Unlike the Iraqis, some groupings of refugees are deemed too problematic for any form 
of expedited processing. One example is Burundians and Rwandans, referred to by a security 
official as the “genocide populations.” The same official explains:  
If we had a really problematic population, and we have had problematic populations in 
Africa, particularly people that were involved in Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi; we 
can't touch those populations, those are very difficult, and as a group they are more 
problematic then they are worth our time to try and go in and screen out the good from 
the bad, because there was so many of them involved at various times with respect to 
genocide.
482
  
 
The perception that “genocide populations” are too messy and heterogeneous for group 
processing is predicated on the belief that internally homogenous and bounded ethnic groupings 
are ideal. The sad irony of this is that it was the promotion, and reification, of precisely these 
types of groupings by both former colonial rulers and ethnonationalists in places like Rwanda 
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that fueled genocidal violence in the first place. In describing the effects of identification 
practices in Rwanda, Timothy Longman notes that “colonial policies…transformed Hutu, Tutsi, 
and Twa into relatively rigid ethnic categories of great political significance. Regardless of their 
historical meanings, the ethnic categories, because of colonial policies, largely determined 
people’s life opportunities.”483 The search for homogenous and finite groupings of refugees 
benefits from these problematic categories.  
The decision to avoid what is perceived as the burdensome task of separating the risky 
from the at-risk demonstrates how the bureaucratic rationale to remake resettlement processing 
efficient intersects with security practices under group processing. These assessments of risk and 
efficiency occur at a distance from refugee camps and yet rely on what Turner describes as 
sorting practices that attempt to separate “innocent victims” from what are perceived as 
troublemakers.
484
 When practices associated with “perfect vision” and “drawing circles” are 
unable to carve out vulnerable, homogeneous, and finite groupings of refugees, the state moves 
on to the next refugee grouping candidate.   
When describing the exclusion of entire groupings of refugees under group processing 
officials are quick to point out that individual referrals from the UNHCR will still be accepted by 
the Canadian government. There is a certain level of unease on the part of officials in discussing 
what amounts to the biopolitical exclusion of heterogeneous and risky groupings of refugees. 
Despite the suggestion that individual resettlement will continue to be available in the absence of 
group processing, without the political will, as there was with the Iraqis, the decision against 
group processing has serious implications for the refugees in question. The Canadian Council for 
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Refugees in 2010 remarked that “processing times for refugees to Canada from Africa are 
unacceptably long; refugees and their families suffer disproportionately from this situation in 
spite of the reality that African countries host huge numbers of refugees in need of 
resettlement.”485 Decisions against using group processing need to be considered in light of 
varying processing times at Canadian visa posts across the globe. In contrast to expedited forms 
of processing at visa posts that host Iraqi refugees, posts in Africa that would service 
Burundians, Rwandans, and Somalis are extremely slow and subjected to caps. It is difficult to 
envision many of these refugees escaping their predicament and being selected for resettlement.  
In rare instances, during my interviewing, some Canadian officials admitted that entire 
groupings of refugees have been excluded from group processing. In these cases there was no 
recourse to individual resettlement for members of these groupings. One example is Iranian 
Kurds in camp Ashraf in Iraq. An immigration official explained that the Iranian Kurds have 
been directly linked to a listed terrorist organization by the Canadian state, which has repeatedly 
told the UNHCR that they will not resettle the 134 individuals as they are inadmissible as a 
“group.” According to this official, “they are a group that has vowed to overthrow a government 
and we designated them as a bad group.”486 The use of the expression “bad group” and the 
acknowledgement that certain groupings of refugees are inadmissible provides a rare exception 
to the usual hesitation by government officials to admit these decisions.  
Gender and Cultural Assumptions under Group Resettlement  
Mawani’s analysis of racial encounters and mixing in British Columbia’s former cannery 
spaces demonstrates that constructions of race were not only based on biological distinctions, but 
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also cultural and gender predispositions as early as the nineteenth century. These in turn 
determined where racialized groupings would be situated within the hierarchical organization of 
the canning industry.
487
 While the context of contemporary group resettlement is much different, 
similar assumptions of culture and gender influence constructions of vulnerability and risk. 
Moreover, the perceived tainting of vulnerability for some groupings of refugees is gendered and 
in some instances based on cultural assumptions.  
In 2005, the United States agreed to resettle 2500 Liberian female heads of households 
from Guinea.
488
 The refugees had experienced what is referred to as double flight by UNHCR 
officials, first to the Ivory Coast and then Guiney. According to one official, the group proposal 
created problems since it de facto included male members despite being based on the UNHCR 
category “women-at-risk.” Rather than include the males in the grouping, the UNHCR developed 
a separate category called deferral pains in which direct male family members would be 
individually resettled at the same time as the Liberian females.
489
 Implicit in this decision is that 
individual males might compromise the vulnerability of female Liberian refugees. Moreover, the 
testing for groupness is sometimes framed by gender. As noted earlier, Mawani points to how 
racial distinctions were marked by degrees of difference, some groupings were seen as a threat 
not only to the white settler society, but to those colonial subjects that were viewed as potentially 
occupying a place in this settler society; albeit a subordinate position within a hierarchized 
system.
490
 The grouping of Liberian females was viewed as “deserving” of the opportunity to 
settle and integrate into the United States. From the perspective of UNHCR authorities, the 
                                                     
487
 Mawani, Colonial Proximities, 45.  
488
 UNHCR, Progress Report on Resettlement. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 
Standing Committee, 30
th
 meeting (Geneva: UNHCR), 7
th
 June, 2004, 3 
489
 UNHCR, Personal interview with author, 28
th
 August, 2012.   
490
 Mawani, Colonial Proximities.  
157 
 
 
inclusion of males in the grouping would taint its vulnerability and therefore cast doubt on this 
assumption.  
The decision by the Canadian government to screen-out Chechens from group processing 
also displays gender assumptions. This can be seen in an Immigration officials remarks:  
As a general rule, we’ve told the UNHCR don’t bother referring us groups of Chechens. 
The number that have been engaged in other activities; it’s like every one of them would 
have to go through a thorough screening, the odd individual woman maybe, but don’t 
come to us and say would you take 500 Chechens, because we know that all 500 we 
would have to really scrutinize.
491
   
 
Once again, the statements are revealing in that they run counter to the usual hesitation of 
officials to make such generalizations regarding group proposals. They demonstrate that the 
Canadian government is willing to “draw circles” around groupings of refugees and frame them 
as risky. The reference to the “odd individual woman maybe” demonstrates how gender is 
employed in assessments of risk and vulnerability. Authorities face challenges in their efforts to 
craft specific groupings of refugees based on vulnerability, homogeneity, self-containment, and 
riskiness. With the Liberian refugees, the presence of single males risked tainting the 
vulnerability of the grouping based on the UNHCR category “women at risk,” while with the 
Chechens masculinized conceptions of risky groupings are challenged by the existence of least 
some females within these groupings. In both these situations, the crafting of groupings based on 
commonalities is confronted with the presence of heterogeneity.  
Cultural preferences can be seen in the most recent responses of Western resettlement 
states to the plight of Somali refugees in places such as Kenya. This was not always the case. In 
2004 US officials resettled Somali Bantus and in 2005 Somali Benadir under the P2 
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designation.
492
 In 2003 Canadian officials piloted group processing with the selection of 900 
Sudanese and Somalis from Dadaab, Kenya. Canada and Australia jointly resettled these 
refugees.
493
 As mentioned earlier, more recently, the purportedly mixed nature of Somali 
refugees living in Dadaab along with concerns over security and fraud have led government 
officials from both Canada and the US to exclude them from group resettlement schemes. This is 
despite the fact that Somalis fit the UNHCR criteria of being in need of resettlement. The 
organization’s 2013 Global Resettlement Needs report explains that there are many Somalis in 
Dadaab, Kenya awaiting resettlement. It blames this situation on both the security situation in 
Dadaab, which makes accessing the refugees there difficult, and on long delays in the security 
screening process of major resettlement states.
494
 Biopolitical fears surrounding Somali refugees 
are influenced by assumptions of Somali culture. This is reflected in the statements of a UNHCR 
official that compared Somali to Burmese refugees: 
The rate of fraud in the Burmese program was minimal, I mean there was no need for 
them to lie and it wasn’t part of their culture so to speak, whereas the Somalis it is very 
much part of their culture to lie, and I know that sounds kind of flippant to say that, but 
that’s what they say as well, ‘this is always how we have gotten around, this is how we 
have always gotten through life, is to be deceptive when you have to be’, um, which they 
don’t have to be, but it’s difficult to change that attitude.495 
 
Notwithstanding the official’s qualifications, the statements point to essentialized notions of a 
supposedly distinct Somali culture based on deception.  Such deeply problematic forms of 
cultural racism can be seen in generalizations about the ability of Somalis to successfully 
integrate into Western countries, which are once again influencing resettlement decisions. One 
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example is the United Kingdom, which is reluctant to select any Somalis for resettlement and 
would prefer Ethiopians.
496
 The UNHCR official quoted above remarked that:  
[US] interest in Somalis is waning because their having a lot of problems and let’s be 
quite frank, Somalis are famous worldwide among the resettlement countries to be 
exceptionally difficult to resettle and to integrate into societies and causing lots of 
problems in communities where they are resettled in these countries. I mean countries 
have even come back and said sorry but we don’t want any of your Somalis, we’re sick of 
them, we’ll consider your Ethiopians, we’ll consider you’re Congolese.497  
 
The candid statements above demonstrate that Western governments have clear preferences for 
certain groupings of refugees over others. These preferences are based on the assumption of 
groupism; they reify ethnic “groups” such as the “Congolese,” “Ethiopians,” and “Somalis”, 
imputing distinctive cultures to their “identities.” The statements prove that integration potential 
continues to influence resettlement decisions, especially within the EU, 
498
 but also in Canada 
where recent changes to the entire resettlement program point in this direction. This is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the Canadian government in 2012 did not resettle any Somalis 
based explicitly on concerns that they don’t integrate well.499  
The links between culture, the ability to integrate into Western states, and groupism is 
reflected in a comprehensive report on refugee resettlement that points to generalized prejudices 
and public misconceptions about the possibility of Somali refugees having relations to Islamic 
radicalism. According to this report, some of the most disadvantaged refugees in the world have 
low acceptance rates for resettlement.  It explains: 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum are the “favoured” caseloads. These are groups of 
refugees who are deemed to be a low security risk and who are believed to have attributes 
that make it easier for them to adjust to life in the resettlement country…this has led to 
situations where resettlement states actively compete for some groups of refugees while 
ignoring others in equally vulnerable situations.
500
 
 
One example already mentioned is the Bhutanese referred to by a Canadian immigration official 
as a “clean population.”501  
Cultural preferences can be seen within multilateral discussions on large-scale 
resettlement initiatives. Eileen Pittaway, who attended several undocumented meetings with the 
UNHCR and resettlement state officials recalls that preferences for non-Muslim refugees were 
discussed and that refugees from Southeast Asia such as the mainly Christian refugees from the 
Karen and Karenni camps in Thailand were seen to be easier to integrate.
502
 This is in contrast to 
the Muslim Rohingyas from Burma, something discussed shortly.    
The cultural biases that underpin assessments of Somali refugees in places such as 
Dadaab can be contrasted with the positive framing by the media, general public, aid workers, 
and the US government of orphaned Sudanese men referred to as the “lost boys.” The refugees 
were resettled by US officials under the P-2 designation beginning in 2000. McKinnon explains 
that the unique circumstance of the their flight, orphaned boys at the time, led aid workers, who 
made direct connections between the refugees and the orphaned lost boys of Peter Pan, to press 
for their resettlement.
503
 Boas points to the role of Christian organizations and traditional 
religiously affiliated resettlement agencies such as World Vision, the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, and the Hebrew Immigrant 
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Aid Society as influencing the US decision to resettle the Sudanese men.
504
 McKinnon adds that: 
“the ‘Lost Boys’ and their stories worked well in the history of U.S. refugee resettlement because 
their narratives of exile provided great opportunities for human interest stories depicting the U.S. 
state as benevolent and hospitable.”505 This constructed narrative of the Sudanese refugees 
purportedly made them an easily identifiable and discrete grouping of refugees for US 
authorities.
506
 For aid workers, their perceived distinctiveness allowed constructions of 
vulnerability in a bid to gain resettlement, while for government officials it satisfied the desire to 
draw clear boundaries around groupings of refugees. At the same time, McKinnon argues that 
the Sudanese men, who were initially sent to Arizona, do not identify with the label “lost boys” 
in a literal sense. Rather, they use it strategically as means of communicating what it means to be 
a refugee from Southern Sudan and to garner donated resources that keep the Arizona Lost Boys 
Center open.
507
 The resettlement of the Sudanese men demonstrates how refugees can sometimes 
re-appropriate statist conceptions of distinctiveness to their advantage. While the boundaries still 
exist, they have been able to have a say in what constitutes their collectiveness. A similar process 
can be seen in Malkki’s description of how Hutu refugees refused to naturalize their presence 
within Tanzania by re-appropriating the concept of refugee-ness, normally viewed as an 
aberration in the national order of things. In the context of what was perceived as a nation in 
exile:  
refugee status was valued and protected as a sign of the ultimate temporariness of exile 
and of the refusal to become naturalized, to put down roots in a place to which one did 
not belong. Insisting on one's liminality and displacement as a refugee was also to have a 
legitimate claim to the attention of "international opinion" and to international 
assistance.
508
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This is an example of refugees coming together to strategically co-opt statist and humanitarian 
framings to their advantage. Malkki’s analysis points to “a deterritorialized [Hutu] nation 
without roots sunk directly into the national soil.”509 The drive for commonality and 
homogeneity under group resettlement represents the territorializing and spatial logics that 
Malkki associates with the “national order of things.” This drive, however, is continuously 
confronted with hybridity, fluidity, and as the cases above demonstrates resistance.   
The challenges of crafting groupings of refugees with commonalities are reflected in the 
narrow group definition of the “lost boys,” which fail to account for those refugees that 
developed families prior to their resettlement. McKinnon explains: 
When the U.S. government granted resettlement clearance to the ‘‘Lost Boys,’’ it was 
under the auspices that the men were still orphans, meaning that they were living in 
refugee camps without kin relations. Many of the men had established families in the 
camps, yet they weren’t able to resettle with their partners or children.510  
 
Hyndman suggests that “technologies of knowing” such as maps and statistics in refugee camps 
fail to account local historical contexts.
511
 In a similar fashion, group resettlement practices that 
attempt fix groupings of refugees in place are challenged by the fluidity of life in refugee camps. 
Sovereign practices work to capture the excess of heterogeneity, subsuming it under its 
homogenizing and ordering logic through the creation of new bureaucratic categories such as 
“deferral pains.” 
 Grouping and Integration Potential   
To date, all of Canada’s group processing initiatives have involved other countries, 
whether bilaterally or multilaterally. The UNHCR’s group methodology grew out of discussions 
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on the Multilateral Framework of Understanding on Resettlement (MFUR). The agreement 
attempts to address the issue of varying selection criteria amongst the signing parties. It explains: 
As national legislation and policy may dictate the manner in which individual 
resettlement countries deal with the referral of groups, any limitations with respect to 
group processing to be identified at the outset… Refugees are not arbitrarily to be 
screened out of a multilateral resettlement operation solely on account of characteristics 
such as physical and mental condition, gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age, political 
opinion, nationality or country of origin.
512
  
 
The statement not only ignores that identification and selection practices under group 
resettlement schemes are based on national, ethnic, and gender categories, but that these 
categories are predicated on the assumption that substantive ethnic and national “groups” exist 
and can therefore be compared and contrasted in selection practices. MFUR further calls on: 
all parties to seek a full understanding of the characteristics of the refugee population, 
including particularly vulnerable cases such as survivors of violence and torture, persons 
with medical needs (e.g. HIV/AIDS, mental health needs, disabilities), women at risk, 
separated children and the elderly, so as to best delineate and coordinate their respective 
responsibilities.
513
  
 
Unfortunately, such information can be used to exclude unhealthy and difficult to integrate 
groupings of refugees from large-scale resettlement programs. Despite MFURs inclusive spirit, 
when the major resettlement states such as Canada decided to put it into practice many groupings 
of refugees were screened out. A Canadian immigration official recalls:  
Once the UNHCR had identified some priority populations, it was pretty clear at first that 
some of the populations, one of them was the Rohingyas in Bangladesh, before Dadaab 
it’s absolutely the worst refugee camp in the world in terms of living conditions, bad 
health, lack of access to education, so a lot of the countries, people would not meet the 
selection criteria, a lot of the countries have integration potential criteria, so for a lot of 
these refugee populations they are screened out just based on that [integration potential] 
for some other countries. For Canada, we focus on protection; however, refugees do have 
to demonstrate integration potential in 3 – 5 years.514  
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The Rohingyas are Burmese refugees that practice Islam. They currently reside in Bangladesh. 
To be fair, Canadian officials under pressure from the UNHCR eventually resettled a few 
hundred Rohingyas in Quebec but not under the group processing program. Since then there has 
been no more overseas processing of Rohingyas. The reasoning behind this, according to a 
DFAIT official, is “concern over integration potential since the Rohingyas are unfortunately one 
of the world’s most underprivileged populations.”515 The statement begs the question: if 
resettlement programs are officially based on humanitarian protection then the Rohingyas would 
seem to qualify for a program such as group processing. 
 Multilateral decisions on group resettlement schemes are also influenced by security 
concerns. In implementing MFUR, a Canadian immigration official remarked: 
We had to pick a population that all countries could agree to. That considerably narrowed 
the populations in the world because all countries do have different selection criteria, 
different admissibility, we check for different things criminally, medically, integration 
potential. Its individual checks on these matters, however, we have to pick a population 
that would meet everyone’s criteria in terms of integration potential, security issues, 
medical issues. So it ruled out an awful lot of the groups in parts of the world where there 
are some fundamentalist or security elements within the camps.
516
 
 
The last part of this statement highlights how group resettlement schemes target refugee camps 
that are perceived by authorities as relatively risk free and ordered. The desire is to carve out and 
select “clean populations.”  
Despite legislation such as IRPA and the UNHCR’s focus on protection needs, 
considerations of integration potential continue to form an integral part of the resettlement 
process. Drawing on the governmentality approach, Lippert describes the rationale of Western 
resettlement programs. He explains that:  
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The liberal subject contrasts starkly with the refugee, the former being the stable Western 
figure of reason and normality, the latter an entity of non-reason and abnormality that 
flees illiberal government by migrating to the West. Liberal government insists there be 
devices present to encourage a choosing capacity among those deemed to lack such 
powers. Refugee resettlement is such a device. It attempts to mediate, over a more or less 
discrete period, between the Canadian citizenry thought to be established and civilized, 
and the migrating, marginalized refugee.
517
  
 
Refugees are thought to be settled when they become self-supporting. For this reason, Lippert 
notes: 
In resettlement, refugees’ active capacities are not to be crushed or annihilated; they are 
to be nurtured, promoted, shaped and, in a sense, brought into being.
518
  
 
He points to a mixture of pastoral and advanced liberal forms of governing in resettlement. Yet, 
as the discussion above suggests this is only part of the rationale of resettlement. Equally 
important is the sovereign decision to admit or exclude refugees from these programs. Under 
group processing, authorities are concerned to carve out and select groupings of refugees deemed 
capable of becoming self-governing liberal subjects that exercise choice. Selection practices are 
connected to what Latham calls subsumption; teleological assumptions about the incorporation 
of migrants into societies. This includes: the expectation that migrants will assimilate and 
integrate on a permanent basis and become “full members of society in political, economic and 
social terms.”519 The state, however, “cannot be sure anyone who is admitted on a permanent 
basis will live up to the assumptions of subsumptive incorporation.”520 For this reason, it relies 
on “assessments of skills and background; and seeking assurance through practices of interviews, 
tests, and oaths and a belief in the natural tendency for allegiance to merge through long-term 
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social and cultural submersion.”521 In the case of multilateral resettlement decisions discussed 
above, these assessments occur through the examination of the health, education, camp 
conditions, integration potential, and security risk of various refugee camps and the refugees that 
occupy these spaces. Participation in multilateral forums such as the Core Group on the 
Bhutanese and the Working Group on Resettlement provides resettlement states with more 
leeway to consider these factors. Government officials have recourse to the claim that they must 
satisfy the requirements of many states, despite their own national regulations. The exclusion of 
the Rohingyas over integration concerns combined with the inclusion of the Karen has the effect 
of discriminating between Muslim (Rohingyas) and Christian Burmese refugees (Karen). 
 
Group Processing and the Canadian Protracted Refugee Situations Working Group  
As noted in chapter two, group processing, in part, grew out of discussions within the 
UNHCR in the early 2000s on how to deal with the issue of protracted refugee situations, 
understood at the time as refugee warehousing. The resolution of these situations is not merely 
humanitarian in nature, but as Presse’s and Thompson’s remarks demonstrate, strategic. They 
explain:  
In addition to the humanitarian imperative, Canada has a strategic interest in helping 
refugees find lasting solutions—because the longer refugee populations languish without 
access to durable solutions, the greater the risk they could pose to stability in their region, 
resulting in more refugee outflows. As such, Canada is exploring how its own 
resettlement program could be better used to help manage down refugee numbers.
522
 
 
Concern over the potential instability of protracted displacement informed the creation of the 
Protracted Refugee Situation working group (PRS), introduced in the last chapter. Its “whole-of-
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government” approach in dealing with protracted situations draws on the foreign policy expertise 
of DFAIT, the development expertise under the Canadian International Development Agency, 
security expertise from the CBSA, and immigration expertise from CIC.
523
 The working group 
examines the prospects for voluntary repatriation or local integration, whether or not Canada has 
development programs within, and good relations with, countries hosting refugees in protracted 
situations, and if CIC can apply resettlement spaces to these situations. Ideally, resettlement 
would use the group processing method.
524
 The starting point for discussions within the PRS 
group was the UNHCR’s High Commissioners Dialogue in 2008 that focussed on protracted 
situations. Five priority situations were identified as in need of resettlement: Burundians in 
Tanzania, Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, Eritrean in Sudan, Burmese (Rohingyas) in Bangladesh 
and Bosnians and Croatian’s in Serbia. The working group considered whether or not it would 
use group processing to resolve these five priority situations.
525
 It is worth noting that at this 
point none of the aforementioned situations have been selected for this program. Public 
presentations of the PRS downplay if not outright ignore the important role that CBSA plays in 
screening refugees in these situations.
 526
 The PRS discusses the potential security implications 
of choosing to apply the “whole of government” approach to a UNHCR identified priority 
situation and in particular when considering resettlement.
527
  The inclusion of the CBSA within it 
allows security practices to operate remotely from refugees that are unaware that they are being 
screened at an early stage of consideration for group processing. Already mentioned is that the 
PRS considers the “inadmissibility patterns” of groupings of refugees that are candidates for the 
program. Based on CBSA security assessments, the PRS decided against resettlement for a 
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grouping of Eritreans in Eastern Sudan. According to a DFAIT official, there were security 
concerns expressed about their admissibility to Canada and a belief that elements of the Eritrean 
refugee population in Sudan posed a risk to Canada. The same official explained that:   
We recognize that in resettling, Canada has a generous program. We want to be a 
generous country and offer people opportunities to begin again, but that we do take 
security issues seriously and make sure that the population that has been identified 
doesn’t pose or people do not pose a security risk to this country once they arrive.528   
 
In the event that a grouping of refugees is determined to be a security risk then the PRS considers 
other measures to deal with protracted situations such as diplomatic pressure to open up local 
integration in countries of first refuge or the use of development assistance to improve conditions 
in these countries.
529
 In the example of the Eritreans in Eastern Sudan discussed above, the 
UNHCR and United Nations Development Program are piloting what is referred to as the 
“transitions solutions initiative”, which attempts to move beyond humanitarian care and foster 
development and self-reliance.
530
 Despite this initiative, the UNHCR’s own assessment of the 
situation in Eastern Sudan makes it difficult to envision a life beyond mere humanitarian 
assistance for these refugees.
531
 The organization’s 2013 Global Appeal Update explains 
“refugees and the local community in eastern Sudan face acute poverty and lack of access to 
health care, education and employment. Refugees also face difficulties in integrating locally, and 
there is no possibility of voluntary repatriation at this time.”532 On top of this, there appears to be 
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a pattern of discrimination against Eritrean refugees in Canadian overseas visa posts in Africa. 
The Canadian Council for Refugees in 2009 highlighted what it describes as “a disturbing 
upsurge in rejections of Eritrean refugees in Cairo by Canada.”533 The rejections were based on a 
perceived lack of credibility on the part of Eritrean applicants. Under pressure from the Canadian 
Council for Refugees, 40 of the rejected Eritreans were reviewed by the Canadian Federal Court, 
which in 2011 ruled in favor of 4 of these applicants, claiming that they were unfairly refused by 
a Canadian visa officer.
534
 The upsurge in rejections of Eritrean refugees by Canadian visa 
officials demonstrates the implications of far removed security assessments that decide against 
offering group processing or large-scale resettlement. While officials are quick to point out that 
when this is taken off table the system reverts to individual referrals this overlooks the varying 
quotas in overseas visa posts and the extremely low chances that an individual will escape a 
place like Dadaab through resettlement.  
In practice, approaches such as the “transitional solutions initiative” are another example 
of Western governments attempting to mitigate the effects of externalization strategies. In this 
way, both development assistance and protracted refugee situations are securitized through 
targeted approaches that are principally concerned with protecting Western populations. 
Moreover, the PRS can be seen as another example of “targeted governance” in which group 
processing is one tool amongst others used to mitigate the perceived risks associated with large 
numbers of refugees languishing in these situations.  
Conclusion  
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The decision-making process under group processing is shrouded in secrecy. The 
revelation of contentious elements of this process to the general public would lead to criticism of 
the government’s preferential treatment towards some groupings of refugees over others. The 
unease of officials is reflected in how they couch discretion in resettlement decision-making in 
the language of bureaucratic issues, multilateral obligations, and the broader goals of “durable 
solutions.” 
In Society must be Defended, Foucault notes that biopower inscribes racism into the 
mechanisms of the state, fragmenting the biological field, dividing and subdividing the species. It 
is here that biopolitics intersects with groupism under group resettlement schemes as the state 
compares and contrasts what it views as substantial ethnic, national, gender, and cultural 
“groups.” Using risk management techniques based on biodata, integration potential, and 
“inadmissibility patterns,” it sorts the messy, fluid, heterogeneous, culturally problematic, and 
risky groupings of refugees from the internally homogenous, bounded, vulnerable, and “pure” 
ones. Confronted with groupings of refugees deemed too problematic, government officials 
would rather move on to the next refugee camp or grouping than sort the risky from the at-risk.  
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Chapter Five:   
Recent Reforms to Canada’s Resettlement Program: Extending the Logic of Group 
Processing 
 
Beginning in 2011, the former Conservative government of Canada made important 
changes to the entire overseas resettlement program.  While these changes did not apply to the 
“Group Processing” Program, they adopted its logic in key respects. The government pitched the 
reforms as aimed at improving the social and economic outcomes of resettled refugees. This 
would be done by both curbing the acceptance of what the government referred to as refugees 
with high needs and by restructuring the program away from a “global approach”, where 
refugees could be resettled from anywhere, towards a more “focused approach” where refugees 
would be resettled from only a few specific refugee populations over several years. The 
government attempted to sell these reforms to the NGO community by emphasizing the 
settlement benefits that purportedly stem from limiting resettlement to refugees chosen from a 
few large refugee populations. In the process it drew on previous group processing exercises to 
argue that the reforms would improve the efficiency of overseas processing. In this chapter I 
reveal biopolitics at work in the focused multiyear approach adopted. The Canadian 
government’s plan to improve the economic and social outcomes of resettled refugees amounted 
to new provisions for the selection of whatever it deemed to be the healthiest, most educated, and 
easiest to integrate groupings of refugees. 
The focus of this chapter is the period of 2011 to 2013 during which time the government 
held consultations with the Canadian Council for Refugees over the reforms. In 2011 it made 
mention of the changes in a Canada Gazette notification on the repealing of the source country 
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class. Presented as inefficient, the notification suggests that by repealing this class the 
government could streamline the resettlement program to focus on priority refugee 
populations.
535
 The concerns over the purported inefficiency of the source country class extend 
to the entire resettlement program. 
In this chapter I argue that the move towards a focused multiyear approach reflects 
important elements of the logic of group processing and by extension Valverde’s and Mopas’s 
concept of “targeted governance.” A primary function of the reforms is to allow more space for 
the biopolitical selection of groupings of refugees while retaining the humanitarian appearance of 
the resettlement program. Risk management techniques operate in the biopolitical selection of 
populations of refugees for potential resettlement. Similar to the examination of “inadmissibility 
patterns,” internal government documents suggest the carving out of groupings of refugees 
according to expected settlement potential, previous economic outcomes, and national 
categories. The chapter highlights how government officials contemplated the exclusion, or at 
least the limiting, of refugees it perceived as costly and, to this end, made comparisons of various 
refugee populations. It also considers how senior bureaucrats at CIC reflected on different 
approaches to implementing the contentious aspects of the reforms given the potential for public 
backlash.  
The chapter considers the Canadian Council for Refugee’s position on the reforms. The 
emergence of a government-led resettlement program combined with the politicization of 
resettlement decisions has led to an unsettled feeling in the organization. The government’s focus 
on a few refugee groupings is viewed as opening the door to discrimination while limiting the 
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flexibility to respond to emergency situations and individuals in urgent need of resettlement. The 
Canadian Council for Refugee’s position on the reforms as well as the concerns of some 
bureaucrats at CIC to maintain the perception that Canada’s resettlement program will continue 
to be based on humanitarian principles illustrates the unease surrounding the grouping of 
refugees generally. The chapter considers tensions between the individualistic focus of the 
refugee regime and the preference of governments to select groupings of refugees.  
 Finally, the chapter undertakes a preliminary examination of the recent – and ongoing – 
largescale resettlement of Syrian refugees under the current Liberal government, elected in 2015. 
While the selection of the Syrians is formally based on the individual, it does share some 
similarities with group processing. Firstly, it involves the carving out what are perceived as low 
risk and vulnerable groupings of refugees from the wider Syrian refugee population.
536
 Second, 
despite security concerns, the government has made efforts to expedite the processing of these 
groupings of refugees.
537
 Finally, the selection of the Syrians, much like group processing 
initiatives, has been informed by biopolitical considerations. However, unlike the secretive 
nature of group processing decisions, these considerations have been played out in the open in a 
seemingly democratic manner.   
Selling a “Focused Approach” to Resettlement  
The Canadian government began consideration of overhauling its overseas resettlement 
program in 2011.  According to internal memos obtained by the Canadian Council for Refugees, 
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the stated goal of the reforms was to improve social and economic outcomes of resettled 
refugees. This was to be achieved by curtailing the number of what it perceived as high needs 
refugees as well as by reorienting the program towards a focus on multi-year commitments for 
only a few refugee populations.
538
 Refugees considered high needs are those requiring 
substantial health and settlement services in order to integrate into Canadian society.    
There was little in the way of official pronouncements on the specifics of these changes. 
A Memorandum to the Immigration Minister dated October 30
th
, 2012 captures how the 
government intended to present the proposed reforms to the general public. It lays out a 
communication strategy that suggests that CIC “highlight the fact that making large, multi – year 
commitments will enable the Department to work more closely with partners, including the 
provinces and territories, to better plan for the settlement needs of specific refugee groups and 
provide refugee host countries with a clear signal of support from Canada.”539 The goal was to 
emphasize that selection would continue to be based on vulnerability and that the reforms were 
principally about the potential settlement benefits that would arise from selection limited to a few 
populations. Despite this strategy, in September 2013 a Canadian Press article exposed many of 
the controversial components of the reforms, including the limiting of refugees with health 
problems. Contained in that article, and in response to this revelation, a government 
spokesperson remarked “I can tell you that our Conservative government will continue to give 
refuge to the most vulnerable populations.”540 
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In contrast to the lack of announcements for the general public, CIC held extensive 
consultations with key stakeholders such as the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Special 
Agreement Holders Council, the provinces, territories, and various other actors involved in the 
private sponsorship of refugees. The rest of this section considers how CIC framed the proposed 
changes for these stakeholders.  While the government initially attempted to focus attention on 
the settlement side of the resettlement process, the question of which populations would be 
chosen quickly became an issue as did the contentious proposal to limit the number of overseas 
refugees perceived as costly. These issues are reflected in the candid nature of CIC discussions, 
interactions, and presentations at the Canadian Council for Refugee’s consultations during this 
period.  
In a 2012 issue paper, “Targeted Selection”, CIC presented stakeholders with three 
options for the proposed focused approach to resettlement. Option one was a regionally focused 
approach in which the majority of Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) would be selected 
from three to five countries of origin over a five year period. Option two would focus the 
majority of GAR selection on three to five different refugee populations from three different 
world regions, “where multiple refugee populations reside in a particular country, resettlement 
selection will target specific refugee populations.”541  Finally, option three would focus selection 
on a few refugee populations in protracted situations. Stakeholders as well as the CIC 
bureaucracy pushed for option two, a focused global approach. From the perspective of the 
Canadian Council for Refugees, this came closest to maintaining some semblance of a global 
resettlement program. On October 30
th
, 2012 an internal memo to the Immigration Minister 
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explains that the government had chosen “a modified take on the Focused Global Approach”, 
which “would see 90% of GAR spaces allocated to three to five refugee populations residing in 
three different geographical regions, with 10% of GAR spaces set aside for individual protection 
needs and emergency appeals.”542  
A presentation by the former CIC Director of Resettlement at the December 2012 
Canadian Council for Refugees winter consultation provides some insight as to how the 
government presented the reforms for stakeholders. The Director made the argument that “large, 
multi-year resettlement commitments enables CIC to plan in advance, work with partners and 
stakeholders to coordinate activities overseas and develop population-specific settlement 
programming in Canada.”543 A CIC document prepared for the Special Agreement Holders 
Council and the Canadian Council for Refugees provides more specifics as to what was meant by 
“population-specific settlement programming.” It links multi-year population-based resettlement 
initiatives with both improved communications and information sharing with stakeholders in 
Canada as well as initiatives such as the development of cultural profiles. These profiles outline 
“the refugee population’s history, religion, cultural traditions, family structures, medical trends, 
educational background, refugee camp conditions and settlement considerations.”544 From the 
perspective of the government, group profiles would allow communities in Canada to become 
educated and better prepared for the arrival of groupings of refugees. This includes the use of 
medical profiles. Drawing on previous group processing exercises, it was suggested that: 
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representatives from CIC Health Branch, regional medical clinics, the Public Health 
Agency of Canada and Medical Officers (MOFs) [could] meet via teleconference or 
video conferencing to discuss the medical health profile of the refugee population, in 
order to determine a possible screening protocol both in Canada and prior to arrival, as 
was done for the Bhutanese movement.
545
   
 
 “Targeted Selection” points to streamlined medical protocols that are purportedly “tailored to 
the population’s needs, including a group profile to inform local authorities in Canada prior to 
the group’s arrival.”546 The issue paper argues that “given cuts to the supplemental coverage 
afforded refugees through the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP), streamlined medical 
protocols will be crucial for addressing the health concerns of refugees resettled to Canada.”547 
These protocols along with the use of biographical, medical, and cultural profiles were presented 
as a solution to improving settlement outcomes in a context of cuts to refugee health care.
548
  
The previous government further attempted to rationalize the reforms by highlighting 
current and historical practices under the resettlement program. It was argued that the program 
already focused selection on a few refugee populations despite its global approach. CIC 
emphasized that: 
Canada’s resettlement program has historically drawn the majority of its refugees from 
three to five main populations [and that] the program could be used more strategically by 
focussing on the selection of three to five main populations to be resettled over several 
years in order to further assist in providing protection to large populations of refugees, 
unlocking durable solutions for others, while fulfilling Government of Canada 
priorities.
549
  
 
The statements suggest that from the government’s perspective it has always grouped refugees. 
In contrast to this, the Canadian Council for Refugees felt that grouping refugees, or assessing 
                                                     
545
 CIC, “Information Sharing for Improved refugee Outcomes.”    
546
 CIC, “Issue Paper: Targeted Selection.” 
547
 Ibid.  
548  With the election of a Liberals government in October 2015, many of these cuts have been reversed. See CBC 
News, “Liberal government fully restores refugee health care program”, CBC news, accessed February 16, 2016, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mcallum-philpott-interim-federal-health-program-refugees-1.3453397   
549
 CIC, “Issue Paper: Targeted Selection.” 
178 
 
 
them as populations, was a form of discrimination. Such criticism is not new. As chapter one 
noted, during the 1970s the Canadian government was criticized by NGOs for being 
discriminatory in its varying responses to the Hungarian, Indochinese, Chilean, and 
Czechoslovakian refugee movements. In part, the concern over discrimination stems from the 
tensions between a refugee regime that focuses on individual persecution and rights, and the 
reality that many instances of forced displacement, and the practices that respond to them, 
involve some type of grouping. A key moment in this regard is the passing of the Refugee 
Convention in 1951. Nyers explains that the “refugee subjectivity promoted in the Convention is 
nothing less than a classic example of Western liberal individualism.”550 He goes on to explain 
that “the refugee was defined no longer by the country from which he or she fled but as a human 
being with certain inalienable rights. ‘Humanity’ is the organizing principle here, not the 
nationality or citizenship status of the refugee applicant.”551 The emphasis on individual 
protection under the Convention is reflected in the Canadian Council for Refugees’ position on 
the proper role of resettlement: 
When considering selection, priority consideration should be protection for refugees and 
stateless persons and this should first be considered in regards to individuals, not groups 
or populations. The Refugee Convention is focussed only on the individual and, in past 
discussions at the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) and with the 
UNHCR; NGOs have been firm in urging that options for individual protection must 
remain available.
552
  
 
 
Soguk goes further back, tracing the liberal humanitarian focus of refugee rights to the post-
WWII organization the IRO, discussed in chapter one. While the IRO constitution retained “the 
definition of refugee based on group affiliations”, it expanded this definition to “include a more 
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generalized understanding based on the merits of individual cases.”553 For quite some time then, 
the refugee regime has emphasized the rights of individuals as opposed to groupings. Despite 
this, as this dissertation has emphasized, the assumption of groupism permeates the state’s 
assessment, sorting, and selection of overseas refugees. It is implicit even in the criticisms 
directed against it by NGOs that take for granted the existence of ethnic, national, and racial 
“groups” that are subjected to the state’s discrimination. What’s unique about the reforms, as 
well as group processing more generally, is that the grouping process is made explicit in a 
context where the refugee regime is based ostensibly on the individual. In contrast to this, the 
explicit use of national categories in the refugee regime was commonplace in earlier periods. 
Nyers, for example, explains that during the interwar period: 
Refugees were defined primarily in accordance to their nationality or country of origin 
(be it Russian, Armenian, German, etc.). In addition to being outside their country of 
origin, people were recognized as refugees because of their prior membership in groups 
of persons who had been denied formal de jure protection from their country of origin.
554
  
  
Nyers points to the state-centric nature of the refugee definition during this period.  
Beyond emphasizing the historical focus of the resettlement program on populations, the 
government suggested that “targeted refugee selection” would improve existing diasporic 
communities, Canadian multiculturalism, and perceptions of refugees through public 
announcements on largescale resettlement decisions. Once again, it drew on previous group 
processing exercises to make these claims, including the selection of the Sudanese and Somali 
Madhiban out of Kenya in 2003-04, the Karen out of Thailand in 2006-08, and the Bhutanese 
from Nepal in 2008-12. It was suggested that the settlement of large refugee populations would 
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create “sustainable communities.” Pointing to the use of group processing for the Karen, it notes 
that: 
The establishment of large Karen populations in cities around Canada, including Ottawa, 
Charlottetown, Regina, and Moose Jaw, has been instrumental in the development of new 
ethnic communities in these cities. Establishing these communities contributes to 
Canadian multicultural objectives, such as intercultural understanding, and also has the 
potential to reduce incentives for secondary migration to major centres.
555
 
 
 
The Karen (viewed as a “clean population” by one government official, as discussed in Chapter 
4), are presented as beneficial to the fabric of Canadian society because of their groupness. 
“Targeted Selection” explains that “the Somali community in Hamilton…played an integral and 
invaluable role in the initial settlement process on the group processing of the Somali Madhiban 
in 2004.”556 At the same time, the government acknowledged the concerns of some of the service 
provider organizations that placing large groupings of refugees in one area could magnify 
integration challenges through what was referred to as “negative coping mechanisms” and the re-
establishment of “community hierarchies.” To mitigate this potential problem, “Targeted 
Selection” suggests that “large refugee populations will be resettled to various locations across 
Canada, as opposed to a single location, in order to better facilitate their integration into 
Canadian society.”557 The concerns of service providers involved with resettlement go to the 
heart of debates on what the makeup of multiculturalism should be in Canada.  
The Canadian Council for Refugees argues that an overly focussed resettlement program 
would run counter to the objectives of multiculturalism and that: 
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There is a balance to be struck between embracing the idea that different ethnic and 
linguistic communities will (and even should) stick together for comfort and wanting 
those resettled, as individuals, to be comfortable enough in Canadian society to feel they 
belong…group resettlement can undermine this process by encouraging the individuals in 
the group to focus on their own group’s needs only. A greater diversity of source 
populations contributes to greater balance and encourages learning of English/French and 
the making of friends outside the group. These factors contribute to the success of the 
whole resettlement process. Considering the Canadian mosaic, it will not sit well with the 
welcoming community, especially those who have strong connections with other refugee 
populations, if Canada only focuses on a handful of refugee populations. In light of 
Canada’s history and the composition of our population, we are in a unique position to 
provide a welcoming environment to diverse refugee populations.
558
 
 
The selection of refugees from a diversity of backgrounds is viewed as better suited to promoting 
the health and vitality of the Canadian population. Even as such statements aim to be pluralistic, 
inclusive, and welcoming, there is a strong hint of biopolitics at work in them. 
The tensions between grouping and individual refugee rights are further reflected in how 
“Targeted Selection” deals with what it refers to as “scrutiny of populations.” It warns that:  
The [Immigration] Department could face public scrutiny with respect to the selection of 
populations for large resettlement commitments, particularly regarding the criteria for 
selection and prioritization of populations…this risk could be mitigated by establishing 
clear guidelines to prioritise and inform population selection.
559
  
 
Despite these sorts of suggestions from the CIC bureaucracy, a Toronto Star article from 2013 
explained that there were no guidelines for how refugee populations will be selected.
560
 As noted 
in the introductory chapter, there were similar concerns expressed about how groupings of 
refugees would be selected for group processing.  
  More recently, an official from the Department of Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship Canada (IRCC, formally CIC) explained that multiyear commitments are based on 
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several factors, including resettlement priorities identified by the UNHCR, international policy 
and diplomatic considerations, operational implications, and stakeholder views. The official 
indicated that IRCC consults with Global Affairs Canada (formerly DFAIT) to get a sense of 
Canada’s relations with countries of first refuge under consideration for multiyear commitments. 
For instance, IRCC makes sure that it would be able to obtain exit visas for a refugee population 
under consideration. The unease in discussing “groups” or populations of refugees is expressed 
in the same IRCC officials’ comments on multiyear commitments. On the one hand, the official 
emphasizes that decisions are for the most part deferred to the UNHCR and are based on need 
and vulnerability; furthermore, security considerations apply to individuals and not the “group.” 
The official denied that population profiles are used in making multiyear commitment decisions, 
insisting that they are merely employed to help settlement agencies with already chosen 
populations. On the other hand, when pushed further on matters of security in relation to the 
selection of populations, this official admitted that IRCC does consult both CBSA and CSIS on 
whether or not there are any major security concerns with refugee populations under 
consideration. Similarly, IRCC also examines the integration potential of populations it is 
considering for selection.
561
  As will be seen below, population profiles are in fact used in the 
decision-making process.  
“Generating Efficiencies”   
The similarities between the reforms and group processing are expressed in the desire to 
make the entire resettlement program efficient. In fact, many of the documents shared with the 
Canadian Council for Refugees and other stakeholders were revealing in this respect. “Targeted 
Selection” linked the preferences of states for what are perceived as groupings of refugees with 
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similar traits to streamlined processing. In discussing the purported benefits of selecting 
individuals with similar profiles, it revealed that: 
Despite the large number of refugees in need of resettlement, most major resettlement 
countries prefer refugees with similar socio-demographic and protection needs. A large 
multi-year resettlement commitment will allow Canada to signal well in advance to 
referral agencies, such as UNHCR, the numbers and types of referrals requested as well 
as greater coordination of referrals with other resettlement countries.
562
   
 
These candid statements demonstrate that the preference of states to group refugees with 
commonalities weighs against considerations of humanitarian need. The relationship between 
this preference and improving the efficiency of overseas refugee processing is reflected in the 
government’s acknowledgement that:  
There is a lack of evidence to support the claim that targeted refugee selection will result 
in improved economic outcomes for resettled refugees. However, a targeted approach 
will enable a number of policy approaches and programmatic efficiencies which align 
with the Department’s strategic interests, operational capacity, foreign policy interests 
and protection goals that have the potential to contribute to improved economic outcomes 
for resettled refugees.
563
  
 
This is a peculiar conclusion given that for the most part the government had been framing the 
reforms primarily as a means to improve the economic and social outcomes of refugees; indeed, 
“Targeted Selection” emphasizes this.  The reference to enabling “programmatic efficiencies” 
resonates with Valverde’s and Mopas’s concept of “targeted governance” and the neo-liberal 
desire to reform governmental programmes perceived as inefficient. In describing Thatcher’s and 
Reagan’s restructuring of universal social programs in the 1980s, they note that “the idea of 
‘targeting’ programmes was linked to the idea of efficient, apolitical, knowledge-driven, 
‘evidence-based’ policy.”564  This is reflected in how the government rationalized the reforms.   
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 “Targeted Selection” suggests that the global nature of the current resettlement program 
places high demands on existing operational capacity; the need to travel to remote locations is 
costly and yields low numbers of processed refugees. It adds:  
Using traditional processing methods, officers posted abroad have limited time to process 
refugees and organise medical examinations while balancing the processing demands of 
other immigrant classes. Moreover, for refugees living in remote and relatively 
inaccessible locations, making trips to these areas may be overly costly particularly when 
only a few refugees are being processed at a time.
565
 
 
In contrast to this, it argues, “a targeted selection approach for resettlement would reduce strain 
on existing operation capacity, both in Canada and overseas, while building on identified best-
practices in refugee processing… A resettlement program that targets a limited number of 
populations enables missions to invest their resources more effectively.”566 An IRCC official 
explains that multiyear commitments provide visa offices with predictability in terms of refugee 
referrals from the UNHCR. This in turn is viewed as allowing these offices to more efficiently 
allocate resources and better plan for UNHCR referrals.
567
   
The targeting of specific refugee populations leads to calls for the increased use of group 
processing:  
Large-scale commitments provide opportunities for group processing, whereby large 
numbers of refugees with similar socio-cultural characteristics are selected in a short 
timeframe using streamlined eligibility criteria and admissibility screening. Group 
processing provides an opportunity to conduct streamlined interviews, the flexibility to 
reallocate resources, improve the efficiency of admissibility assessments, and the ability 
to quickly process families for resettlement. In the Management Response to the 2011 
GAR/RAP Evaluation, CIC committed to working with UNHCR and other resettlement 
partners to identify refugee populations that could benefit from group processing in the 
future.
568
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The idea of improving the efficiency of admissibility assessments is based on the CBSA 
practices discussed in the last chapter, which consider “inadmissibility patterns” when 
conducting security assessments on groupings of refugees under consideration for group 
processing. The statements highlight how the targeted grouping of refugees under both group 
processing and the reforms are linked to the desire to remake governmental programs efficient. 
An evaluation of the GAR resettlement stream and Resettlement Assistance Program in March 
2011 suggests that the group processing designation expedites “the efficient processing of 
refugees, as it allows for the large-scale movement of refugees with similar socio-cultural 
characteristics.”569 The report calls for the adoption of “more efficient refugee screening and 
processing approaches” such as group processing.570 It compares the processing of refugees 
across Canadian visas offices in Bogota, Nairobi, Damascus, and Singapore, noting: 
...given the group processing model available in Singapore, it was able to process large 
numbers of GARs utilizing limited staff resources. The Damascus office was also able to 
process relatively large numbers of refugees per staff member due to the acceptance of 
Prima Facie designation for Iraqis in Syria, and close access to urban-based refugees (the 
majority of whom resided in Damascus). In contrast, the efficiency of refugee processing 
in the Bogota and Nairobi offices did not benefit from Prima Facie and/or group 
processing designations.
571
 
 
More recently, a Library of Parliament document from April 2015 explains that CIC views 
multi-year group resettlement commitments as a means to realizing administrative efficiencies 
and providing “consistency for receiving communities, who can tailor orientation information 
and other supports to the refugees being resettled.”572  
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For some time then, the Canadian government has reflected on the eligibility, 
admissibility, and time requirements associated with the processing of overseas refugees. In 
earlier periods, a principle concern was to dispense with the normal immigration requirements 
for groupings of refugees framed as “ideal types.” More recently, the overseas processing of 
refugees has been problematized and subjected to reforms framed in the bureaucratic language of 
streamlining, resource requirements, and processing methodologies.   
 The government also suggested that the reforms would improve its response time to 
vulnerable refugees, which is similar to the rationale for group processing. “Targeted Selection” 
argues that “the global nature of the [current] program effects CIC’s ability to provide both 
timely protection and to effectively respond to new or emerging refugee situations in a 
meaningful way (e.g. Libya). A targeted approach can be used to protect vulnerable populations 
in a timely and efficient manner.”573 It adds “UNHCR and private sponsors appreciate the global 
nature of the resettlement program; however, the program’s global reach has resulted in it 
becoming oversubscribed and driven by operational capacity and existing caseloads rather than 
by strategic selection of populations based on protection need.”574 Such sentiments by CIC are at 
odds with the concerns of NGOs that view the global nature of the program as an essential 
component of flexibility in responding to emerging crises wherever they arise. Moreover, as 
discussed in previous chapters, group or large-scale resettlement decisions usually take years to 
be reached. The managerial language of “Targeted Selection” strategically targets limited 
resettlement spaces to groupings of refugees that are perceived as easy to access and process.  
 
 Reforming Canada’s Resettlement Program: Biopolitical Selection Practices  
 
                                                     
573
 Ibid.  
574
 Ibid.  
187 
 
 
The Canadian government framed the reforms to the resettlement program as a means of 
improving settlement outcomes by limiting intake to already chosen refugee populations. As I 
have shown, the targeted and neo-liberal rationale behind these changes shares similarities with 
the logic of group processing. This section draws on several key internal memos at CIC obtained 
by the Canadian Council for Refugees. The memos suggest that behind closed doors bureaucrats 
struggled over how to implement the contentious aspects of the reforms within existing refugee 
and immigration legislation, while at the same time being sensitive to public and refugee 
advocate perceptions. Despite some disagreements within CIC on this matter, both the 
bureaucracy and Immigration Minister aimed to maintain the government’s biopolitical 
discretion to discriminate between groupings of refugees on the basis of health, security, and 
integration potential.  
The limiting of what were referred to as high needs refugees was one of the most 
contentious aspects of the government’s reforms. A series of internal emails that circulated at 
CIC in June 2012 demonstrate that bureaucrats were considering this proposal in light of cuts 
made to the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) (since reversed by the new Liberal 
government). Still, the emails and other internal documents at CIC illustrate how the state applies 
biopolitical calculations in crafting and selecting groupings of refugees for resettlement.   
The IFHP provides temporary health coverage to resettled refugees and other protected 
persons that arrive in Canada. The former Conservative government’s cuts to this program 
included: supplemental health care benefits such as prescription medication, dental and vision 
care, and psychological counseling. Initially, these were to affect all protected persons including 
government-assisted resettled refugees. Under pressure from health care workers and other 
refugee advocates, the Conservative government reversed its decision for government-assisted 
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refugees before the changes were to take effect.
575
 A CIC news release at the time captures how 
former Immigration Minister Kenney framed the changes for the public. The Minister spoke of 
ensuring “fairness for Canadian taxpayers while emphasizing the need to protect public health 
and safety.” He argued that “Canadians are a very generous people ...however; we do not want to 
ask Canadians to pay for benefits for protected persons and refugee claimants that are more 
generous than what they are entitled to themselves.”576  The reference to Canadians being 
generous is a familiar line used in official statements, one that usually precedes discussions of 
security exclusions, and is meant to justify these contentious decisions.  The framing of refugee 
and migrant health as a drain on health care systems is now commonplace in many Western 
states.
577
 A common refrain is that “bogus” refugee’s abuse or take advantage of generous 
welfare systems in the West. In the context of welfare state retrenchment the refugee becomes 
the scapegoat for the shortcomings of health care systems.
578
 Moreover, under neo-liberal 
inspired targeted approaches, politicians place refugees alongside other categories of individuals 
that are assumed to have failed to live up to the expectations of responsiblized and active 
citizenship. One such example is the “welfare cheat.” On top of this, there has been a 
securitization of public health stemming from fears surrounding the spread of infectious diseases 
in particular from the Global South. This has led to a narrowing of public health that seeks to 
protect Western populations as opposed to helping vulnerable refugees in developing 
                                                     
575
 See Meagan Fitzpatrick, “Refugee health cuts 'clarified,' not reversed, Kenney says, ”CBCnews, February 18th, 
2016, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/refugee-health-cuts-clarified-not-reversed-kenney-says-1.1133956    
576
 CIC, “Reform of the Interim Federal Health Program ensures fairness, protects public health and safety,” CIC, 
accessed April 25
th
, 2012, news release has been archived, 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/releases/2012/2012-04-25.asp 
577
 See Renisa Mawani, “Screening out Diseased Bodies: Immigration, Mandatory HIV testing, and the Making of a 
Healthy Canada” in Medicine at the Border: Disease, Globalization and Security, 1850 to the Present, ed. Alison 
Bashford (Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).  
578
 This is similar to Bigo’s arguments regarding politician’s obsessions with illegal immigration as a means to 
deflect attention away from their own (or the state’s) shortcomings (e.g. welfare state retrenchment). Bigo,   
“Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.” 
189 
 
 
countries.
579
  It is reflected in Kenney’s statements above which attempt to reassure Canadians 
that despite the cuts to the IFHP, public health and safety would be upheld.  
Initially, there was some confusion as to whether or not resettled refugees would be 
included in these cuts. The emails reveal inconsistencies between the Conservative government’s 
official statements and internal debates within the CIC bureaucracy. On July 3
rd
, 2012 the 
Minister publically stated that government-assisted refugees from UNHCR run camps would 
continue to receive health benefits.
580
 Yet, discussions between immigration bureaucrats a month 
earlier suggest that the Conservative government intended to include these refugees in the cuts. 
An internal email explains: 
The policy sector needs to begin work with the Ops sector on developing a strategy for 
resettlement of refugees with medical conditions or needs. We will need to be able to 
inform the UNHCR before June 30 on what types of referrals the UNHCR should not be 
making to Canada due to changes in IFH in the short term and which cases they may 
need to withdraw now (e.g. all persons needing assistive devices related to mobility).
581
  
 
The bureaucracy was scrambling to find a way to limit “high needs” refugees despite the 
Immigration Minister’s refusal to change the legislation to refuse persons on the grounds of 
health, known as “excessive demand.” Resettled refugees are exempt from “excessive demand” 
rules which normally apply to immigrants with health care issues deemed overly costly for the 
health care system thereby making them inadmissible to Canada. It would appear that then 
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Immigration Minister Kenny felt that overturning this post-IRPA legislation would not be 
viewed favorably by refugee advocates since the resettlement program is supposed to be based 
on vulnerability and protection needs.  
The same series of CIC emails in June 2012 point to several strategies to limit “high 
needs” refugees. One suggestion made was to use the population-based approach to resettlement 
as a means to realize this objective. Contained within the emails are discussions on a chart that 
lists the top source countries for privately sponsored refugees and government sponsored 
refugees. The emails discuss several refugee population candidates that might be selected under 
the reforms. In relation to these, the resettlement director at the time remarked that:  
What would be key to know for the short-term for each of these populations is: the top 5 
(in incidence rate) medical conditions diagnosed during [Immigration Medical 
Examinations] IME; the medications and or treatments needed to treat these conditions; 
the average cost of the treatment on a monthly basis.
582
  
 
While the statements do not make an explicit suggestion to limit or block unhealthy refugee 
populations, they suggest the potential for this. Given that the Immigration Minister at the time 
did not want to alter legislation based on the “excessive demand” rules, one way to limit “high 
needs” refugees was to examine disease incidence rates across refugee populations. The 
government’s objective to improve the social and economic outcomes of resettled refugees could 
be achieved through the selection of what it perceived as healthy populations.  
 Several months later in December 2012, an internal CIC memo prepared for the 
Immigration Minister provides much more detail as to options the government was considering 
in limiting “high needs” refugees. It began by pointing out the increased cost of resettled 
refugees in the post-IRPA era. To prove this claim, it provided an estimate of how many 
government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees resettled after the passing of this 
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legislation would have been found inadmissible if the “excessive demand” criteria were applied 
to them. The bureaucracy warned the Immigration Minister of several problems in limiting the 
number of “high needs” refugees. It explained that “high needs” are inseparable from the 
contemporary refugee experience, including protracted situations, and that: 
Once Canada receives an application, whether for a privately sponsored or UNHCR-
referred refugee, the Department is required to process the application to completion. In 
accordance with the excessive demand admissibility exemption in IRPA, refugee 
applicants may not be refused because their health condition might reasonably be 
expected to cause an excessive demand on health or social services.
583
    
 
Despite this, a CIC paper on the reforms, one that was made available to NGOs, suggests that 
“although Canada’s ability to refuse admission to applicants with high health or settlement needs 
is limited under IRPA, there are a number of ways to manage administratively the number of 
high-needs refugees resettled to Canada.”584 In fact, for the past decade under IRPA overseas 
visa posts used a similar form of discretion to lessen the “ability to establish” requirements when 
considering resettlement candidates. The same CIC paper explains: 
Although Regulations require applicants to demonstrate an ability to establish 
successfully, in practice, applicants are rarely refused on this basis. Departmental policy 
is designed to enable most low-skilled applicants to pass an ability to establish 
assessments (e.g. the applicant may be able to find low-paid work).
585
  
 
This suggests that the context in which discretion operates is an important aspect of resettlement 
decisions.
586
 As Anna Pratt agues, it is more than the residual leftover in the absence of laws.
587
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Overseas visa officers have discretion to consider, as Lippert might argue, the potential for 
refugees to become self-governing liberal subjects that exercise choice.
588
   
CIC bureaucrats were also concerned about the effectiveness of measuring or capturing 
“high needs.” This was reflected in the option to focus on the UNHCR referral stage by setting a 
quota on medical case referrals as a proportion of the number of government-assisted refugees 
selected under the resettlement program. From the perspective of CIC, the problem with this 
approach was that it did not effectively deal with the UNHCR’s narrow definition of these types 
of referrals. It was suggested that:  
Many refugees who are generally considered to have “high-needs” by resettlement, 
settlement, and community service providers will not meet this definition. For example, 
large single-parent families, refugees with no formal education and limited life skills for 
living in Western cities, and refugees suffering from poor mental health would not fall 
under this quota. Refugees in these circumstances also face multiple settlement barriers 
and place additional demand on various settlement, community and health services.
589
   
 
The Immigration Minister was warned that “conditions resulting directly from the events that led 
to displacement, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, are prevalent and often do not present 
until after the refugee arrives in Canada.”590 The concerns of the officials demonstrate that, 
despite the desire for “perfect vision”, they sometimes encounter processes that fall outside their 
field of vision.  
Beyond concerns over effectively measuring “high needs,” the potential for public 
backlash weighed heavily on CIC bureaucrats. An internal CIC memo notes:    
Setting a quota on the number of refugees accepted with limited education or the number 
of large, single-parent families could be perceived as a reversal of Canada’s humanitarian 
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tradition. A much larger proportion of the resettlement applicants would be affected, 
including disproportionately more women and girls.
591
 
 
The bureaucracy reminded the Minister of the purpose of IRPA and its protection focus:  
The excessive demand exemption for refugees exists in the Act to ensure that health 
needs are not a barrier to protection for those most in need. A significant reduction in the 
number of medical case referrals from the UNHCR and an absolute bar on people who 
are not expected to recover from a health condition could be perceived as deliberately 
working against the spirit of the excessive demand exemption and of the objective stated 
in the Act that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives.
592
 
 
CIC officials were well aware that despite the Minister’s insistence to not contravene IRPA the 
option of imposing a cap on UNHCR-referred medical case refugees would lead to criticism by 
stakeholders, refugee advocates, and portions of the general public.  
 Another option considered by CIC attempts to capitalize on the reform of the resettlement 
program to focus on the selection of few refugee populations over several years. The same 
internal memo from 2012 explains: 
This option would manage the intake of referrals of high medical needs cases by 1) 
choosing populations for resettlement partly based on settlement potential and overall 
health of the population; and 2) developing caps for referrals of persons with specific 
health conditions within a refugee population.
593
  
 
The first part of this option demonstrates a form of biopolitics that draws distinctions between 
healthy and unhealthy and easy to integrate and difficult to integrate groupings of refugees.  To 
realize these objectives it was suggested to the Minister that health profiles could be used: 
When considering populations of focus, the Department would request a general 
population profile from the IOM that would provide epidemiological information and 
incidences of significant settlement barriers (i.e. developmental delay, blindness, victims 
of trauma and torture, etc.). Once a population is selected, the department would establish 
a cap on the number of cases with known conditions or barriers. For example, if we know 
the population had high incidences of developmental delay and victims of violence and 
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torture, we would inform the UNHCR that out of, for example, 1,000 applicants we 
would only accept referrals for 50 persons with high medical needs (medical cases), 10 
persons with developmental delay and 50 victims of violence and torture.
594
 
 
Implicit in the proposal above is that government officials can use epidemiological information 
to determine an acceptable level of incidences of disease within a refugee population selected for 
resettlement to Canada. Populations with high levels of incidences of diseases could be sorted 
from those with low levels; the goal being to protect the health, longevity, and vitality of the 
Canadian population. The statements resonate with Foucault’s notion of biopower, which “aims 
to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by achieving an overall 
equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers.”595 
Within the same 2012 memo, the Deputy Minister pointed to a potentially more inclusive 
use of health profiles for former Minister Kenny. This was done by drawing on the experiences 
of the Karen and Bhutanese group processing exercises. It explains: 
Detailed information on the general health profiles of these populations was shared with 
provincial partners and SPOs [Service Provider Organizations]…These practices could 
be replicated more broadly within a targeted population model…The department may 
develop and share general population profiles and needs assessments with stakeholders, 
as well as providing advance information about groups stakeholders can expect to receive 
each year. Such enhanced information will assist SPOs and health and social service 
partners to better meet the needs of high needs GARs in order to support their social and 
cultural integration, a first step toward improving their ability to achieve economic self-
sufficiency.
596
 
  
This approach would be in line with what was discussed at the beginning of this chapter and 
what was publicly promoted by the Conservative government; namely, to focus on improving the 
settlement of chosen refugee populations. Beyond this, the statements further demonstrate that 
the logic of group processing informed the reforms of the entire resettlement program.  
                                                     
594
 Ibid.  
595
 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 249.  
596
 Ibid.  
195 
 
 
The bureaucracy at CIC warned the Minister of the potentially contentious nature of 
using health and integration profiles to select entire refugee populations, explaining that:  
 
There is a legal risk that as the rationale for the selection of certain populations would 
come under scrutiny, depending on said rationale, the selection of certain populations 
could be seen as discriminatory against other groups.
597
  
 
 
To mitigate this risk, the bureaucracy recommended selecting refugee populations “identified by 
the UNHCR as being in need of resettlement.”598 It was easy enough for the Conservative 
government to take this advice since the need for resettlement vastly outstrips the available 
places that resettlement states are willing to offer.
599
 For this reason, governments are able to 
exercise discretion in selecting refugees while still adhering to UNHCR priorities.  
A third option considered for limiting “high needs” refugees was strengthening the 
“ability to establish” requirement. While this option appears not to have been presented to the 
Minster, it was discussed in a CIC paper shared with the Canadian Council for Refugees and 
other stakeholders. It explains: 
Under this option, Missions would be asked to apply more stringently the ability to 
establish criteria. Guidance would clarify that refugee applicants should be exempted 
from the ability to establish assessment (for reasons of vulnerability or urgent protection, 
as outlined in the Regulations) only in exceptional circumstances. Literacy and formal 
education levels of the applicants would be emphasized more strongly, as these 
contribute to the potential to learn an official language and find employment in 
Canada.
600
 
 
The paper makes clear that this strategy would realize the government’s objective in limiting 
“high needs” refugees given the broad discretionary power that overseas missions could use to 
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capture all types of “high needs” that are presumed to be hidden in narrower definitions such as 
the UNHCR’s medical case category. It pointed to the potential for clear cost savings for 
provincial health, settlement, and community services. Not surprisingly, many refugee advocates 
would be upset with this measure and the paper acknowledges this. Already facing caps, it 
explains that private sponsors would be further frustrated since the policy would lead to 
increased refusals based on ‘ability to establish’ criteria. It argues that: 
Stakeholders would likely react negatively to this proposal and accuse Canada of 
preventing the most vulnerable from attaining Canada’s protection, especially female-
headed households. In light of the upcoming reduction in GAR numbers and changes to 
IFH benefits, this option could be perceived as a retreat from a Resettlement Program 
driven first and foremost by humanitarian (rather than economic) principles.
601
  
 
The government’s grappling with these issues highlight how in the contemporary period there is 
some level of unease in applying naked biopolitical calculations in the grouping of refugees. 
Reflecting on Butler’s conception of a lawless sovereign power operating through the 
governmentality of indefinite detention, it would seem that in some contexts legitimacy still 
matters.
602
  CIC documents and internal memos to the former Immigration Minister point to a 
balancing act by the bureaucracy as they struggled with the Minister to find ways to limit “high 
needs” refugees, capture these needs in a cost effective manner, and uphold the public perception 
that Canada’s resettlement program will continue to be based on humanitarian principles. 
The desire to compare and contrast various groupings of refugees is reflected in the 
former Immigration Minister’s request on August 29, 2012 for: a summary of how the UNHCR 
prioritizes refugee populations for resettlement; information on UNHCR resettlement referrals 
out of Africa; academic papers on the settlement outcomes of Somali refugee cohorts that arrived 
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during the 1990s; and “data on other refugee cohorts, disaggregated by country of birth.”603 The 
request was to help the Minister decide “whether Canada should respond to UNHCR’s appeals 
for more resettlement out of the Horn of Africa.”604  The Minister wanted to compare and 
contrast the settlement and integration outcomes of various groupings of refugees based on 
national categories with particular attention focussed on Somalis.  Several annexes attached to 
the memo provided the Minister with what were referred to as the economic outcomes for 
government-assisted and privately sponsored refugees as well as refugees that arrive in Canada. 
The annexes considered Somali integration outcomes in comparison to other groupings of 
refugees. The memo, prepared for the Minister, explained: 
To provide a sense of prevailing trends with respect to economic outcomes, detailed 
analyses were done on some of the recent top source countries for GARs [government-
assisted refugees]. The analysis provided in Annex F is focussed on GARs from 
Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. Annex G and H then break 
down the same outcomes for PSRs [privately-sponsored refugees] and in-Canada landed 
refugees from the same source countries.
605
  
 
The assumption by officials is that the production of statistical categories based on nationality 
reflects the existence of relatively self-contained national “groups” with varying levels of 
integration potential. When combined with the examination of diseases across refugee groupings, 
it highlights a form of biopolitics at work within the reforms. The consideration of settlement 
outcomes of previous cohorts of refugees is similar to chapter four’s discussion of the CBSA’s 
examination of “inadmissibility patterns” under group processing. Valverde’s and Mopas’s 
concept of “targeted governance” suggests that there has been a move away from disciplinary 
power based on normalizing populations towards risk management techniques that break 
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individuals down into sets of “measurable risk factors.”606  The comparison of economic and 
settlement outcomes between, and within, various groupings of refugees demonstrate this type of 
governing. The goal is to anticipate the cost and difficulty of settling refugees based on specific 
national categories; to sort the difficult from the easy to integrate. Risk management techniques 
operate in two different ways. First, they compare different groupings of refugees along the lines 
of health, education, integration levels, and security risks. Second, they operate temporally by 
comparing historical and contemporary groupings of refugees framed with same national 
category.   
Several weeks later the Immigration Minister was provided with another memo, 
“Resettled Refugee Populations: Multi-Year Commitments for 2013 and Beyond,” that 
considered several refugee population candidates for the focussed multiyear approach. The 
memo is worth examining in some detail as it offers further evidence of the biopolitical practices 
of selection under this approach. The memo suggests that given current commitments to the 
resettlement of 20,000 Iraqis over several years as well as the selection of an additional 500 
Bhutanese in 2012-13 only two new multi-year commitments would be considered. The UNHCR 
had proposed four groupings of refugees for potential resettlement: Afghans in Pakistan, Somalis 
in Kenya, Bhutanese in Nepal, Columbians in Ecuador, and Congolese (Democratic Republic of 
Congo) in the Great Lakes region of Africa.
607
 Despite this, the Immigration Minister approved 
the selection of 5,000 mostly Iraqi and some Iranian government-assisted refugees out of 
Ankara, Turkey by 2018 and an additional 1,000 Bhutanese located in Nepal by 2014. Included 
                                                     
606
 Valverde and Mopas, “Insecurity and the Dream of Targeted Governance,” 240.  
607
 CIC, “Resettled Refugee Populations: Multi-Year Commitments for 2013 and Beyond.”   
199 
 
 
with the memo was an attached Annex, which provides insight into why these two populations 
were chosen and not the others, recommended by the UNHCR.
608
  
The Annex begins with a consideration of Iraqi refugees in Turkey, one of the two chosen 
populations. It notes that this large population is both a UNHCR and Ministerial priority. It 
justifies their selection based on a mix of foreign policy interests, strategic concerns over the 
protracted nature of the situation in Turkey, and the perception that Ankara is a stable location 
within which to conduct largescale resettlement processing. It explains that:  
Turkey has recently become a country of strategic interest to Canada. This is happening 
at a time when Turkey is feeling the increasing pressures of hosting a large number of 
asylum seekers. Between January and September 10, 2012, over 78, 000 Syrians have 
fled to Turkey and while the country is struggling to cope with the growing number of 
refugees, hostility to foreigners is rising in border communities.
609
 
 
In light of this situation, the Annex raises the issue of international burden sharing, one of the 
stated goals of resettlement by the UNHCR. An argument is made that a long term resettlement 
commitment by Canada would help influence Turkey to keep its borders open to incoming 
refugees.  
It is unclear why Turkey was a country of strategic interest to the former Conservative 
government. However, “Targeted Selection”, does point to the potential for a larger foreign 
policy role under a focussed approach to resettlement. It explains:  
In the past, Canada’s resettlement priorities were tied to larger foreign policy objectives, 
such as developing programs that facilitated immigration for communist defectors.  In 
recent years, refugee populations have been selected according to their vulnerability and 
need, as well as private sponsors’ interest.  Rather than directing where Canada should 
invest resettlement spaces, foreign policy has merely guided where the resettlement 
program does or does not operate, whether due to the existence of Canadian sanctions 
(e.g. Iran) or an inability to obtain entry visas (e.g. Eritrea).  A targeted selection 
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approach proposes to align Canada’s resettlement program more closely with foreign 
policy interests and consistent with UNHCR priorities and private sponsors’ interests.610  
 
In the case of Turkey, it appears that the Conservative government wanted to use the offer of 
resettlement as leverage in negotiations with Turkey and others, whether on issues surrounding 
trade, investment, and security cooperation, or convincing the Turkish government to allow more 
Syrian and Iraqi refugees to permanently settle. This last point is reflected in the memo, which 
provides further justification for focussing on Iraqi refugees and outlines what is meant by 
Ministerial priorities: 
This commitment responds to UNHCR’s request for continued commitment to Iraqi 
refugees and is aligned with the Government of Canada’s concern for religious minorities 
and Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) refugees in the region…Turkey is a 
major transit country for refugees and other migrants heading to Europe. A large and 
predictable resettlement commitment there provides an opportunity for Canada to show 
an increased commitment to burden-sharing with Turkey (encouraging Turkey to keep 
asylum space open) and would help set the stage and capacity for Canada to engage in 
larger scale Syrian resettlement at a later date, if needed.
611
 
 
In fact, when this memo was written, there was already a sizable Syrian refugee population in 
Turkey and the Canadian government was under pressure from the UNHCR and refugee 
advocates to resettle more of them.  I shall return to the Syrian situation below. 
The second population chosen by the Immigration Minister for a multiyear commitment 
was an additional 1,000 Bhutanese refugees from Nepal who have family ties in Canada. With 
the exception of the government’s familiarity with the Bhutanese, both the memo and Annex 
provide few reasons as to why the Minister approved their selection. The Annex emphasizes that 
Canada is the current chair of the Bhutanese Core Group and part of multilateral efforts to find a 
comprehensive solution for the Bhutanese in Nepal.  Furthermore, it argues that: 
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Accepting another 1,000 persons who have ties to Canada will reduce the pressure in the 
future for a private sponsorship program. Canadian engagement will ensure we can work 
multilaterally to complete what the Bhutanese Core Group started: to find solutions for 
the remaining population through ongoing pressure on Nepal and Bhutan to allow for 
local integration, or repatriation of the few elderly who prefer to return to Bhutan alone 
instead of being resettled.
612
 
 
The memo to the Minister adds that the Bhutanese are a UNHCR priority and that the proposed 
commitment would allow Canada to maintain a presence in Asia for potential new resettlement 
initiatives in the region.
613
 It goes on to explain that this population has been selected for a Visa 
Office Referred (VOR) initiative, which is a new stream of resettled refugees. Under it, the 
UNHCR identifies refugees deemed in need of resettlement who are then matched with private 
sponsors. The Canadian government and willing sponsors share in the cost of providing income 
support for the resettled refugees. The program has been criticized by the Canadian Council for 
Refugees for being part of broader attempts by the government to create a state-led resettlement 
program.
614
 The memo concludes that “there are no known strategic or operational disadvantages 
to this option.”615  
There are several things omitted in this memo and the attached Annex on the Bhutanese 
refugees. First, as discussed in previous chapters, this grouping of refugees is considered what 
one official referred to as a “clean population” with minimal security concerns. Second, Labman 
suggests that the Bhutanese are “desirable” in terms of employment skills and educational 
levels.
616
  The decision to select a further 1,000 was based on familiarity with well-educated and 
skilled refugees that have already been thoroughly screened as a grouping. The reference to “no 
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known strategic or operational disadvantages” highlights the neo-liberal and targeted logic 
behind the reforms to the resettlement program.  
  The second part of the annex to the 2012 memo considers refugee populations identified 
by the UNHCR but not recommended for resettlement by CIC. It begins with Somali refugees in 
Dadaab, Kenya, acknowledging their need for resettlement given the protracted nature of the 
conflict in Somalia, the lack of durable solutions, and the large size of the camps in Kenya. 
However, and somewhat ironically, it suggests that the scale of the problem is an obstacle to 
resolving it: 
The Somali refugee situation remains one of the UNHCR’s greatest challenges. The sheer 
number of persons in need means resettlement is unlikely to bring about any changes for 
Somalis at large unless countries were to engage at the same level as what was done for 
the Bhutanese and what is being proposed for the Congolese.
617
  
 
The remarks beg the question: why not offer Somalis that are living in Dadaab the same 
largescale resettlement as the Bhutanese, or what is now being done for the Syrians, and what 
might occur for the Congolese?  
The Annex cites security concerns as one of the reasons that CIC does not recommend 
selecting Somali refugees for a multiyear commitment. This includes what the government 
believes is the infiltration of Al Shabaab into the Dadaab camps, which, from the perspective of 
authorities, has created a heterogeneous grouping of refugees with potentially threatening 
elements. On top of this, accessing the camps to process large numbers of refugees is viewed as 
difficult given the precarious security situation. The memo concludes:  
This type of commitment is not feasible for resettlement countries. Canada, like most 
countries, is unable to access Dadaab Refugee Camp at this time where a significant 
number of Somali refugees reside, due to the deteriorating security situation. New 
arrivals of Somali refugees in Dadaab would not make sense at this time given the lack of 
access 
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It adds: 
 
the Somali refugee situation and context is complicated by the fact that very little 
documentation exists due to the lack of a stable government for over three decades. 
Combined with the very real presence of Al-Shabaab members and other war criminals 
within both urban and camp based refugee populations, it is clear that a group processing 
approach is not viable.
618
 
 
The concerns of authorities over documentation, heterogeneity, and what are perceived as 
urban refugee populations highlight the similarities between group processing and the selection 
of populations under the reforms. The lack of documentation places Somali refugees outside the 
vision of the Canadian state, generating unease in officials. Gaps in this type of knowledge 
combined with a perception of risky heterogeneous groupings of refugees in Dadaab represent a 
problem for biopolitical practices that strive for homogeneity, “perfect vision,” and “clean 
populations.” 
The annex attempts to ease the optics at play in its assessment of Somali refugees by 
emphasizing existing commitments for them, explaining:  
Canada has Somali refugees (among many others) already referred by both the UNHCR 
and private sponsors and the mission in Nairobi will be working to process all 
outstanding applications over the course of the next several years. While the Department 
cannot propose a multiyear GAR commitment to new Somali referrals, Nairobi’s target 
for refugees out of this region in the world will remain high so that inventories can be 
brought to working levels allowing Canada to commit to a more feasible initiative 
(Congolese).
619
  
 
The “more feasible initiative” that was mentioned earlier is the proposed selection of 2,500 
Congolese between 2015- 17 as part of a major multilateral resettlement effort that would select 
a minimum of 50,000 refugees.
620
 A UNHCR report for the February 2013 Working Group on 
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Resettlement suggests US interest in the Congolese as well, including several P-2 group 
resettlement initiatives. The report’s numerous references to verification and re-verification 
practices further reflects the emphasis on visibility under group resettlement schemes. It explains 
that “in Rwanda, UNHCR has used the 2011/2012 verification exercise to identify the ‘Mudende 
group’, consisting of 2,045 households, totaling some 12,000 refugees for a P-2 group processing 
proposal for the USRAP [United States Refugee Admissions Program].”621  In Uganda, it 
indicates that the UNHCR at the end of 2012 had completed what was referred to as a 
“population verification exercise” for Congolese refugees. The report explains that “while the 
potential for a P-2 group proposal is being actively pursued, a P1 expedited processing 
methodology will be initiated based on established criteria agreed at the UNHCR Regional 
Resettlement Meeting in Nairobi in May 2012, and the use of the Abridged RRF [Resettlement 
Registration Forms] which was affirmed toward the end of last year.”622 In light of the protracted 
displacement of the Congolese, the report notes that the UNHCR had decided to shift approaches 
from one based on the strategic selection of individuals to large-scale resettlement based on what 
it calls “group profiling exercises.”623  
The emphasis on expedited forms of processing for the Congolese, whether based on 
individuals or groupings, can be contrasted with the slow security clearance of Somalis.
624
 At the 
2013 Working Group on Resettlement meeting in February, the UNHCR drew attention to the 
lack of resettlement spaces made available for refugees in Dadaab. It explained: 
UNHCR has only commitments received for 1,250 refugees (UK, Sweden, USA, 
Australia and Norway). It has formally requested 600 places (mainly for Somalis) with 
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Canada but is still waiting for the formal reply. UNHCR would thus still need 1,250 or 
650 places (depending on Canada’s decision).625  
 
Regardless of whether or not the former Conservative government agreed to this request to 
resettle 600 mostly Somali refugees, the memos and reports discussed throughout this chapter 
suggest that the selection of Somali refugees was not a priority. Their dire situation is 
exacerbated by the intensions of the Kenyan government to implement a policy of encampment 
in which all refugees will be moved to Dadaab or Kakuma. 
626
 On top of this, opportunities for 
individual resettlement are bleak. For some time now, the Canadian Council for Refugees has 
criticised the Canadian government for the long delays for processing at its Nairobi visa mission, 
which is now subject to a cap on new referrals.
627
 Combined with the decision against large-scale 
resettlement similar to the one proposed for the Congolese this amounts to the exclusion from 
resettlement of some of the neediest refugees in the world.  
The US government appears to have a similar position in regards to Somali refugees. The 
2012 US proposed refugee admissions explains “in East Africa, we continue to process P-1 
Somalis in Kakuma refugee camp; however, processing in Dadaab has been suspended since 
December 2011 due to the worsening security situation.”628 While the US had allocated up to 
12,000 resettlement spaces for African refugees in 2013, the vast majority of these are P-1 
individual designations as opposed to P-2 group designations; there are only 750 refugees under 
this designation.
629
 In contrast to this, that same year it was anticipated that there would be 
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15,900 refugees under the P-2 group referral designation in East Asia, mostly Burmese.
630
 Where 
P-2 group initiatives exist in Africa, such as in Ethiopia, it does not include the large number of 
Somalis in Dadaab, Kenya. This suggests that while the US program selects from a diverse range 
of nationalities, in practice, it focuses on a few populations, namely the Bhutanese, the Burmese, 
and to lesser extent Iraqis (16.4%).
631
 As such, it is similar to the focussed approach for the 
Canadian resettlement program in that it targets a few refugee populations. The exclusion of the 
majority of Somali refugees from the US and Canadian resettlement programs highlights the 
implications of this. Protection space is closed off for some of the most vulnerable refugees in 
the world based on their imputed affiliation with what are perceived to be risky or problematic 
groupings.  
The Annex also considered the selection of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, though part of 
the section on the Afghans was redacted. Similar to the Somalis, it is acknowledged that this is a 
large and vulnerable grouping of refugees caught in a protracted situation. Despite this, the 
bureaucracy at CIC recommended against large-scale resettlement. The annex explains that the 
UNHCR only refers a few hundred refugees to the US, Canada, and Australia and would like to 
increase this to 1,000 annually. Drawing on the UNHCR’s “strategic use of resettlement,” which 
aims at using limited resettlement spaces in tandem with other durable solutions such as local 
integration, it argues:  
There is recognition from all parties concerned that resettlement is not the solution. 
However, a coordinated strategy in relation to small-scale resettlement from Pakistan 
might yield benefits for others. Both Australia and the US
632
 will look at increasing 
numbers; the group
633
 as a whole will also encourage more countries to offer 
resettlement. Using resettlement strategically in this situation would put UNHCR and the 
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international community in a position to leverage further cooperation with the 
Government of Pakistan.
634
  
 
Similar to the Canadian government’s reforms of the resettlement program, the UNHCR’s 
“strategic use of resettlement” reflects “targeted governance.” With the Afghans in Pakistan, the 
aim is to target small-scale resettlement in a manner that provides Western countries with 
leverage in negotiations with Pakistan, whether on security matters, economic trade, or 
increasing the local integration of Afghans.    
The Annex also pointed to the security situation in Pakistan as posing a risk to 
successfully conducting and completing large-scale resettlement for the Afghans. In particular, it 
suggests that this situation might limit the mobility of government officials.
635
 Similar to the 
security situation in Dadaab, Kenya, this is viewed as an obstacle to streamlined methods of 
processing large groupings of refugees. The Annex also attempted to ease the decision against 
large-scale resettlement by pointing to both past and present commitments for Afghan refugees. 
It highlights Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan as further proof that it has done its part for 
the Afghans. It claims: 
Canada has expended significant resources in Afghanistan as well as the region and has 
resettled over 27, 000 refugees through PSR and GAR programs since the 1990s, mostly 
from Pakistan (with smaller numbers out of Central Asian republics like Tajikistan and 
even smaller numbers out of Iran).
636
  
 
An argument is made that the UNHCR should be encouraged to include the targets of private 
sponsors when discussing the Afghan refugee issue with the government of Pakistan. It was 
suggested that: 
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Afghans in Pakistan represent Canada’s single largest private sponsorship caseload…the 
admissions target for PSR applications are set in the 600 to 800 person range every year –
or close to 60% of the target UNHCR is aiming at for global resettlement. Through this 
program, Canada is indeed doing its fair share for this group.
637
 
 
Despite this claim, the Annex acknowledges that “a cap on new applications has been placed on 
the mission in Islamabad since January 2012 and will remain in place for the foreseeable 
future.”638 This suggests that decisions against large-scale resettlement for certain groupings of 
refugees are paired with caps, amongst other factors, on privately sponsored refugees from 
overseas missions that service these same groupings.  
Given the redacted sections in the Annex it is unclear whether or not these were the only 
reasons that led to the decision against selecting Afghans out of Pakistan for a multiyear 
commitment. The available information discussed above suggests that the Canadian government 
preferred avoiding this grouping of refugees for concerns over security linked to the perceived 
risks for inefficient processing. Moreover, it hoped that other countries would offer limited 
resettlement spaces that might mitigate the potential instability that stems for protracted refugee 
situations. 
Syrian Resettlement: Transparency, Biopolitics, and Grouping 
   In 2013, the Conservative government announced that it would select 1,300 Syrians; 
however, only 200 would be GARs.
639
 In response to this, the Canadian Council for Refugees 
argued that given federal cuts to refugee health care, private sponsors would face massive 
unanticipated costs to resettle Syrians. These costs could be seen as a disincentive for private 
citizens and organizations to come forward and sponsor the Syrians. The organization further 
pointed out that “Sponsorship Agreement Holders are barred from sponsoring refugees in 
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Turkey. Yet, Turkey is one of the main countries to which Syrian refugees have fled.”640 Similar 
to the Afghans in Pakistan discussed above, this suggests that the government was pairing the 
decision against resettling large numbers of government-assisted Syrian refugees out of Turkey 
with administrative tactics designed to block the private sponsorship community from resettling 
from the same place. The Conservative government put sharp limits on the Syrians -- as a 
grouping -- through the denial of largescale GAR selection and the blocking of private sponsors.  
In the lead up to the Federal elections in November 2015 the government changed its 
position on the Syrians. Anne-Marie Bélanger McMurdo suggests several factors behind this. 
Firstly, the recent images of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees making their way to 
Europe with many of them drowning has led refugee advocates to intensify pressure on Western 
governments to take action. In particular, McMurdo suggests that the death of three-year old 
Alan Kurdi, the Syrian child who drowned while travelling from Turkey to Greece on a boat, 
“marked a tipping point, strengthening the public outcry for the Canadian government to change 
its previously restrictive policies towards refugees.”641 Commenting on the impact of this 
incident in a recent Toronto Star article, Janet Dench from the Canadian Council for Refugees, 
referred to Alan Kurdi’s death as a “defining moment that shifted Canadians’ attitude toward the 
distant refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East.”642 Second, in Canada, the question of 
Syrian resettlement became a major issue in the 2015 Federal election.
643
 In a bid to secure votes 
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all the major political parties made election promises to resettle Syrians. The newly elected 
Liberals initially selected 25,000 Syrians.
644
  Third, McMurdo explains that: 
Citizens wanted their government to match the rhetoric of Canadian identity as 
compassionate, actively engaged in the international community and open to newcomers. 
It was no surprise that citizens pushed the government to make an effort towards 
resettling Syrians, given the longstanding willingness of many citizens to be actively 
engaged in sponsoring refugees themselves.
645
  
 
As Dauvergne’s investigation of immigration and refugee law in Canada suggests, admitting 
refugees for humanitarian reasons helps fulfill the expectations of a liberal state to define and 
understand itself as compassionate and caring.
646
  
 Given the high profile of the Syrian refugee movement, the decision-making process has 
unfolded in a public, seemingly democratic way. This openness is reflected in how the 
government has shared many of the details of the Syrian resettlement program with the public. 
An online notification titled #WelcomeRefugees: Canada resettles Syrian refugees lists the 
number of Syrians that have arrived in Canada on a weekly basis, a stark contrast from the 
former Conservative government, which was reluctant to share this sort of information. The 
same notification provides key figures that breakdown the Syrian arrivals into the categories of 
Government Assisted Refugees, Privately Sponsored Refugees, and Blended Visa Office-
Referred Refugees. It lists the communities across Canada where the refugees have settled.
647
 It 
is clear that the Liberal government is making an effort to be transparent about these figures.  
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#WelcomeRefugees provides details of the processing of Syrian refugees, including a list 
of the Federal agencies involved and what function they perform in the process.
648
  The Syrians 
are being resettled under what is called the “humanitarian transfer” methodology. This 
methodology differs from group processing in that it is formally based on the selection of 
individuals, however, it does share some similarities with the logic of it.
649
 Much like group 
processing, the UNHCR referred a large number of Syrians within a short period of time, 
deploying extra resources, immigration and security officials to overseas visa posts servicing 
them. The former Immigration Minister Alexander decided to recognize the Syrians on a prima 
facie basis thereby removing the need for refugee status determinations. This enabled the 
UNHCR to refer a large numbers of Syrian refugees directly from the UNHCR’s registration 
database in countries such as Lebanon and Jordan. Turkey is an exception to this because the 
government there controls refugee registration.
650
 Recall that group processing involves the 
skipping of refugee status determinations and that under the United States’ P-2 group referral the 
UNHCR directly sends bio data from their registration database to US authorities. Furthermore, 
the selection of Syrian refugees was grouped in that it was based on the crafting of vulnerable 
subgroupings from the wider Syrian refugee population, viewed by some as risky.  
The newly elected Liberal government also revealed details of the security screening 
process as it attempted to reassure portions of the public that effective measures were been taken 
to prevent the infiltration of risky elements within the movement of Syrian refugees to Canada. 
#WelcomeRefugees reminds the public that: 
Protecting the safety, security and health of Canadians and refugees is a key factor in 
guiding how we carry out this plan. Each Syrian refugee that Canada welcomes will 
undergo a robust, multi-layered screening: immigration and security interviews are done 
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by experienced visa officers; documents are verified and biometric and biographic 
information collected; health screening; identities confirmed on arrival.
651
 
 
The government announced that it had “asked the UNHCR to prioritize vulnerable refugees who 
are a low security risk, such as women at risk and complete families.”652 It informed the public 
that the UNHCR will use iris scan technology to verify the identities of refugees and that: 
Immigration processing will be completed overseas. This includes full immigration 
medical examination, including screening for communicable diseases such as 
tuberculosis. Security screening will include collecting biographical information, and 
biometrics, such as fingerprints and digital photos, which will be checked against 
immigration, law enforcement and security databases.
653
 
 
The statements reflect the de-localized nature of contemporary border practices. The border is 
also dispersed, following refugees as they make their way to Canada:  
Upon arrival in Canada, all refugees will be welcomed and processed by Border Services 
Officers (BSOs) for admission into Canada. This will include final verification of 
identity.
654
 
 
Similar risk management techniques are included in the United States’ plan to resettle Syrian 
refugees. A ‘facts sheet’ by the organization Human Rights First designed to lessen the public’s 
fears surrounding the resettlement of Syrian refugees to the United States points to UNHCR 
biometric and identification practices based on regular interactions with refugees.  It explains 
that:  
The U.S. government…conducts its own extremely rigorous screening process, including 
health checks, repeated biometric checks, several layers of biographical and background 
screening, and in-person interviews by specially-trained officers. Multiple agencies are 
involved, including the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, the State Department, the 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], the National Counterterrorism Center, the 
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Department of Defense and U.S. intelligence agencies. DHS [Department of Homeland 
Security] has added an additional country-specific layer of review for Syrian refugee 
applications, which includes extra screening for national security risks.
655
 
 
The understandable desire of refugee advocates to convince skeptics that the resettlement of 
Syrians is safe leads to an uncritical acceptance of biopolitical practices. This is reflected in the 
factual description of highly intrusive security practices by Human Rights First that ignores the 
implications of risk management techniques that act on refugees, immigrants, and travelers. As 
Amoore and De Goede emphasize, representations of “biometric technologies as infallible and 
unchallengeable verifiers of the truth about a person” are deeply problematic for assuming that 
these identifiers are in fact an accurate representation of an individual.
656
 They stress that 
biometrics “can be parcelled up, contracted out, integrated, applied and innovated.”657  This has 
serious implications for an individual’s privacy. Unfortunately, this is precisely what is being 
done with the security screening of Syrians where biometric data is being analyzed, synthesized, 
and shared with numerous security, intelligence, police, and military agencies.
658
  
At the same time, the Canadian Council for Refugees has expressed some reservations 
over the Syrian resettlement program. While the organization initially played an important role in 
pressuring the government to increase the resettlement of Syrians, it has increasingly become 
concerned over the diversion of resources away from other groupings of refugees – most notably 
those located in Africa.
659
 This concern is part of the broader critique by the Canadian Council 
for Refugees against moving the resettlement program from a formally global approach to one 
based on focussed multiyear commitments. Under the latter, the processing of chosen groupings 
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of refugees is expedited, while other groupings wait in limbo and are subjected to quotas, 
backlogs, and what the organization calls “burdensome paperwork.”660 In May of this year, it 
issued a call for a “resettlement plan reflecting equity for all regions,” noting that:  
Although some sponsors would like the processing of Syrian refugees to be faster, 
compared to other refugees it is relatively quick and easy to sponsor Syrian refugees. 
Africa hosts fully a third of the refugees in need of resettlement, but they routinely wait 
as long as five years for Canada to process their application. Over 6,000 people in Africa 
are currently waiting for an answer from Canada.
661
 
 
As mentioned earlier, beginning in 2011 the government imposed caps and quotas on the private 
sponsorship of refugees from visa offices in Nairobi, Cairo, Pretoria, Dar es Salaam, and 
Islamabad. The Canadian Council for Refugees explains that: 
Syrian refugees are exempted from these quotas, so sponsors can apply for as many as 
they have the capacity for. However, for other refugees, Sponsorship Agreement Holders 
often find they cannot submit a sponsorship because they have reached their limit, either 
overall or for the specific visa office. This particularly affects African refugees as four of 
the five capped visa offices are in Africa.
662
 
 
The organization is also concerned about the unequal application of new rules introduced in 2012 
that require refugees selected by sponsors to be individually determined to be refugees by either 
the UNHCR or the country in which they are taking first refuge. It notes: 
Since September 2015, Syrian and Iraqi refugees no longer require this documentation, 
but the rule continues to apply to other refugees. Many refugees, such as Afghans in 
Pakistan or Iran, do not receive individual refugee determination from either the UNHCR 
or the local government, so they cannot be sponsored by Groups of Five or Community 
Sponsors.
663
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From the point of view of the Canadian Council for Refugees, measures such as caps, quotas, 
and state, or UNHCR, refugee status requirements compromise the principle of naming, which 
calls for the ability of sponsors to choose the refugees they wish to sponsor.  
While portions of the public were moved by the images of drowning Syrians to open 
Canada’s door to them, others were concerned over what was perceived as a risky grouping of 
refugees. These concerns have made it easier for the government to be transparent about the 
application of biopolitical security practices in the screening of Syrian refugees. This 
transparency reveals how the government is crafting purportedly less risky groupings of Syrians 
based on gendered assumptions. The candid and relatively open discussion of security screening 
behind the Syrian resettlement program is unique in Canada’s historical response to refugee 
movements. As this dissertation demonstrates, as well as authors such as Whitaker, there is a 
long history of secrecy surrounding the security screening of refugees.
664
 Similar to group 
processing, the resettlement of Syrian refugees is based on the relatively quick deployment of 
immigration and security officials to countries that host them. Once there, “targeted” biopolitical 
risk management techniques in the “theatre” craft vulnerable groupings of refugees from wider 
refugee populations, ensuring that risky “profiles” have not tainted them. Where the Syrian 
program differs from group processing is in the relative transparency of the decision-making 
process as well as the importance of political will, under public pressure, to push through a large-
scale resettlement decision despite reservations from portions of the public and Canada’s security 
establishment. Similar to the Iraqis, the government tailored security practices and processing 
methodologies to allow for the selection of what is otherwise considered a risky heterogeneous 
grouping of refugees.      
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This chapter has situated the targeted approach of the reforms of Canada’s resettlement 
program and its associated reliance on biopolitical techniques within the logic of group 
processing. Multiyear resettlement commitments rely on the production of profiles based on the 
health, culture, settlement potential, “inadmissibility patterns,” and economic outcomes of 
groupings of refugees. Risk management techniques assess the viability, risk, ease of access, and 
efficiency of processing groupings of refugees. They sort the relatively healthy, easy to process 
and integrate groupings of refugees from those perceived as unhealthy, difficult to process and 
integrate. Targeted selection is based on the goal of “generating efficiencies” within overseas 
refugee processing, linking the selection of groupings of refugees with purportedly similar traits 
to streamlined processing methods. The reforms are the culmination of years of reflection by the 
Canadian government on the efficiency and resource requirements of processing overseas 
refugees for resettlement. Moreover, they are reflective of the neo-liberal logic at work in group 
processing. 
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Conclusion 
In this final chapter of the dissertation I reflect on some of the theoretical insights that 
arise from studying group processing in Canada and group resettlement schemes in general. 
Historically, refugees have always been grouped -- racially, ethnically, nationally, religiously, 
and culturally -- and the same goes with practices of resettling them.  Political ideology, foreign 
policy considerations, economic needs, and security concerns have also long shaped the grouping 
and selection of refugees. At some times the grouping of refugees is made explicit through statist 
categories such as the “Indo-Chinese designated class” or the “hard-core,” whereas at other times 
it is implied in the way governments assess overseas refugees, as with Canada’s approach to 
Tibetan refugees. The dissertation has traced the contemporary desire to select groupings of 
refugees believed to have the clearest set of commonalities and boundaries -- as determined 
through a variety of practices, such as use of census, identification, mapping, and profiling 
practices.  
The chapter considers the emphasis placed on visibility, ordering, boundary-making, and 
homogeneity in group resettlement practices. It examines the relations between groupism, 
biopolitics, border practices, and risk management techniques. I discuss how secrecy and unease 
relate to the tensions between the grouping of refugees and the focus on individuals under the 
Refugee Convention. In the final part of the conclusion, I reflect on some possibilities for 
progressive alternatives to contemporary group resettlement schemes. In particular, I consider 
the potential of “mediated passage”665 to challenge the biopolitical and risk management 
practices at work in these schemes. Critical in this regard is conceptualizing collective action 
without re-performing the taken for granted assumptions of what constitutes a “group.” 
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Drawing Circles: Biopolitics and Grouping in Resettlement Schemes  
With group resettlement schemes, officials attempt to identify who is inside and outside 
“the circle.” They try to impose boundaries on the disorder, fluidity, and contingency in refugee 
camps. The drawing of “circles” around what are perceived as vulnerable refugee “groups” 
reflects the logic of sovereignty. As Nyers reminds us, with regard to humanitarianism’s claim of 
neutrality and impartiality in conflicts, “sovereignty, based on the relation of the exception, is a 
violent relation in the sense that it is a practice that works to keep things apart, create boundaries, 
and maintain separateness.”666 Sovereign power differentiates between chosen “groups” and 
those refugees remaining in camps. This is a bordering operation and may be seen as yet another 
variation of the ways in which sovereignty acts through borders and bordering, such as practices 
of detention, deportation, and the issuing of visas.  Like other forms of bordering, group 
resettlement bordering intersects with the construction of collective identities and narratives. 
Similar to the way that state borders aim to protect national populations from what are regarded 
as internal and external biopolitical threats, the border around a grouping of refugees attempts to 
secure a conception of pure vulnerability. 
 In these ways, state authorities engage in an instrumental version of Brubaker’s notion of 
groupism. While officials assume the existence of “groups” based on ethnic, national, or racial 
categories, they operate on the assumption that some “groups” are more group-like than others. 
This is reflected in how authorities create and reform categories that group refugees, from “group 
labour” and the “hard core,” to the “long stayers” and the “screened in” under the “Indochinese 
designated class.”  
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Once again, the preoccupation with homogeneity in group resettlement schemes is 
intertwined with sovereign logics. As Goldberg argues, “modern states, especially in their 
national articulation, ordered themselves not as heterogeneous spaces but in particular as racially 
and culturally homogeneous ones.”667 Biopolitics operates through this preference for 
homogeneity. In Society must be Defended,  Foucault  draws attention to the potential for 
biopolitics to justify techniques aimed at eliminating threats, both internal and external to the 
population, including murder, political death, expulsion, or rejection.
668
  Authorities under group 
resettlement schemes consider the presence of terrorists, imposters, and war criminals that 
threaten both the internal homogeneity of prospective groupings of refugees based on 
vulnerability and the security of Western populations. Risk management techniques based on 
“inadmissibility patterns,” levels of riskiness, health, and integration potential assist authorities 
in separating what they deem “clean populations” from risky and difficult to process ones. These 
techniques are integral to “groupism” since they operate by abstracting specific types of 
information from the complex and fluid conditions that prevail in refugee camps and elsewhere. 
In the process, refugees are reduced to “dividuals” with commonalities, reifying “groups,” and 
converting them into mobile inscription devices that can be shopped around to prospective 
resettlement states.   Biopolitics works as a form of “groupism” by testing the internal sameness 
and boundaries of groupings of refugees; determining what constitutes an acceptable level of 
riskiness, heterogeneity, and porousness in otherwise vulnerable groupings. These practices 
share similarities with former colonial anxieties surrounding racial mixing and fears of 
contamination.  
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 “Targeted governance” is employed to “generate efficiencies” in the overseas processing 
of refugees under both group processing and the multiyear focused approach to resettlement. The 
examination of “inadmissibility patterns” highlights how this emphasis on efficiency intersects 
with anticipatory security practices. Despite the global mapping of refugee vulnerability by the 
UNHCR, group resettlement programs target what are perceived as homogenous, easy to 
process, and relatively risk-free groupings of refugees. 
The forgoing analysis of group resettlement schemes provides an opportunity to consider 
how the grouping of refugees cuts across the socially produced distinction between onshore and 
offshore practices. Important, in this regard, is distinguishing between categories and 
“groups.”669 The Canadian government’s use of the term “ideal types” in relation to Baltics is an 
example of a statist category informed by racial preferences. It operated in both “displaced 
persons” camps in Europe and with the arrival of “unauthorized” boats from Sweden. “Ideal 
types” were viewed as the right fit for Canada regardless of where they were located.  I am not 
suggesting that we should ignore how the state places refugees into categories based on their 
location; there are real and important effects that stem from this. However, this dissertation 
highlights those moments when the state draws conclusions on groupings of refugees that cut 
across the categories of “in-Canada asylum claimants,” “government assisted refugee,” and 
“privately sponsored.” For example, as chapter five noted, determinations of “inadmissibility 
patterns,” incidences of disease, and settlement outcomes based on specific national categories 
cut across the distinction between inland and offshore refugees.  
The Invisibility of the Making Visible 
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In this dissertation, I have shown how governments are concerned to make visible, at 
least to themselves, those groupings of refugees they are considering for resettlement. The 
process of identifying the most internally homogenous and bounded groupings of refugees relies 
on profiling, registration, and mapping practices. Spaces and processes that escape the vision of 
the state and UNHCR generate unease in officials. These include border areas viewed as too 
fluid and urban centers considered heterogeneous. Invisibility, and by extension knowledge 
insecurity, produces unease. Those groupings that frustrate the state’s desire for “perfect vision” 
are far less likely to be chosen. At the same time, the practices of making visible, like virtually 
all components of the process of choosing some refugee groupings over others, are themselves 
kept largely invisible.    
Individuals/Groupings  
In this dissertation, I have drawn attention to the tensions and relations between “groups” 
and individual refugees in Canada’s group resettlement practices. In the previous chapter I noted 
that the refugee regime has, for quite some time, emphasized the rights of individuals as opposed 
to groupings. With group resettlement, there is a belief by officials that bounded and 
homogenous groupings exist and can be uncovered. Similarly, refugee advocates and NGOs take 
for granted the existence of racial, ethnic, or national “groups” in their criticisms of the state. 
Secrecy and unease relate to the fact that group resettlement schemes make explicit the grouping 
process in a context where individual refugee rights are emphasized. Put another way, secrecy 
and unease relate to the fact that what was taken for granted in earlier periods is now brought to 
light through the reflection of the grouping process in a context that formally emphasizes the 
rights of individuals. In earlier historical periods, the Canadian government explicitly 
acknowledged its discrimination against what it viewed as racial and religious “groups.” In those 
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rare instances when the government selected refugees it had grouped racially, it attempted to 
downplay these decisions given the public’s racist attitudes. In the present period, with the 
ostensibly nondiscriminatory character of programs such as group processing, officials are more 
intent on keeping the exercise of such racialized discretion secret. NGOs insist that group 
resettlement decisions be based on protection needs as opposed to integration potential. Officials 
are uneasy with discussing the exclusion of specific groupings of refugees in the presence of 
NGOs -- and even anonymously in interviews for this dissertation.  Secrecy plays a role in 
resettlement decisions by concealing the more contentious elements of risk management 
techniques at work in these programs. The concern to mask naked biopolitical assessments of 
groupings of refugees suggests that the government’s need for legitimacy continues to function 
in some manner in the exercising of this form of sovereign power.  
The grouping of refugees from the state’s perspective is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, this grouping permits more discretion to operate biopolitical security practices, to 
consider integration potential and levels of health across entire groupings of refugees. On the 
other hand, the state cannot escape the question as to which “groups” (or populations) are 
selected and for what reasons. It is always prone to the criticism that it discriminates between 
“groups,” that it gives preferential treatment to some over others.  
Cultivating Refugee Agency through a “Politics of Mediation” in Group Resettlement 
 
The grouping process presents a unique set of challenges for those pursuing critical 
approaches to refugee studies. The literature that highlights how the international refugee regime 
silences individual refugees and de-politicizes their experiences is relevant to many aspects of 
group resettlement schemes. Risk management techniques based on bio-data, “inadmissibility 
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patterns,” and integration potential ignore the political subjectivities and narratives of refugees. 
The UNHCR’s articulation of narratives of displacement based on groupings of refugees 
overlooks the unique personal experiences of individuals. There is an emphasis in these 
narratives on collective experiences of violence, intimidation, trauma, and the “need” for 
resettlement. However, as I have shown, there are some discussions of political resistance in 
“group” profiles. Through practices of simplification, abstraction, and ordering, these profiles 
construct specific narratives of displacement, vulnerability, commonality, riskiness, and “need.” 
In this way, they play a role in reifying bounded and internally homogenous refugee “groups” 
and reinserting them within the “citizen/nation/state ensemble.”670 With group resettlement, the 
task of critical theory is to challenge how these profiles and narratives are constructed in the 
interests of resettlement states.  
This leads to an important question: how do we encourage and foster progressive 
alternatives to the current dynamics of group resettlement schemes without reproducing 
“groupism” and nationalist, ethnic, bureaucratic, or racial labels? In this final section, I begin to 
answer this question by exploring collective forms of resettlement that challenge the statist logics 
of vision, ordering, boundary-making, and grouping at work in group resettlement schemes.  
To begin with, a denial of refugee agency is intensified under group resettlement 
schemes. While individuals may actively seek inclusion in groupings of refugees, the decision as 
to which groupings are chosen is far removed from them in forums such as the Working Group 
on Resettlement in Geneva or PRS working group in Ottawa. The UNHCR’s drive to proactively 
map global vulnerability, “need,” and risk leads to the labelling of refugee agency as instances of 
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fraud. In those rare cases where refugees come together to lobby states for resettlement,
671
 it is 
on terms dictated by Western states. Alternatives to the current makeup of group resettlement 
schemes, therefore, must contend with the categorizing, labelling, coding, and grouping 
processes of both humanitarian organizations and states. How might refugees challenge these 
processes?  
An approach to consider is what Robert Latham has called “mediated passage.” Mediated 
passage holds the promise of shifting agency back towards refugees in their encounters with state 
officials under resettlement schemes. The homogenizing and grouping logic of these schemes 
reproduce border practices. Cultivating agency under these schemes must address this fact. 
Latham suggests: 
on its own the agency of migrants involved in negotiating their presence around the 
border will typically be outflanked by states that are able to interpose themselves between 
migrants and social institutions or establish unmediated relations with migrants in the 
context of border security. The relationship between migrants, the security state, and the 
social institutions that populate a society, therefore, requires a politics of mediation.
672
 
 
For Latham, this can be realized through civil society organizations (CSOs) that act as 
mediators.
673
 These organizations would “verify and vouch for the legal identity of the migrant 
and negotiate with the state as to what the minimum criteria are for admission…the state must 
remain blind to the process; all there is to know is that the migrant is vouched for by a trusted 
CSO.”674  
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Critically, for Latham, CSOs must remain autonomous from the state.
675
 Under the 
current framework of group resettlement schemes, the UNHCR and organizations such as the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) act as mediators between state officials and 
refugees. These organizations, however, act in the interests of states. A key problematic in 
cultivating a politics of mediation under group resettlement is how to ensure that NGOs represent 
the voices of refugees in their encounters with states. Is it possible to envision truly autonomous 
NGOs that operate in this manner? While a complete answer to this question is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, it is worth considering William Walters’s insights on what he calls “the 
humanitarian border.” Rather than view humanitarianism as something permanently implicated 
in the biopolitical calculations of states, he suggests that it is more productive to approach it “as a 
field which exists in a permanent state of co-option, infiltration but also provocation with the 
state (but also with other supranational and international entities as well).”676 This suggests that it 
is possible for humanitarian actors to play a progressive role in mediated passage.   
An important question to consider in conceptualizing a politics of mediation under group 
resettlement is whether or not it is necessary or preferable, to treat refugees as a “groups”? After 
all, does this not simply reproduce “groupism” as well as the statist logics of borders and 
territorialized identities? A related question arises from this: is it possible to act collectively 
without reproducing what is conventionally taken to be a “group”? More specifically: how might 
we act collectively without requiring or emphasizing internal sameness, exclusionary boundaries, 
and extreme cohesiveness?  
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Here, it is worth recalling that Brubaker questions the assumption by social scientists that 
“groups” understood as bounded, discrete, and homogenous are in fact a permanent feature of 
social life.
677
 He argues, “categorical group denominations—however authoritative, however 
pervasively institutionalized—cannot serve as indicators of real ‘groups’ or robust 
‘identities.’”678 A key concern of Brubaker is to demonstrate that it is not necessary to study 
conflicts by positing the existence of ethnic, national, or racial “groups.” The same can be said 
when analyzing the resettlement of large numbers of refugees.  
 In cultivating a politics of mediation under group resettlement the question of boundaries 
will inevitably be raised. How might refugees approach this issue? One way to answer this 
question is to consider the different ways that boundaries can function. For instance, Latham 
points to how boundaries can work to protect public spheres from colonization by corporate 
influences.
679
 This suggests that it is possible to think of boundaries as more than mechanisms 
that exclude refugees. Boundaries might play a constitutive role in mediated passage by helping 
to maintain the autonomy of NGOs. This in turn would provide a space for refugees to come 
together and articulate their desire for resettlement on their terms.  
 A politics of mediation would challenge the labelling and grouping practices of states and 
the UNHCR. Important in this regard, is Carolina Moulin’s and Peter Nyers’s examination of a 
three month sit in and protest in 2005 by Sudanese refugees outside the UNHCR office in Cairo, 
Egypt. Moulin and Nyers draw attention to how these refugees interrupted the UNHCR’s 
presumed “monopoly over the language of protection, care, and resettlement.” They highlight 
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what they call “acts of naming” by the refugees, which challenged the UNHCR’s framing of the 
protests in the media:   
These acts of naming were unavoidably political in that they were in disagreement with 
the UNHCR’s own accounting of the refugee population. Through their performance, 
these acts assert a claim on who has the status of a speaking being. In itself, to name is to 
make a political statement over the right of defining one’s own identity or community.680  
 
For Moulin and Nyers, the Sudanese refugees acted politically by articulating their own 
understanding of identity and community and in the process contesting what they call “the 
governmentality of protection, care, and mobility.” As such, the Sudanese refugee’s demands 
“can be read as a re-taking of the governmentality of care, inserting refugee voices into the 
bureaucratic processes of categorization, population-making, and care that governs their life.”681 
Importantly, Moulin and Nyers situate this retaking within what they refer to as a “productive 
politics of interruption.” For this reason, it is more than a simple re-performance of sovereign 
logics. Under group resettlement, or what is perhaps better understood as collective forms of 
resettlement, it is possible for refugees to act collectively to disrupt both the UNHCR’s and 
state’s presumed hold on the language of distinctiveness, commonalities, and boundaries. 
Refugees might re-appropriate this language on their terms, or they might reject it.  
The work of Jay M. Marlowe on the Sudanese “lost boys” is also useful in considering 
conceptions of collectivity outside the normative expectations of the UNHCR. Drawing on the 
work of Bourdieu, Marlowe highlights the distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary in 
shaping the identities of refugees. Western discourses privilege the extra-ordinary associated 
with trauma as was the case with the “lost boys.” Missing within this is what are considered 
ordinary stories; how the “lost boys” responded, coped or dealt with their situation. Marlowe 
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seeks to elevate the ordinary by placing “greater emphasis upon understanding a person’s life 
beyond the ascribed status of being a refugee and the associated traumatic experiences of forced 
migration.”682  Critically, he points to the possibility of opening up a discussion on the hopes and 
aspirations of refugees. This is important since it moves beyond coping strategies in dealing with 
the traumatic experience of forced migration. Under mediated passage, it is possible for refugees 
to come together and articulate their different wants and desires for moving to another place. 
A progressive politics of mediation under collective forms of resettlement might 
challenge how state’s make visible certain practices, while concealing others. Specifically, 
refugees might collectively choose to withhold information from the state in the resettlement 
decision-making process. In this way, they challenge statist practices of visibility. Lippert and 
Rehaag point to strategies of both invisibility and visibility in contemporary sanctuary practices. 
They note:  
Reflected in the earliest scholarly accounts of contemporary sanctuary practices, the 
division between visibility and non-visibility is seen in the analytical distinction between 
sanctuary as ‘exposure’ and sanctuary as ‘concealment.’ The former – exposure—is a 
strategy to provide protection to immigrants in a church or religious building and to gain 
the attention of mass media, the public and state authorities. The latter –concealment—is 
the antithesis of this effort whereby sanctuary provision is purposely concealed from state 
authorities.
683
 
  
Similar strategies could be used under collective forms of resettlement. Refugees might choose 
to strategically make visible processes that normally generate unease in officials, including 
heterogeneity, contingency, and disagreements within a collectivity.  While in other cases, they 
may choose to withhold this sort of information. 
                                                     
682
 Jay M. Marlowe, “Beyond the Discourse of Trauma: Shifting the Focus on Sudanese Refugees,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 23. 2 (2010): 184. 
683
 Randy K. Lippert and Sean Rehaag, “Introduction: sanctuary across countries, institutions, and disciplines” ed. 
Randy K. Lippert and Sean Rehaag, Sanctuary Practices in International Perspectives, Migration, citizenship and 
social movements (Routledge: New York, 2013), 3). 
229 
 
 
Conclusion:  
This dissertation has critically interrogated how states along with the UNHCR and 
humanitarian organizations play a role in crafting refugee “groups” selected for resettlement. It 
has considered how the grouping of refugees for resettlement is informed by statist and 
bureaucratic categories. It is my hope that the reader comes away from the dissertation with not 
only a better understanding of how group resettlement decisions are made, but also a critical 
appreciation of the implications of labelling, categorizing, ordering, and grouping practices in 
these decisions.  
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Appendix A:  
Table One: Group Resettlement   
Year UNHCR potential 
group submissions and 
priority situations.  
Groups resettled by 
Canada under Group 
Processing.   
Groups identified in 
the Annual Proposed 
Refugee Admissions 
report to Congress. 
Recommendations by 
Refugee Council USA 
(RCUSA) for P2 group 
designations.   
Resettled Refugee 
Groups under the US 
P2 Designation. 684 
1999  Bosnians.
685   
 
 Bosnians; Togolese in 
Benin   
2000    Sudanese “Lost Boys”.  
2001    Sudanese “Caretaker” 
Group686 
2003  900 Sudanese and 
Somali from 
Dadaab.687  
 
 
 Somali “Bantus” from 
the Kakuma camp in 
Kenya; “vulnerable” 
Liberian refugees from 
the Ivory Coast.   
2004  450 Somali Madhiban 
in Kakuma, Kenya; 
 
14 groups 
recommended for P-2 
group designation.688 
 
Under active 
consideration for group 
designation:  
Meskhetian Turks in 
Russia; Bhutanese in 
Nepal; Vietnamese in 
the Philippines; certain 
Liberians in West 
Africa.   
 
Somali “Bantus” in 
Kenya  
 
 
2005 Burundi; Congolese; 
Eritrea in Sudan; 
810 Karen in Mae La 
Oon, Thailand.689  
Meskhetian Turks in 
Russia; Hmong Lao at 
Somali Benadir in 
Kenya, Dadaab  
                                                     
684
 Information for the far right column entitled “Resettled Refugee Groups under the US P2 Designation” was 
mostly provided by a UNHCR Resettlement Officer involved with P2 Group Referrals. Included in this list are both 
the Somali Barwin and a mixed group of Afghans in Uzbekistan, however, there were no dates provided as to when 
they were resettled to the US.  
685
 A CCR representative recalls that while the resettlement of Bosnians was not officially a group processing 
exercise it shared many characteristics with it. It was seen as a sort of pilot project for its eventual creation. CCR, 
Personal interview with author, 2
nd
 August 2012. Similarly, while the resettlement of Bosnians was not a regular P-2 
designation it shared similarities with the eventual creation of the UNHCR group methodology. UNHCR, Personal 
Interview with author, 28
th
 August, 2012. 
686
 This group is associated with the Sudanese “lost boys”.  
687
 “Canada and Australia in cooperation decided to jointly resettle the two smallest minority groups being 
persecuted in the Dadaab refugee camps.” Labman, At Law’s Border, 232.  
688
 Names of some groupings of refugees not available.   
689
 Labman suggests that the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Norway, and Ireland all used the group methodology to resettle the Karen out of Thailand. Labman, At 
Law’s Border. However, to my knowledge only Canada, the US, and Australia have used the group method.    
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Somalis; Sudanese in 
Ethiopia; Bhutanese; 
Burmese.  
 
 
 
Wat Tham Krabok in 
Thailand690  
 
Minority clan Somalis 
in Uganda  
 
Under active 
consideration for group 
designation:  
Bhutanese in Nepal; 
Eritrean Kunama in 
Ethiopia691; Iranian 
Kurds, especially in 
Turkey; Afghans in the 
former Soviet Union; 
refugee populations in 
Libya.  
 
 
“1972” Burundians in 
Tanzania  
 
Group of 2,500 
Liberian female-
headed households 
who have experienced 
“double flight” to Ivory 
Coast and Guinea692;  
 
group of 1,500 
Liberians in single-
parent households in 
Ghana 
 
Ethiopians in Yemen 
“the ex-navy cases”. 
This includes: former 
Navy personal and 
their families.  
  
Burmese in camps 
along the Thai border. 
2006 Burundi; 
Eritreans in Sudan; 
Somalis;  Congolese; 
Bhutanese; Burmese.693 
  
1800 Karen in Mae La 
Oon and Mae Ra Ma 
Luang, Thailand 
Meskhetian Turks in 
Krasnodar Krai, 
Russia; 
 
Bhutanese in Nepal; 
Burmese in Thailand  
Burundians in 
Tanzania (UNHCR 
group referral 
continued); 
2007 500 Somalis; 
9900 Bhutanese; 
12, 000 Burmese; 
1000 Afghans in 
Russia; 1104 Iranians 
in Turkey; Iraqis in 
various countries.694  
 
  
1, 000 Karen in Mae 
La Oon and Mae Ra 
Ma Luang, Thailand. 
695 
 
Burmese in Tham Hin 
as well as other camps 
in Thailand; Burundi in 
Tanzania; Tibetans in 
Nepal; Congolese 
Banyamulenge in 
Burundi; Bhutanese in 
Nepal. 
Eritreans in Ethiopia 
“the Kunama”.  
Congolese in Burundi   
“the Gatumba 
survivors”. 
 
 
2008 20, 000 Bhutanese;  
6300 Burmese 
in Malaysia; 
22, 000 Burmese/ 
Bhutanese in Thailand; 
350 mixed nationalities 
1, 300 Karen refugees 
(2008-09). 697 
 
Burundians in 
Tanzania; Bhutanese in 
Nepal; Congolese 
Banyamulenge; 
Congolese refugees in 
Zambia; Mauritanian 
Burmese from 
Malaysia “Chin 
ethnicity”; 
 
Ethnic minorities and 
others from Burma in 
                                                     
690
 These are Burmese refugees that were expeditiously processed for resettlement (not group method) according to a 
Congress report. However, a UNHCR representative explained that the U.S approached them about resettling this 
population using the group method.  
691
 US government urged UNHCR to submit a group profile for the Eritrean Kunama in Ethiopia.  
692
 UNHCR group referral based on women-at-risk.  
693
 UNHCR document “Measuring Protection by Numbers” (November 2006) explains that between 2004 and 2006 
43,000 refugees (13 refugee groups) have been submitted for resettlement consideration from countries of first 
refuge in Africa, the Middle East and Central and Eastern Asia.    
694
 UNHCR decides to promote the use of group processing for Iraqi refugees with both Australia and Canada. 
Canada did not proceed with group processing with this grouping of refugees.     
695
 Refugee Council of Australia 2007 report suggests that the Australian government should consider accepting 
group resettlement recommendations from the UNHCR for Iraqi refugees in order to fill its Mid-East quota. The 
CCR advocated for the resettlement of 3,000 stateless Palestinians from Iraq living in "no-man's land" in the Al Hol, 
Al Tanf and Al Waleed camps (unsure if the organization suggested group processing). 
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in Syria; Burundians in 
Tanzania, Afghans in 
Pakistan and Iran, 
Eritrean in Sudan, 
Burmese (Rohingya) 
refugees in 
Bangladesh; 
Bosnian and Croatian 
refugees in Serbia.696 
refugees in Senegal;  
Colombian refugees in 
Panama; Haitian 
refugees in Dominican 
Republic; Burmese 
Chin refugees in India; 
Burmese Rohingya 
Muslim refugees in 
Malaysia; Burmese 
Rohingya in Bangla-
desh; Karen and 
Karenni refugees; 
1,500 Hemshins; 1,500 
Batumi Kurds; 5, 500 
Yezids and 10-15,000 
Abkhaz Georgians in 
Krasnodar Krai in the 
Russian Federation; 
Afghans in Pakistan; 
Iraqis in Jordan; 
Sabaean Mandaeans in 
Jordan and Syria; 
Sudanese Darfurians in 
Iraq. 
Thailand.  
 
 
  
2009 25, 000 Bhutanese;  
7, 000 Burmese in 
Malaysia; Eritreans in 
Sudan.698 
55, 000 Somalis from 
Somalia and Ethiopia 
in Kenya; 
80, 000 Afghan 
refugees in Iran; 
Approx. 9, 000 Iraqis, 
Iranians and Afghans 
in Turkey ; 
600 Afghan refugees in 
Uzbekistan; 
1,000 
refugees/refugees in 
Libya; 
20, 800 Iraqi refugees 
in Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon, including 
600 
 Iraqi Palestinians from 
Syria699  
5, 000 Bhutanese 
(2009-12)  
Sudanese; Darfurians 
in Iraq; Eritreans in 
Shimelba; 
 
 
Ethnic minorities and 
others from Burma in 
camps in Thailand;700 
 
Ethnic minorities and 
others from Burma in 
Malaysia (Burmese 
Chin);701 
 
Burundians in 
Tanzania  
 
Bhutanese in Nepal.702 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
697
 The 2008 Refugee Council of Australia (RCOA) report explains that Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) is 
concerned about the inadequacy of third-country resettlement of camp-based Rohingyas in Bangladesh.  
696
 Priority situations are based on UNHCR Antonio Guterres’s initiative on resolving protracted refugee situations 
(PRS).  
698
 2010 Projected Global Resettlement Needs – Sudan Section explains: “Eritrean protracted refugees will be 
presented using the group methodology, pending the availability of complete registration data. Group resettlement is 
expected to be launched in 2011”.    
699
 According to the Refugee Council of Australia, 2011. 
700
 UNHCR group referral continued from previous year.  
701
 UNHCR Group referral continued from previous year.  
702
 It should be noted that a group proposal based on Somalis out of Dadaab was submitted to the United States in 
late 2009 and was rejected. 
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2010 Priority Refugee 
Situations identified by 
the UNHCR703:  
Africa (Kenya), Asia 
and the Pacific (Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 
Uzbekistan and Pacific 
Island States), Europe 
(Turkey), and Middle 
East and North Africa 
(Libya, Syria/ 
Jordan/Lebanon). 
Bhutanese 
continued.704  
Iraqis; Columbians; 
Eritreans in Eastern 
Sudan; Somalis; 
Darfuri in Chad and 
Cairo; Rohingyas; 
Eritreans in Shimelba;  
 
 
Ethnic Minorities and 
others from Burma in 
camps in Thailand;  
 
Ethnic Minorities and 
others (ethnic Chin - 
Christians) from 
Burma in Malaysia;  
 
Bhutanese in Nepal;705 
 
2011 Somalis in Kenya; 
Sudanese in Chad; 
Eritreans in Sudan; 
Colombian refugees in 
Ecuador; urban 
situations in Malaysia 
and camp populations 
in Nepal (Bhutan) and 
Thailand (Burmese); 
Iraqis in Syria, Jordan 
and Lebanon; Afghans 
in Iran and Pakistan. 
Bhutanese 
continued.706  
Eritreans in Shimelba;  
Darfuri in Chad  
 
Burmese Karen and 
Karenni in Thailand; 
 
Burmese Chin 
(Christians) in 
Malaysia; Bhutanese in 
Nepal.  
2012 Iraqis in Jordan, Syria 
and Lebanon;  
Iraqis and Iranians in 
Turkey;  
Afghans in Pakistan;  
Afghans in Iran  
Somalis in Dadaab 
Camp, Kenya;  
Colombians in South 
America;  
Eritreans in East 
Sudan;  
North Africans 
displaced from 
Libya.707  
  Burmese from 
Malaysia “open to all 
Burmese”.708 
 
Burmese in Thailand; 
Bhutanese in Nepal. 709 
 
 
2013  1, 000 Bhutanese out 
of Nepal. 710 
 
 
 
                                                     
703
 Priority Situations identified for the implementation of the UNHCR’s strategic use of resettlement approach.  
704
 Pride Uganda Alliance International calls for group resettlement of LGBT in Uganda (Nov 5, 2010 Xtra online). 
The same organization spoke in the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Development.  
705
 The UNHCR referred a small group of Rohingyas women-at-risk that was approved and the US government 
expects more referrals (unsure whether or not this is a group referral under the P2 designation).  
706
 Canadian Burmese Rohingyas Organization calls for Canada to increase the resettlement of Rohingyas out of 
Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia.   
707
 Not able to obtain a full listing of group referrals and submissions from 2008-present. UNHCR headquarters 
would not provide this information. 
708
 It’s important to note that the UNHCR usually does not refer Rohingyas in Malaysia. 
709
 UNHCR 2012 projected global resettlement needs explains: “As a result of the expansion and redefinition of the  
US designated P-2 group of [Burmese] refugees in Malaysia to include all ethnic minority groups from [Burmese] 
instead of only [Burmese] Chin refugees, as had previously been the case, all refugees from [Burma] who had 
registered with UNHCR Malaysia by 17 August 2010 are eligible for group processing under the US Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP).”US government at this time was also working on a P2 designation for Eritreans in 
Shimelba camp in Ethiopia.  
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2014  1, 000 Bhutanese out 
of Nepal (continued) 
  
 
Table Two: Group Processing – Canada 
Year  Groups resettled by Canada under Group Processing.   
1999 Bosnians.
711   
 
2003 900 Sudanese and Somali from Dadaab.
712  
 
 
2004 450 Somali Madhiban in Kakuma, Kenya; 
 
2005 810 Karen in Mae La Oon, Thailand.
713  
 
 
2006 1800 Karen in Mae La Oon and Mae Ra Ma Luang, Thailand 
2007 1, 000 Karen in Mae La Oon and Mae Ra Ma Luang, Thailand. 
714 
 
2009-12 5, 000 Bhutanese.  
2010 Bhutanese continued.
715  
2011 Bhutanese continued.
716  
2013 1, 000 Bhutanese out of Nepal. 
717 
2014 1, 000 Bhutanese out of Nepal (continued) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
710
 This is a recommended proposed refugee population under the new reforms. It is unclear whether or not group 
processing will be used. 
711
 A CCR representative recalls that while the resettlement of Bosnians was not officially a group processing 
exercise it shared many characteristics with it. It was seen as a sort of pilot project for its eventual creation. CCR, 
Personal interview with author, 2
nd
 August 2012. Similarly, while the resettlement of Bosnians was not a regular P-2 
designation it shared similarities with the eventual creation of the UNHCR group methodology. UNHCR, Personal 
Interview with author, 28
th
 August, 2012. 
712
 “Canada and Australia in cooperation decided to jointly resettle the two smallest minority groups being 
persecuted in the Dadaab refugee camps.” Labman, At Law’s Border, 232.  
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 As noted above, Labman suggests that the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Finland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Norway, and Ireland all used the group methodology to resettle the Karen out of Thailand. 
Labman, At Law’s Border. However, to my knowledge only Canada, the US, and Australia have used the group 
method.    
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 Refugee Council of Australia 2007 report suggests that the Australian government should consider accepting 
group resettlement recommendations from the UNHCR for Iraqi refugees in order to fill its Mid-East quota. The 
CCR advocated for the resettlement of 3,000 stateless Palestinians from Iraq living in "no-man's land" in the Al Hol, 
Al Tanf and Al Waleed camps (unsure if the organization suggested group processing). 
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 Pride Uganda Alliance International calls for group resettlement of LGBT in Uganda (Nov 5, 2010 Xtra online). 
The same organization spoke in the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Development.  
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 Canadian Burmese Rohingyas Organization calls for Canada to increase the resettlement of Rohingyas out of 
Bangladesh, Thailand, and Malaysia.   
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 This is a recommended proposed refugee population under the new reforms. 
